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Abstract
This thesis studies two strategies that households may use to keep their consumption smooth in the
face of fluctuations in income and expenses: credit (borrowing and savings) and insurance (state-
contingent transfers between households). The first chapter asks why insurance among households
in rural Thai villages is incomplete. The second chapter analyzes the impacts of micro-credit. The
third chapter examines the interaction between interpersonal insurance and access to savings.
The first chapter is motivated by the observation that interpersonal insurance within villages
is an important source of insurance, yet consumption, while much smoother than income, is not
completely smooth. That is, insurance is incomplete. This chapter attempts to identify the cause of
this incompleteness. Existing research has suggested three possibilities: limited commitment-the
inability of households to commit to remain within an insurance agreement; moral hazard-the need
to give households incentives to work hard; and hidden income-the inability of households to verify
one another's incomes. I show that the way in which "history" matters can be used to distinguish
insurance constrained by hidden income from insurance constrained by limited commitment or
moral hazard. This history dependence can be tested with a simple empirical procedure: predicting
current marginal utility of consumption with the first lag of marginal utility and the first lag of
income, and testing the significance of the lagged income term. This test is implemented using panel
data from households in rural Thailand. The results are consistent with insurance constrained by
hidden income, rather than limited commitment or moral hazard. I test the robustness of this result
to measurement error using instrumental variables and by testing over-identifying restrictions on the
reduced form equation for consumption. I test robustness to the specification of the utility function
by nonparametrically estimating marginal utility. The results suggest that constraints arising from
private information about household income should be taken into account when designing safety
net and other policies.
My second chapter (co-authored with Abhijit Banerjee, Esther Duflo and Rachel Glennerster)
uses a randomized trial to analyze the impacts of microcredit in urban South India. We find that
more new businesses are created in areas where a microcredit branch opens. Existing business
owners increase their spending on durable goods but not non-durable consumption. Among house-
holds that did not have a business before the program began, those with high estimated propensity
to start a business reduce non-durable consumption and increase spending on durables in treated
areas. Those with low estimated propensity to start a business increase non-durable consumption
and spend no more on durables. This suggests that some households use microcredit to pay part of
the fixed cost of starting a business, some expand an existing business, and others pay off more ex-
pensive debt or borrow against future income. We find no effects on health, education, or women's
empowerment.
My third dissertation chapter (co-authored with Arun Chandrasekhar and Horacio Larreguy)
is motivated by the observation that the ability of community members to insure one another may
be significantly reduced when community members also have the ability to privately save some of
their income. We conducted a laboratory experiment in rural South India to examine the impact
of savings access on informal insurance. We find that transfers between players are reduced when
savings is available, but that, on average, players smooth their consumption more with savings
than without. We use social network data to compute social distance between pairs, and show
that limited commitment constraints significantly limit insurance when risk-sharing partners are
socially distant, but not when pairs are closely connected. For distant pairs, access to savings helps
to smooth income risk that is not insured interpersonally.
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Chapter 1
Distinguishing barriers to insurance in
Thai villages
1.1 Introduction
Risk to households' incomes is widespread in developing countries-crops and businesses fail, jobs
are lost, livestock die, prices fluctuate, family members become ill, etc. If perfect insurance were
available, such income risk would not translate into fluctuations in household per capita con-
sumption. In fact, poor households in many developing countries are insured against short-term,
idiosyncratic income shocks to a surprising degree, despite absent or imperfect markets for formal
insurance, credit, and assets (Rosenzweig (1988), Townsend (1994), Townsend (1995), Udry (1994),
Morduch (1995), Suri (2005)). However, households are generally not completely insured-income
and consumption are typically found to be positively correlated, and serious income shocks like se-
vere illness translate into reduced household consumption (Gertler and Gruber 2002). Households
neither seem to live "hand to mouth," with shocks to income translating one-for-one to fluctuations
in consumption, nor to be fully insured, with consumption completely buffered against shocks to
income.
Furthermore, households do not smooth consumption only with a borrowing-savings technology.
There is direct evidence that households make state-contingent transfers to others in their village
(Scott (1976), Cashdan (1985), Platteau and Abraham (1987), Platteau (1991), Udry (1994), Collins
et al. (2009)). Transfers which depend on current states-loans forgiven when the borrower's crops
fail, money given when a neighbor is ill, etc.-are the hallmark of insurance, since in a pure credit
system transfers would depend only on past states (the amount borrowed, etc.). The incidence
of state-contingent transfers demonstrates that households obtain insurance from others in their
village. A natural question is then, why is this insurance not complete? Among the reasons proposed
for the failure of full insurance are: moral hazard-one household's actions are not observable
to others; imperfect information about income realizations-households' income realizations are
unobservable by others; and limited commitment-households with high incomes, who would be
required by full insurance to make transfers to others, may leave the insurance arrangement instead.
Knowing what barrier to full informal risk-sharing is most important in a given community
is important for evaluation of policies that may affect the sustainability of informal insurance.
Policies that interact with existing informal risk-sharing mechanisms may have very different im-
pacts depending on the nature of incomplete informal insurance. For instance, a work-guarantee
program such as India's National Rural Employment Guarantee Act could crowd out insurance
constrained by moral hazard (by reducing the penalty for exerting low effort) or limited commit-
ment (by making exclusion from the informal insurance network less painful), but could "crowd
in" insurance constrained by imperfect information about households' incomes (which I will refer
to as "hidden income"), by ruling out the possibility that a household received a very low income,
since households have recourse to the work-guarantee program.
If binding, the participation constraints of the limited commitment model, the truth-telling
constraints of the hidden income model and the incentive-compatibility constraints of the moral
hazard model all preclude the village from achieving full insurance. All three models predict a
positive correlation between income and consumption changes1 , as well as predicting that one
household's income realizations will affect the consumption of other households in the village.
Therefore, finding such a positive correlation is not sufficient to distinguish between these models.
Most of the existing literature on barriers to informal insurance, which I briefly review below, tests
one model of incomplete insurance against one or both of the benchmark cases-full insurance and
borrowing-saving only. Such tests, while they can reject full insurance, are not able to reject models
of incomplete insurance other than the particular insurance friction they consider. It is possible
that tests of a particular insurance friction versus borrowing-saving or full insurance will conclude
in favor of that incomplete insurance model if the true data-generating process is in fact another
'The relationship between income and consumption need not be everywhere positive under a moral hazard model,
even if the likelihood ratio is monotone (Milgrom 1981), (Grossman and Hart 1983). However, incentive compatibility
requires that consumption be increasing in output on average. Moreover, if agents can costlessly "burn output,"
monotonicity may be required (Bolton and Dewatripont 2005).
insurance friction. The contribution of this paper is to develop and empirically implement a set
of testable predictions which distinguishes between the hidden income-, limited commitment- and
moral hazard-constrained insurance.
I show that, when insurance is constrained by limited commitment or moral hazard, a house-
hold's "history" matters in a specific way in predicting that household's current consumption:
conditional on the village's shadow price of resources (a measure of the aggregate shock faced by
the village), a household's lagged inverse marginal utility ("LIMU") is a sufficient statistic for fore-
casting the household's current inverse marginal utility. This implies that no other past information
should improve the forecast of current inverse marginal utility made using LIMU. Allowing the dis-
tribution of household income to depend on actions taken by the household in the past (investment,
for instance) does not overturn this sufficiency result.
On the other hand, when household income is unobserved, a household's LIMU is no longer
a sufficient statistic in forecasting consumption. Because low-income households are optimally as-
signed low consumption, hence high marginal utility, their temptation to claim even lower income
(resulting in a higher transfer), is highest for these households. Because truthful households value
current consumption more than misreporting households, while truthful and misreporting house-
holds value promised future consumption equally, incentive compatibility is attained by reducing the
expected future surplus promised to low-income households relative to their current consumption.
That is, the timing of households' consumption is distorted in the hidden income model, meaning
that community's expected cost of providing each household's marginal unit of consumption is not
equated across periods. In a world without private information, this distortion would be inefficient:
a given level of expected utility can be provided most efficiently if the cost of the marginal unit
is equated in expectation across periods. However, in the hidden income model, this distortion in
the timing of consumption serves a screening purpose: households truthfully reporting low income
value an extra unit of consumption in that period more than households falsely reporting low in-
come, whereas truthful and untruthful households put equal value on expected utility promised in
the future.
The tests of limited commitment and moral hazard I derive generalize existing results from
the contract economics literature (Kocherlakota 1996), (Rogerson 1985), while the hidden income
test is a new result. The second contribution of this paper is to empirically implement these tests,
examining the relationship between LIMU and current consumption in rural Thailand using 84
months (7 years, 1999-2005) of the Townsend Thai Monthly Survey. Sufficiency of LIMU is rejected:
lagged income has predictive power in forecasting current inverse marginal utility. Moreover, the
prediction errors generated with LIMU alone display a significant, positive correlation with lagged
income, as predicted by the hidden income model. This suggests that the ability of household
to hide their income plays a role in generating the observed comovement between income and
consumption.
An important consideration in implementing these tests is the concern that consumption is
measured with error. Measurement error in right-hand variables is usually seen as a threat to
power, causing under-rejection of the null hypothesis (in this case, sufficiency of LIMU), but the
tests used here, measurement error can distort the size of the test, causing over-rejection of the null.
Accounting for measurement error in lagged consumption using instrumental variables techniques
and by testing over-identifying restrictions on the reduced form equations for current and lagged
consumption does not overturn the rejection of sufficiency of LIMU. This suggests that measurement
error is not driving the conclusion that neither limited commitment nor moral hazard can explain
the relationship between current consumption, past consumption and past income.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 provides a brief overview of related
literature. Section 3 outlines the benchmarks of full insurance and pure borrowing-saving, dis-
cusses the three barriers to insurance (moral hazard, limited commitment and hidden income),
and explains the theoretical approach for distinguishing among these barriers. Section 4 explains
how these theoretical predictions can be empirically tested, accounting for measurement error in
consumption and uncertainty about the form of households' utility functions. Section 5 discusses
the data used to implement these tests, Section 6 presents the results and Section 7 concludes.
Proofs are contained in Appendix A. Tables appear in Appendix B, and figures are in Appendix C.
1.2 Related literature
Several papers have examined whether limited commitment- or moral hazard-constrained insurance
explain consumption and income data better than pure borrowing-saving or full insurance models.
The contribution of this paper, relative to the existing literature is, first, to propose and implement a
test of the hidden income model, which to my knowledge, has not previously been empirically tested.
Another novel contribution of this testing procedure is that it can distinguish the hidden income
model not only from full insurance and borrowing-lending, but also from limited commitment-
and moral hazard-constrained insurance. The third contribution of this paper relative to existing
literature is that, unlike maximum likelihood and GMM approaches, the tests proposed here do
not rely on a particular specification of the production technology or the utility function.
Ligon (1998) uses a generalized method of moments (GMM) approach to test moral hazard-
constrained insurance against full insurance and borrowing-saving (i.e., the permanent income
hypothesis) in India using ICRISAT village data, and finds that moral hazard best explains con-
sumption data in 2 of 3 villages; in the third some households' consumptions are better explained
by the PIH. Ligon, Thomas and Worrall (2002) use a maximum likelihood approach to test full
insurance against limited commitment, also in the ICRISAT villages. They find that limited com-
mitment explains consumption dynamics, but not why high-income households consume as little
as they do relative to low-income households. Lim and Townsend (1998) incorporate capital assets
and livestock into a moral hazard-constrained insurance model, and find that it fits the ICRISAT
consumption data better than the PIH or full insurance using a maximum likelihood approach.
Cox et al. (1998) argue that qualitative features of lending in Peruvian villages are inconsistent
with full insurance or the PIH, but consistent with limited commitment. Albarran and Attanasio
(2003) show that the comparative statics of a limited commitment model are matched by data
from Mexico following the introduction of Progresa. Dubois et al. (2008) develop a model with
limited commitment and incomplete formal contracts and find, using a maximum likelihood ap-
proach, that its predictions are matched in Pakistani data. Kocherlakota and Pistaferri (2009)
review the literature which uses the asset-pricing implications of incomplete markets (borrowing-
lending only) and private information (moral hazard/adverse selection) economies; they find that
the asset-pricing implications of the moral hazard/adverse selection model fit US, UK and Italian
data with a "reasonable" coefficient of relative risk aversion (estimated using a GMM approach),
while the implications of the borrowing-lending model are rejected. Hayashi et al. (1996) review
the literature on full consumption smoothing in the US and find that neither endogeneity of la-
bor nor nonseparability between labor and consumption explains the rejection of full smoothing
of food consumption in the PSID. Blundell et al. (2008) document that persistent income shocks
are partially insured in the US, and even transitory shocks are not fully insured for low-wealth
households.
Several papers have examined whether private information about households' productivity (a
Mirrlees-style adverse selection model) can explain incomplete insurance in developed economies.
Kaplan (2006) derives quantitative predictions about the amount of risk sharing that would arise,
for a given wage distribution, under limited commitment versus a setting with observed income
but unobserved productivity. Ai and Yang (2007) find that a model with limited commitment and
private information about productivity (but observed income) better fits quantitative features US
data than a model with limited commitment alone.
The implications of full consumption insurance have been characterized by Wilson (1968),
Cochrane (1991), Mace (1991) and Townsend (1994). The inverse Euler equation implication of
moral hazard-constrained insurance was first characterized by Rogerson (1985), and Phelan (1998)
developed a recursive formulation of the moral hazard problem. The limited commitment model
was first characterized by Kimball (1988) and Coate and Ravallion (1993). The hidden income
model was first characterized by Townsend (1982) and Green (1987). The method used in this
paper, distinguishing hidden income from limited commitment and moral hazard using the first-
order conditions of the social planner's problem, draws on the characterization of efficient limited
commitment-constrained insurance in Kocherlakota (1996) (which is described in section 1.3), and
on the recursive formulation of the hidden income problem developed in Thomas and Worrall
(1990).
The next section presents the benchmark cases of full consumption insurance and pure borrowing-
saving, and then shows how the full insurance benchmark is altered by the presence of limited
commitment, moral hazard and hidden income.
1.3 Models of optimal consumption smoothing: full insurance,
borrowing-saving, moral hazard, limited commitment, hidden
income
1.3.1 Setting
As a simplified approximation to the environment in a village, consider N risk-averse households
who interact over an infinite time horizon in a mutual insurance network. Let i index households
and t index time. Each household evaluates per capita consumption and effort plans according to:
U(ci, ej) = E O #t [v(cit) - z(eit)]
t=o
The specification of U(ci, ej) embodies the assumption of no ex ante heterogeneity among house-
holds:
Assumption 1 All households have a common discount factor 3, and common, additively
separable utility of per capita consumption and disutility of effort functions v(c) and z(e). Utility
is increasing and concave in per capita consumption: v' > 0 and v" < 0.
Following Thomas and Worrall (1990), I also make the following assumption:
Assumption 2 Absolute risk aversion is non-increasing:
d (V, ( t)) /dcit < 0
This assumption guarantees the concavity of the value function in the hidden income model
(Thomas and Worrall 1990); it is satisfied by the commonly-used constant relative risk aversion
and constant absolute risk aversion utility functions. It seems to be a natural assumption since, as
pointed out by Arrow (1971), increasing absolute risk aversion implies that higher-wealth individ-
uals would be more averse to a given absolute gamble than lower-wealth individuals; that is, risky
assets would be inferior goods.
A key assumption is:
Assumption 3 As long as any household is participating in the village insurance network, the
household's borrowing and savings decisions are contractible. (As described below, if a household
leaves the village insurance network they may have access to a borrowing-savings technology with
a weakly lower return.) As a result, savings and borrowing by network member households are
determined as if chosen by a welfare-maximizing planner, not to maximize the household's own
expected payoff. This may appear to be a strong assumption, but given the prevalence of joint
savings groups (ROSCAs) in rural Thailand, and of borrowing from and saving with "village funds,"
where accounts are overseen by a committee of village members, this assumption is not implausible.
Contractibility of borrowing and saving can be implemented as long as other households can observe
a household's asset position, since transfers and future utility can be conditioned on the household
choosing the recommended level of assets. 2
Moreover, when insurance is limited by hidden income, if households can privately save at the
same interest rate available to the community, no interpersonal insurance is possible, because the
household will always find it in their incentive to report whatever income realization yields the
2Collins et al. (2009) document that in samples of Indian, Bangladeshi and South African households, ROSCAs
and other types of group savings arrangements (saving-up clubs and accumulating savings and credit associations,
or ASCAs) are the primary means by which households accumulate sums of savings equal to one month's income or
more. A key feature of these clubs and associations is that members know how much one another have contributed
and borrowed.
highest present discounted value of current and future transfers (Allen 1985), (Cole and Kocher-
lakota 2001). Therefore, to the extent that the predictions of the pure borrowing-saving (PIH)
model are rejected in the data in favor of the hidden income model, the joint hypothesis of hidden
income and hidden savings (at the same interest rate as the community) is also rejected. 3
I assume that the community-controlled borrowing-saving technology has gross return R > 1.
There is an autarkic technology with gross return R' < R. (If no savings is possible in autarky,
R' = 0.) Because the community-controlled borrowing-saving technology is assumed to have a
strictly higher rate of return, the contractibility of savings implies that any net borrowing or saving
by agents in the network (such that (1.21) does not hold with equality) will take place via the
community-controlled technology.
When specifying the value of autarky below, I will make the following assumption:
Assumption 4 Agents cannot take savings accumulated while in the insurance network with
them into autarky. Even in this case, potential access to the autarkic borrowing-saving technology
after leaving the insurance agreement will reduce the amount of insurance attainable in a limited
commitment insurance relationship (Ligon, Thomas, and Worrall 2000). Allowing households to
take their savings with them into autarky will further reduce the amount of feasible insurance,
but does not change the properties of efficient insurance derived below, because the effect of such
savings, which is to raise the value of autarky, will be fully captured in the consumption allocation
to households tempted to leave the insurance network.
Finally, the following assumptions are made on the production technology:
Assumption 5a Output can take on S values, {yi,..., ys}. Indices are chosen so that a higher
index means more output: r > q -> Yr > yq. The number of possible output realizations is
restricted to be finite (although potentially very large). 4 This assumption is required for the
approaches of Grossman and Hart (1983) characterizing the optimal contract under moral hazard,
and the approach of Thomas and Worrall (1990) characterizing the optimal contract under hidden
income, to be valid.
3Doepke and Townsend (2006) show that when income is hidden, if households can privately borrow and save at
a sufficiently different interest rate than the community, some insurance is possible. Although the optimal contract
is then difficult to characterize analytically, Doepke and Townsend show numerically that access to private storage
at a very low gross return does not distort insurance very much, relative to the no-private-savings case, because the
low return dampens the temptation to privately save. This suggests that "saving under the mattress," which likely
carries a negative net return due to inflation and risk of theft, may not pose too great a threat to the characterization
of the optimal contract derived below. Formally introducing the possibility of hidden savings to the model is left to
future work.
4For instance, in the context of Thailand, income could take any one-baht increment from zero to one million
baht.
Assumption 5b Effort can take on two values in each period, working (et = 1) or shirking
(et = 0). This assumption is made for simplicity and allowing for additional levels of effort,
including a continuum of effort levels, would not substantially change the results. Effort costs are
normalized as:
z(1) 1
z(0) 0
Like the assumption of a finite number of income levels, the following assumption is required for
Grossman and Hart's approach to the moral hazard to be valid:
Assumption 5c For every feasible level of promised utility u, there exists a feasible transfer
schedule {r,1(u)} that delivers, in expectation, exactly u + z(1), gross of effort costs, when high
effort is exerted, and a feasible transfer schedule {ro(u)} that delivers exactly u+z(0) in expectation
when low effort is exerted. The first schedule satisfies the "promise-keeping" constraint for an agent
with promised utility u who is assigned high effort (e = 1), and the second satisfies the promise-
keeping constraint for an agent with promised utility u who is assigned low effort (e = 0).
Since the main result for the moral hazard and limited commitment models is that a single lag
of inverse marginal utility is sufficient to capture the extent to which history has influenced what
the household is promised, a natural question is whether this relies on a "memoryless" production
process, with income i.i.d. across time. In fact, allowing the distribution of income to depend on
actions taken by the household in the past does not overturn this result. To make this point, I
make the following assumption:
Assumption 5d The distribution of income at time t is affected by household's effort at time
t and at time t - 1:5
Pr(yt = y,) = Pr(yr let, eti-1)
Define pree - Pr(y, let = e, et_1 = e'), the probability of income realization y, when an effort level
e is exerted in the current period and e' was exerted in the last period. So, prii is the probability
of output level y, if high effort was exerted in the current period and the previous period, etc. The
next assumption (full support of output under high or low effort) rules out schemes that achieve
5Allowing more than one lag of effort to influence the distribution of output would further complicate the notation,
but would not change the results. Golosov et al. (2003) show that an Inverse Euler equation relationship is obtained
in a wide variety of adverse selection economies with very general production functions.
full insurance by punishing the household severely if a level of output occurs that is impossible
when the recommended effort is followed:
Assumption 5e Each of the S income realizations occurs with positive probability under either
high or low effort:
Pree' (0,1), Ve, e', r
Finally, so that there may be a nontrivial moral hazard problem if effort is not observable, I
make the assumption that surplus (expected output less effort costs) is higher when households
exert effort than when they do not:
Assumption 5f Effort raises expected surplus:
S S
E [Prni - PrOi] Yr > E (Prio - Prool Yr > z(1) - z(0)
r=1 r=1
Having set out the environment, I will briefly characterize the benchmark cases full insurance
and pure borrowing-saving before introducing the constraints which may lead to incomplete inter-
personal insurance.
1.3.2 Full insurance
We can find the set of first-best allocations by considering the problem of a hypothetical risk-neutral
planner who maximizes the utility of villager N such that each villager 1 to N - 1 gets at least a
value uit in period t. Let ut {uit}'i be the vector of time t utility promises and e/ e,t_1I
be the vector efforts that were exerted at time t -1. The state variables of the planner's problem are
ut, e', at. The planner chooses effort recommendations eit, transfers rirt, and future promises uir,t+1
for each villager. Transfers, which are equal to the difference between a household's income and its
consumption, Tirt cirt - Yr; and future promises, which summarize the utility the household can
expect from next period onward (Spear and Srivastava 1987); are indexed by r because they may
be income-contingent (though the dependence of promised utility uir,t+1 on the income realization
yr will be degenerate in the case of full insurance while the dependence of the transfer -rirt on the
income realization will be degenerate in the case of pure borrowing-saving). The planner's value
function is:
uN (ut, at, e') max (1,1)
e,{rr± },{ur,t+1 I
S
Z Pree'v(Yr + rNrt) - z(eN) + #E{y}uN(Ut+1, at+1, e)
r=1
subject to the promise-keeping constraints that each household 1 to N - 1 must get their promised
utility uit (in expectation):
S
E Pree'[V(Yr + Tirt) - z(ei) + /Uir,t+I] Uit, Vi < N (1.2)
r=1
and the law of motion for assets:
~N
at+1 = R at - Tirj (1.3)
Let the multiplier on household i's time t promise-keeping constraint be At and the multiplier on
the village's time t budget constraint be r/it.
As is well known, absent problems of commitment or information, every village member's con-
sumption is independent of their own income realization, given aggregate village resources. There-
fore we have
Proposition 1 Under full insurance, (a) realized household income has no effect on household
consumption, given village aggregate consumption, and (b) with no preference heterogeneity and a
common discount factor, households never change place in the village consumption distribution.
Proof. In Appendix A. m
In summary, full insurance predicts a complete decoupling of idiosyncratic income shocks and
consumption changes. Since this implication fails to hold in virtually every dataset where it has
been tested, the next question is how to distinguish among models that do predict a correlation
between income shocks and consumption changes. I will first discuss the other benchmark case
of no interpersonal insurance (borrowing and saving only) and then the moral hazard, limited
commitment and hidden income models.
1.3.3 Borrowing-saving only (PIH)
Hall (1978) showed that, when households discount the future at rate # and can save and borrow
at rate R, but have access to no interpersonal or state-contingent assets, marginal utility follows a
random walk (even if income is correlated over time):
Et_1u'(ct) = #Ru'(ct_1) (1.4)
An implication of the Euler equation (1.4) characterizing the path of consumption under a pure
borrowing-saving model is that, once lagged marginal utility u'(ct_1) is controlled for, no other
information dated t - 1 or before should predict current marginal utility. Borrowing and saving
allows the household to smooth its path of consumption independent of the timing of receipt of
expected income (appropriately discounted). Unanticipated innovations to income are smoothed
optimally over time (but not across households), starting from the time they are realized, so there
is no tendency for consumption to revert to its pre-innovation mean: a household that receives a
negative income shock with have lower expected consumption (higher expected marginal utility)
permanently thereafter.
As discussed below, optimal moral hazard- and limited commitment-constrained insurance lead
to the implication that, conditional on last period's inverse marginal utility, no other lagged infor-
mation should predict current inverse marginal utility. These implications (sufficiency of marginal
utility vs. sufficiency of inverse marginal utility) will not be distinguishable with isoelastic or
nonparametrically estimated utility. With isoelastic utility, in a log specification sufficiency of
the proposed statistic under limited commitment and moral hazard, ln = pIlnci,t1,
cannot be distinguished from sufficiency of the proposed statistic under under borrowing-saving,
ln u'(ci,t_1) = -p ln ci,t1. With nonparametrically estimated utility, both implications reduce to
the requirement that there exists a function f(ci,t_1) conditional on which no other lagged informa-
tion predicts f(cit). However, if sufficiency of (inverse) marginal utility is not rejected, it is possible
to test among borrowing-saving, moral hazard and limited commitment using other implications,
discussed below.
1.3.4 Moral hazard
The moral hazard model has been widely used to explain imperfect insurance in developing and
developed countries. Under a moral hazard model, the agent must be given incentives to do
something-such as exert effort or invest-which cannot be directly observed or contracted on.
The action occurs before output is realized and affects the expected level of output. Introducing
incentive compatibility constraints to the optimal insurance setup implies that Proposition 1 no
longer necessarily holds. With two effort levels, and a utility function separable in consumption
and effort, the incentive-compatibilty constraint will be binding at the optimum (Grossman and
Hart 1983). The constraint is:
S S
E Prii[V (Yr + Tirt) + #uir,t+i] - z(1) = ZProi[V (Yr + Tirt) + 3fr,t+1]
r=1 r=1
i.e. the household must expect the same level of surplus (net of effort costs z(1)) if it exerts effort
in the current period as the household expects if it shirks (and pays no effort cost). 6
The inverse Euler equation implication7 of moral hazard-constrained insurance (Rogerson 1985)
has been used to test the moral hazard model against the PIH, which predicts a standard Euler
equation. The moral hazard model considered by Rogerson assumed that the distribution of time t
output was affected only by the agent's effort at time t. However, Fernandes and Phelan (2000) show
that when the distribution of income depends on past as well as current effort, the moral hazard
problem still has a recursive formulation, with two8 additional "threat-keeping" constraints added
to the planner's problem. These constraints enforce an upper bound on a household's expected
utility from today on if the household disobeyed yesterday's effort recommendation, whether they
obey or disobey today. The constraint requiring that, if the household disobeyed (shirked) yesterday
but obeys (works) today (so that the relevant probabilities are Prio), it does not expect higher utility
than nit, is:
S
TPrio[V(Yr + rirt) - z(1) + Ouirt+i] <; t
r=1
The constraint requiring that, if the household disobeyed yesterday and disobeys today (shirking
in both periods, so that the relevant probabilities are proo), it does not expect higher utility than
6 The constraint is written for a household that exerted effort in the previous period (i.e., the household compares
the probabilities pr with the probabilities prol, both of which reflect having exerted effort in the previous period)
since by Assumption 5f effort raises expected surplus and so households will exert effort along the equilibrium path;
the constraints which ensure this are discussed below.
7 The Inverse Euler equation implies that inverse marginal utility follows a random walk: 1
#REt_1.
8If there are N effort levels instead of 2, there are N(N - 1) threat-keeping constraints, but the solution method
is unchanged.
uit, is:
S
E proo[V(yr + rirt) - z(0) + #6ier,t+i] < fit
r=1
Using Fernandes and Phelan's recursive setup, I show in Appendix A that the inverse Euler equation
also holds under moral hazard even if the distribution of output depends on actions taken in past
periods as well as the current period.9 Therefore, a single lag of inverse marginal utility (LIMU)
is a sufficient statistic in forecasting current inverse marginal utility, even with such technological
linkages between periods:
Proposition 2 When insurance is constrained only by moral hazard, conditional on the time t
shadow price of resources 77, LIMU ( is a sufficient statistic for household i's time t
inverse marginal utility.
Proof. In Appendix A. m
We obtain the result that, conditional on qt, time t - 1 inverse marginal utility is a sufficient
statistic for all t - 1 information for forecasting time t consumption because in the moral hazard-
constrained model (and in the limited commitment model discussed below), income is observed. As
a result, the planner or community directly controls consumption and marginal utility. Moreover,
the temptation preventing full insurance (in this case, the temptation to shirk) is evaluated at the
same levels of consumption and marginal utility that the household actually realizes in equilibrium.
Therefore, expected marginal utility can be expressed as a function of the past only via lagged
inverse marginal utility. It will turn out that this property also holds under limited commitment,
another workhorse model of incomplete informal insurance.
1.3.5 Limited commitment
If an agent can walk away from the insurance network at any time if he can do better in au-
tarky, Proposition 1 no longer necessarily holds (Coate and Ravallion 1993). Limited commitment
imposes further constraints on the planner's problem (1.1), which is now subject to the promise-
keeping constraints (whose multipliers are Ajt), the budget constraint (with multiplier 71it) and the
participation constraints that the expected utility an agent gets in the insurance network be at
least as great as the expected utility he could achieve in autarky, choosing his own savings and
9Golosov et al. (2003) show a similar result for adverse selection economies with very general production functions;
see note 5.
effort optimally. That is, a household will only remain in the network if
V(Yr + Tirt) + 3 uir,t+1 > uaut (yr, e), Vi, r
where
Uaut (yr, e) max V(Yr - St) - #z(et+1)
st ,et+1
+3E [Uaut (Yt+1 + R'st)|et+1, e]
Sufficiency of lagged inverse marginal utility
Kocherlakota (1996) showed that, under limited commitment, the vector of lagged marginal utility
ratios for every member of the insurance group,{v'(cN,t-1) N-1
v'(ci,t_1) Ji=1
is a sufficient statistic for history when forecasting any household's consumption. This vector
specifies a unique point on the Pareto frontier and therefore captures all relevant information
in forecasting any households' future consumption. However, Kocherlakota's result is not directly
testable if the econometrician does not have information on all the members of the insurance group.
Since consumption and income data generally come from surveys, rather than censuses, the test
has limited empirical applicability. In Kocherlakota's setting, the need to keep track of the past
consumption of every member of the insurance network in order to forecast any member's current
consumption arises due to the assumption that the village as a whole cannot borrow or save. If the
village can borrow and save, the shadow price of resources at time t serves as a summary measure
of how much consumption must be given to other households in the village. In this case, we have
the following result, which is testable with panel data for only a sample of households in a network.
Proposition 3 With village-level
'rt, household i's LIMU ,
utility under limited commitment.
future consumption are increasing
Proof. In Appendix A. *
credit access, conditional on the time t shadow price of resources
is a sufficient statistic for household i's time t inverse marginal
When i's participation constraint binds, i's current and expected
in i's income.
(1.5)
The intuition for this result is that, when the only barrier to full insurance is the fact that the
household can walk away when income is high, the principal can allocate consumption to a house-
hold who is tempted to walk away without affecting the incentive of any other household to stay
in the network, except through the tightness of the village's budget constraint. The constrained
household gets current consumption and a future promise that make it exactly indifferent between
staying in or leaving the network. At the optimum, providing a household with utility in the cur-
rent period (through current consumption cit) should be exactly as effective as providing promised
utility in the future (through the utility promise us,t+1). Therefore, the Lagrange multiplier on the
household's promise-keeping constraint uniquely describes the efficient combination of cit, ui,t+1.
Moreover, under limited commitment the household's lagged inverse marginal utility fully captures
the Lagrange multiplier on the promise-keeping constraint. So LIMU captures all the
information from time t - 1 and earlier that is relevant in predicting household i's time t consump-
tion, cit. The need to control for the time t shadow price of resources, qt, arises because 7t captures
the "size of the pie" at time t, while '(c ) captures the share of that pie that will, in expectation,
go to household i.
Since, as discussed above, the same sufficiency result is obtained under moral hazard (with
the additional, stronger implication of an Inverse Euler equation), and with isoelastic or nonpara-
metrically estimated utility an indistinguishable result holds under the PIH10 , if we are unable to
reject sufficiency of LIMU in a given setting, this does not tell us whether limited commitment,
moral hazard, or borrowing-saving is a more plausible alternative. Thus, before moving on to
discuss hidden income, I discuss a stronger implication of limited commitment that would allow a
researcher to distinguish limited commitment from moral hazard and borrowing-saving in the case
that sufficiency of LIMU is not rejected.
Amnesia
A stronger implication of limited commitment, which does not hold under moral hazard or borrowing-
saving, is what Kocherlakota calls "amnesia." As noted above, when limited commitment binds for
household i, consumption cirt and promised future utility uir,t+1 are pinned down by the require-
"
0 As discussed in section 1.3.3, in a log specification with isoelastic utility sufficiency of the proposed statistic under
limited commitment and moral hazard, ln = plnci,t,, cannot be distinguished from sufficiency of the
proposed statistic under under borrowing-saving, lnu'(ci,t_1) = -pln ci,t1. With nonparametrically estimated util-
ity, both implications reduce to that there exists a function f(ci,t-1) conditional on which no other lagged information
predicts f(cit).
ment that the household be just indifferent between staying in and leaving the network, and that
the utility value of current and future consumption be equated at the margin:
V(Yr + Tirt) + fuir,t+1 = aut(yr)
V'(Yr + Tirt) - (UN(Ur,t+1) 1
auir,t+1
independent of the time t promised value uit. Thus the household's old promised value, uit, is
"forgotten" when limited commitment binds. Kocherlakota suggests the following procedure to
test for amnesia: find the network member(s) with the lowest growth in consumption between
periods t - 1 and t. Ignoring measurement error in consumption for now (see Section 1.6), define
Bt a min v'(ci,t_1)/v'(cit)
i=1,...,N
Those for whom v'(ci,t-1)/v'(cit) > Bt, by construction, had binding limited commitment constraints-
otherwise their consumption would have been fully smoothed between periods t - 1 and t. Those
with v'(ci,t_1)/v'(cit) = Bt were not constrained, and therefore did achieve full intertemporal con-
sumption smoothing. Define the sets of constrained and unconstrained households
Ct J i :v'(ci,t_1)/v'(cit) > Bt}
Ut f{i : v'(ci,t-1)/v'(cit) = Bt}
Amnesia implies that, for any constrained household i E Ct, LIMU , IKV ) should not predict
current consumption cit, given current income yt. That is, if we estimate the regression
ln cit = ai ln ci,t_1 + a2 In yit + 6v + Eit (1.6)
for those households i E Ct, limited commitment implies, since the households are constrained,
ai = 0: the old promises are forgotten. This test is implemented, and the results discussed, in
Section 1.6.
The result that, when insurance is constrained by either limited commitment or moral hazard,
the village's current shadow cost of resources and a household's LIMU should together be a sufficient
statistic for the past in forecasting the household's current inverse marginal utility, arises because in
these models (unlike the hidden income model) income is observed, so the community can effectively
control consumption by controlling income-contingent transfers. As a result, there is no deviation
from the optimal division of promised utility across periods-utility in the current period (via
transfers) and utility in future periods (via promised utility) are equally valuable to the household.
1.3.6 Hidden income
As well as issues of ex ante information (moral hazard) and of limited commitment, ex post infor-
mational asymmetries may also restrict the type of (implicit or explicit) contracts that agents can
enter into, and thereby restrict insurance. Namely, it may be that income is not observable by the
community, and households must be given incentives to report it (Townsend 1982). It turns out
that such ex post informational asymmetries cause the sufficiency result of limited commitment
and moral hazard to break down.
Assume now that agents can commit to the insurance arrangement and that effort is observable.
However, household income is not observable by other households. Potentially S (S - 1) incentive-
compatibility constraints are added to the planner's problem:
V(yr + Tirt) + fir,t+1 ;> V(yr + Tirl,t) + Iuir',t+1
r' E S\yr
These constraints require that a household realizing any of the S income levels must not gain by
claiming any of the S - 1 other possible levels. However, Thomas and Worrall (1990) show that
only the S -1 local downward constraints, which require that an agent getting income yr not prefer
to claim the slightly lower income y,-1, will be binding at the optimum. These constraints are:
V(Yr + Tirt) +) uir,t+1 = V(Yr + Ti,r-1,t) + /ui,r-1,t+1,
r = 2, ..., Is
The first-order conditions of the problem imply:
Proposition 4 When agents can commit to the insurance agreement, and effort is contractible, but
output is hidden, forecasts using only , and qt will over-predict consumption for households
with the lowest time t - 1 income realizations, and the degree of overprediction will decline with
the level of time t - 1 income (controlling for an interaction between time t - 1 income and the
aggregate shock 77).
Proof. In Appendix A. *
The intuition for this difference between hidden income on one hand, and limited commitment
and moral hazard on the other is that, in the limited commitment and moral hazard cases, the temp-
tation of a household with high output to claim a lower level of output is not a relevant constraint,
and as a result there is no deviation from the optimal division of promised utility across periods-
utility in the current period (via transfers) and utility in future periods (via promised utility) are
equally valuable to the household. As a result, all past information relevant to forecasting current
consumption is encoded in last period's consumption. When income is private information, in
contrast, consumption is not effectively controlled by the community, and the constrained-optimal
schedule of transfers and promised utilities distorts the trade-off between current consumption and
future expected utility, with households announcing low incomes being penalized more in terms of
future utility, which is equally valuable to truthful and misreporting households, than current con-
sumption, which is more valuable to truthful households, who have lower income than households
who are tempted to falsely claim the same level of income.
Aggregate risk may matter because if the network receives a positive income shock, there is a
potentially countervailing effect: all agents consume more than would have been predicted using
past marginal utility, and the aggregate shock is divided unequally between high- and low-past
income households. (In the limited commitment and moral hazard cases, on the other hand, lagged
inverse marginal utility is the only past information which determines how the aggregate shock is
divided among households. Scheuer (2009) discusses the implications of aggregate risk in the moral
hazard case.)
Therefore, under hidden income, estimating (1.10) should lead to ( $ 0, since In yi,t-i has
predictive power in forecasting current inverse marginal utility not captured in LIMU. A further
implication of the hidden income model is that, if the residuals defined in (1.11) are regressed on
lagged income:
&it = a +,3 ln yi,t-1 + uit (1.7)
we should find a < 0, > 0, because the residuals will be negative at the lowest levels of past
income (a < 0) and the residuals will be increasing in past income (# > 0). On the other hand, if
we are unable to reject a = # = 0, this is evidence for either limited commitment, moral hazard
or borrowing-saving, which can then be distinguished based on the amnesia test discussed above,
the inverse Euler equation implication of moral hazard, and the Euler equation implication of the
PIH. The results of this test are discussed in Section 1.6.
An additional implication of hidden income: insufficiency of LIMU is less when income
is less variable
An additional prediction of the hidden income model is that a reduction in the variability of a
household's income process will have the effect of making truth-telling constraints less binding,
which in turn implies a reduced wedge between LIMU and expected promised utility:
Proposition 5 A decrease in variability of the income process (in the sense of that the new dis-
tribution is second-order stochastically dominated by the old distribution, keeping the probability of
each income realization the same) reduces the degree to which LIMU over-predicts current inverse
marginal utility for low-lagged income households.
Proof. In Appendix A. m
The intuition for this result is that, the less uncertainty about a household's income, the less
binding are truth-telling constraints. Since the truth-telling constraints are the cause of the wedge
between LIMU and expected promised utility, relaxing the constraints reduces the wedge. There-
fore, if one household's income process is more predictable than another's, the household with more
predictable income should exhibit a reduced degree of overprediction at the bottom. The results of
this test are also discussed in Section 1.6.
1.4 Distinguishing barriers to insurance
1.4.1 Testable implication of limited commitment or moral hazard
The fact that, under either limited commitment or moral hazard, all past information relevant to
forecasting current consumption is encoded in last period's consumption implies that the prediction
errors
it - 1 - E 1 | it \ (1.8)
v'(cit) ' (c) v(I~t1
should be uncorrelated with past income, a finding that contrasts with the prediction of the hidden
income model discussed below. Of course, implementing this test requires assuming or estimating
a functional form for vo. A natural starting point is the constant relative risk aversion (CRRA)
function. There is some empirical evidence that the CRRA function provides a good fit for actual
behavior (Szpiro 1986); moreover Schulhofer-Wohl (2006) shows that CRRA can be viewed as a
local approximation to any concave utility function. With CRRA utility with coefficient of relative
risk aversion p, the utility function is:
1-p
v(cit) = i ifpy4 1{ ln(cit) if p = 1
Since the coefficient of relative risk aversion p is unknown, ideally the test would be implemented
in a way that did not depend on assuming a particular value of p. One implication of no correlation
between the prediction errors (1.8) and yi,t_1 is that the prediction errors are not systematically high
for high (low) values of yi,t_1 and systematically low for low (high) values of yi,t-1, an implication
that is preserved by taking a monotonic transformation of (1.8). That is, we can test whether the
transformed prediction errors
1 ( 1 1
t* - E n '( In 77,t
v'(cit) v'(cit) v'(ci't_1)
are uncorrelated with past log income.
When utility is CRRA,
In ,=p In ci,t_1(v (ci't-1))
so the value of p > 0 will not affect the sign of *. Since In 7t enters additively, it can be controlled
for by adding a village-year effect 6vt. Then, expected inverse marginal utility E , '(c, , yt)
is proportional to the predicted value from the regression
In civt = y ln civ,t- i + 6 vt + Eivt. (1.9)
Sufficiency of LIMU implies that if we add In yi,t-1 (or any other variable dated t - 1 or earlier) to
(1.9) and estimate
In civt y ln civ,t-i + ( In yi,t-1 + 5vt + Civt (1.10)
we should be unable to reject ( = 0. Another way to test the sufficiency implication is to test
whether the residuals
ait ay on cit Iln ci,td1 - 1vt (1.11)
are uncorrelated with ln yi,t_1 or any other variable dated t - 1 or earlier. The results of the
regression-based test using (1.10) and the results of the residuals-based test using (1.11) are dis-
cussed in Section 1.6.11
However, two further empirical issues must be considered in distinguishing among different
insurance regimes: agents' utility functions are not known, and consumption is measured with
error. Both of these, if not accounted for, can result in biased inference about the nature of the
barrier to full insurance.
1.4.2 Measurement Error in Expenditure
Classical measurement error
If expenditure is measured with classical error, the estimated coefficient on LIMU in (1.7) will be
attenuated toward zero. This will result in biased predictions of consumption using LIMU. To
see what form the bias will take, note that we want to estimate the part of consumption that is
unexplained by LIMU and village-year effect:
Eivt = In civt - 6 vt - In cio,t_1 (1.12)
Assume an error-ridden measure of consumption is observed,
cio,t-1 = cio,t-1 * viv,t-1
where the measurement error viv,t_1 is uncorrelated with true time t - 1 consumption, civ,t-1, or
true time t consumption, civt. The estimated prediction error is constructed using observed lagged
consumption Eiv,t-i, and the estimates of -y and 6:
sivt = In civt - 6 vt -In esv,t_1
Assume the true data-generating process is insurance constrained by limited commitment or moral
hazard, so that LIMU is in fact a sufficient statistic for forecasting current inverse marginal utility.
"Estimating (1.8) for various values of p leads to similar conclusions as tests using (1.11); results available on
request.
Then, the forecast error (1.12) will be uncorrelated with lagged income:
E(In cit - y ln civ,t_1 - ovt)yiv,t_1 = 0 (1.13)
"true" residual Eivt
However, if - is estimated by OLS, the null hypothesis (1.13) may potentially be incorrectly rejected,
because is biased downward:
plim = -Y 1 - "r r
2
The estimated residual is then positively correlated with lagged income, because fraction A
of current log consumption is incorrectly not projected onto lagged log consumption, and this
term is correlated with lagged income (because under either limited commitment or moral hazard,
contemporaneous income and consumption are positively correlated):
sivt = lncit - ovt -flna,t_1
U2
plimint = Incivt - -- 1 - " In i,t-i
Or2
= Incivt - ovt - 'ylnai,,t-i + 2 2 y In c,ti
uncorrelated w/ yiv,t-1
+ correlated w/ yiv,t-1
That is, we may conclude wrongly that corr( ivt, yiv,t-1) > 0, that is, that LIMU is not a sufficient
statistic, when consumption is measured with classical error, because lagged income is then in effect
a second proxy for true LIMU.
However, for classical error, there is a straightforward solution. If y is estimated using the
second lag of consumption as an instrument for the first lag, we obtain a consistent estimate of -Y:
- -i IV cov(ln 54,-2, In aivt)
cov (ln cio,t-2, ln civ,t _1)
ly cov(ut-2, ut-1)
cov(ln aiv,t- 2 , ln civ,t_1)
=0
Then, the probability limit of the residual is
p lim{ = In B - ot- 7y in aiv,t_1
= in civt + In Vivt - v- (in civ,tI + In vivt_1)
Rearranging,
p lim EI4 = ln civt - y In ci,t_1 - 6 vt + In viv - y In viv,t_1
"true" residual meas. error in civt meas. error in civ, t i
Under the hypothesis that true lagged inverse marginal utility (In ci,t_1) is a sufficient statistic,
the "true" residual (1.12) is uncorrelated with lagged income. Moreover, if the measurement error
in (log) consumption is classical, in vivt and In viv,t-1 are also uncorrelated with lagged income:
corr(ln vivt, iv,t-i) = corr(ln viv,t_1, yiv,t-1) = 0
Therefore, with classical measurement error and a true data-generating process of limited commit-
ment or moral hazard, instrumenting the first lag of consumption with the second lag of consumption
will lead to the correct conclusion:
plimEflyiv,ti = 0.
Non-classical measurement error
Using the second (or longer) lag of consumption as an instrument will not address non-classical
measurement error which is correlated over time. A possible solution in this case is to move lagged
consumption from the right- to the left-hand side of the equation of interest, and test overidentifying
restrictions on the reduced form equations for In cit and In ci,t-i. If lagged income affects current
consumption only through lagged consumption, then all components of lagged income, or any other
lagged information zi,t-s which predicts lagged income, should satisfy the restriction
d In cit d In ci,t_ 1 -K x~
dni,t-s dni,t-s
That is, a unit change in an instrument zi,t_, should have the same relative effect on current versus
lagged consumption as a unit change in another instrument x't_ .
Under the null of limited commitment/moral hazard, consumption depends on a household's
initial Pareto weight and its subsequent income realizations. (Under limited commitment or moral
hazard, lagged income does not belong in the structural equation for consumption, but it appears
in the reduced form because yis depends on cis.) Three lags of income are significant predictors of
cit, so write
3
In cit = asyi,t-s Ao + Eit
where AO is a measure of the household's Pareto weight as of 1999: the household's rank in the
1999 per-capita consumption distribution for the village.
Since lagged income appears in the reduced form for consumption, lags of total income cannot
be used to generate overidentifying restrictions. Instead, I test whether the composition of lagged
income matters for predicting current consumption, beyond its effect on lagged consumption. In
particular, I test whether income from crop cultivation matters differently than income from rais-
ing livestock or fish and shrimp. If crops are more homogenous than animals, less susceptible
to difficult-to-verify disease, or simply easier to observe by virtue of growing in a fixed location
rather than being mobile, reporting low income from animal cultivation may result in a greater
wedge between current and future utility than reporting low income from crop cultivation. That
is, animal cultivation income would be associated with high contemporaneous consumption relative
to future consumption, while crop cultivation income would be associated with lower contempo-
raneous consumption relative to future consumption. This would not be the case under the other
models of incomplete insurance. While different types of income may convey different information
about effort, or different information about the household's prospects in autarky, under limited
commitment or moral hazard that information will be completely encoded in consumption. Under
hidden income, in contrast, the components of income will also matter through the direct effect of
lagged income on current consumption. So in the reduced-form regressions
3
In cit = rricsy.os + liestock iE l- rlLsit- + Aio + 6 it
s=1
3
In ci,tI Z[[r2csy7i7tS + 1r2Lsyi tock] + Ai0 - ei,t-
s=1
and
3
in cit Z[r1CsyctrT] + r1Fsy + i 0 + 6 it
s=1
3
Inci,t-i Z[7r2Csyi,ts + 72Fs - + iA0 + Ei,t-1
s=1
if the first lag of income does not directly affect current consumption, we should find
71iC1 71L1
712C1 12L1
and
7F1C1 _ 7 1F1
7F2C1 7r2F1
These overidentifying restrictions can be used to test whether the rejection of limited commitment
is only due to measurement error.
1.4.3 Specification of uO
The test of hidden income proposed above is to test whether et - yt-1 in
In 1 = +t  In (+ Ei (1.14)
(v' (cit) )(v' (ci't_1))
However, since the form of v( is unknown, the approach above was to approximate it with the
isolelastic function
v(cit) c1 P
ln (,(cit) = p In (cit)
and test st - yt-1 in
ln (cit) = ovt + In (ci,t_1) + &it (1.15)
This raises the question, if the true error Et satisfies Et - yt_1 in (1.14), will testing se - yt-1
in (1.15) yield the correct conclusion? Nonparametrically estimating ) avoids the need to make
an assumption about the form of the utility function. In order to correct for measurement error as
well, a nonparametric IV approach seems most appropriate.
One possible approach would be to use the nonparametric 2SLS approach of Newey and Powell
(2003) to estimate
f (cit) = f (k,- 1) + 5 vt + &it
where at- 1 is estimated using a nonparametric first stage with Ct-2 as an instrument. However,
consistency of this estimator requires that f() and its derivatives are bounded in the tails, if Et- 1
is not bounded. Since in this context f() is an inverse marginal utility function which may tend to
infinity as consumption tends to infinity, this is an unappealing assumption in this context. Newey
and Powell's approach also requires the conditional mean zero assumption:
E (eit| i,t-2) = 0
which is stronger than the assumption needed for linear IV:
corr (eit, Ei,t-2) = 0
Fortunately, inspection of the nonparametric first stage between ln(Et_1) and ln(5t-2) shows it
to be nearly linear (see Figure 2), suggesting that linear IV may be a suitable approach. Therefore,
I nonparametrically estimate f(), using a 5-knot spline, 12 in
In (Et) = f (6a_1) + out + Et
Then, f (at_1) is linearly instrumented with f (at-2). The fitted relationship f (at-), graphed in
Figure 3, is quite similar to the log form implied by CRRA, which is also shown. This is consistent
with other empirical evidence suggesting that the CRRA utility function is, in fact, a reasonable
approximation to actual utility functions (Szpiro 1986).
1.4.4 Summary: Distinguishing barriers to insurance
The preceding discussion suggests four tests that, in combination, can be used to distinguish among
limited commitment, moral hazard, hidden income, and borrowing-saving (PIH):
12Results are not sensitive to the number of knots used. (Results using a 7-knot spline available on request.)
1. Sufficiency of I'(c1 -1) under limited commitment, moral hazard, or borrowing-saving (PIH):
E |t, Xe i,t-s = E7 , ,r/ ,W ,t-s, s > 0
o'(cit) v 'it-i) o (cit) v 'it-i)
2. Amnesia: under limited commitment, if household i is constrained at t:
1 1 1?tYi
E |p, , /dyitb = EI , Irt, ynt
o'(cit) v (i't-i) v, (cit)
3. Overprediction at the bottom: under hidden income:
< 0
and
> 0
E - E ,r/t yi,t-i = 0
o' (cit) V'(cit) un'it-i)
d 1I
dyi,t-i (v'(cit) ( cit) n 'it-i)'
4. Inverse Euler equation: under moral hazard:
1t- 1,(C
v'(ci,t-i)v'c )
These tests are summarized in the following table:
I Autarky/PIH Limited com. Moral hazard Hidden inc.
Sufficiency of In ct -/ _ i/
Amnesia
Overprediction at the bottom
Inverse Euler /
Ligon (1998) and Attanasio and Pavoni (2009) test for asymmetric information regarding agents'
choice of actions (moral hazard) using GMM approaches, while Karaivanov and Townsend (2008)
test across several moral hazard models as well as the PIH using an MLE approach. The test
proposed here has the advantage of accommodating nonparametric estimates of the utility function,
rather than requiring the specification of a parametric form, and requiring no assumptions on
the form of the production function. Of course, in the event that the assumptions imposed by
GMM/MLE methods are correct, they may provide more powerful tests, but such assumptions are
difficult to test and may result in incorrect conclusions if the assumptions are incorrect.
1.5 Data
Data are from the 1999-2005 waves of the Townsend Thai Monthly Survey, which covers 16 villages
in central and northeastern Thailand, 4 each in four provinces, two in the central region near
Bangkok and two in the northeast. In each village, 45 households were initially selected at random
and reinterviewed each month. (See Townsend et al. (1997) for details.) Detailed data were
collected on households' demographic composition and their income, including farms, businesses,
and wage employment. Information was also collected on household expenditure, using detailed bi-
weekly and monthly surveys. Thus expenditure is likely to be quite well-measured in this dataset,
relative to datasets which measure expenditure over a longer recall period and/or which collect
information on only a subset of expenditures, such as only food (as in the Panel Survey of Income
Dynamics in the US).
A total of 531 households appear in all 84 months of the survey period used here, out of an
original 670 who were interviewed in January 1999. I focus on the continuously-observed sample
so that changes in a household's rank in the PCE distribution are not due to migration in and
out of the survey. Differences between the continuously-observed sample and the initial sample
are reported in Table 3. Smaller households and those whose head is engaged in rice farming or
construction are most likely not to be continuously observed, while corn and livestock farmers are
more likely to be continuously observed. This degree of missing data is a concern; however, residuals
of income and consumption (partialing out demographic, village, year and occupation variables) do
not differ across the two samples. Imputing income and expenditure data for missing household-
months based on village, year, occupation and baseline demographic variables and running the
analysis on this sample, yields results similar to the results for the continuously-observed sample. 13
Summary statistics are reported in Table 1. Average household size is 4.5, or 3.8 adult equiv-
alents. Average reported monthly per capita expenditure was 5,213 2002 baht (approximately 124
2002 US dollars.1 4 ). Average reported monthly income per capita is higher than expenditure at
8,981 baht, due to investment.
13 Results available on request.
1 4 The exchange rate in 2002 was approximately 42 baht=$1. All following references to baht refer to 2002 baht.
Households are classified into occupations based on the primary occupation reported by the
household head in the initial wave of the survey. The most common occupation in the sample is
rice farming (35% of household heads), followed by non-agricultural labor (including owning a non-
agricultural business) (12% of household heads), growing corn (10%), raising livestock (9%), and
agricultural wage labor (5%). Growing other crops, raising fish or shrimp, growing orchard crops,
and construction each account for less than 5%. Seven percent report an occupation classified as
"other."
Another strength of the Townsend Thai Monthly Survey data is that households are asked sep-
arately about gifts and transfers (both in money and in-kind) from organizations, from households
in the village, and from households outside of the village. All of these types of transfers are preva-
lent: gifts given to other households in the same village equal 5.4% of average expenditure, while
gifts from others in the same village equal 9% of average expenditure. Gifts/remittances given
to those outside the household's village equal 17.5% of average expenditure, and gifts/remittances
received from those outside the village equal 27.7% of average expenditure. Moreover, these num-
bers exclude transfers embodied in interest-free, low-cost and flexible loans, which are prevalent in
these villages, as well as in other settings ((Platteau and Abraham 1987), (Udry 1994), (Fafchamps
and Lund 2003)) The significant magnitude of intra-village transfers is direct evidence that within-
village insurance is important, while transfers made with those outside the village may constitute
a source of unobserved income.
Finally, using data from rain gauges located in each village, yielding a measure of total rainfall
in each village in each month between 1999 and 2003, quarterly rainfall variables (deviations from
the provincial average in that quarter over the entire period) were constructed following Paxson
(1992):
Rqvt - Rqp, (Rqvt - Aq,) 2 (1.16)
q = 1, 2,3,4
The rainfall variables are used to construct instruments for income in the tests of full insurance,
and for tests of the hidden income model. The next section presents the empirical results.
1.6 Results
1.6.1 Insurance is imperfect...
If households were perfectly insured, there would be no need to look for evidence of a particular
insurance friction-if household consumption did not move with contemporaneous household in-
come, and all villagers' consumptions moved one-for-one with average village consumption, this
would mean that none of hidden income, moral hazard, or limited commitment was a significant
impediment to full insurance. This is not the case for rural Thailand. To see this, I estimate the
standard omnibus test of full insurance (Townsend 1994) using the January 1999-December 2005
waves of the Townsend Thai Monthly Survey:' 5
In cit = a In yit + 3 j + 6 it (1.17)
where cit is household i's per-capita consumption at time t, yit is household i's income at time t
and #i is a household-fixed effect, yields & = .078 (t = 10.5). (See Table 2, column 1.) That is, a
10% change in household income is associated with a .78% change in contemporaneous per capita
consumption. 16
Adding village-year dummy variables ovt to capture common changes in villagers' consump-
tion due to change in aggregate resources (indexing households by v to denote their village) and
estimating
ln civt = a ln yivt + fiv + 6vt + Civt (1.18)
reduces the correlation between income and consumption deviations (from the household means)
to & = .067 (t = 9.2). (See Table 2, column 2.17) The significance of the village-year indicators
is direct evidence that village-level networks are providing insurance, as discussed below, but the
continued significant correlation between income and consumption changes demonstrates that this
15 As detailed in Section 4, income and expenditure data are collected monthly. However, throughout the paper I
aggregate the 84 months of data to the annual level because the correspondence between expenditure and consumption
is likely to be higher at annual frequencies than monthly frequencies. Aggregating to the annual level will also reduce
the importance of measurement error if recall errors are uncorrelated across months.
16 Consumption is measured as expenditure and converted to per capita terms using the equivalence scale used
by Townsend (1994) for Indian villages. The weights are: for adult males, 1.0; for adult females, 0.9. For males
and females aged 13-18, 0.94, and 0.83, respectively; for children aged 7-12, 0.67 regardless of gender; for children
4-6, 0.52; for toddlers 1-3, 0.32; and for infants 0.05. Using an equivalence scale that accounts for within-household
economies of scale (Olken 2005) does not significantly affect any reported results (results available on request).7 A first-differenced specification with a village-year effect yields a correlation of .04 (t = 4.30), the same point
estimate found by Chiappori et al. (2008) for the same dataset.
insurance is incomplete. 18
Measurement error in income is a concern in interpreting the individual and village results.
Classical measurement error in income (uncorrelated with the true'values of income changes and
with the error terms ), will attenuate & toward zero. This would make the extent to which income
changes predict consumption changes in the data a lower bound on the true sensitivity of consump-
tion to income. In this case, instrumenting income with variables correlated with true income but
uncorrelated with the measurement error should then result in a higher estimate of a. Because
many households in these villages work in agriculture, rainfall is a possible instrument. As dis-
cussed above, village-level monthly rainfall data is available for the years 1999-2003. Following the
strategy of Paxson (1992), I instrument income changes with the interactions between occupation
indicators 19 and deviations of quarterly income from the province-wide quarterly average defined
in (1.16), and occupation interactions with squared deviations:
1(occi = o) x Rqvt - Rqp,
1(occi o) x (Rqvt -R-Aqp ) 2
q = 1, 2, 3,4; o G {1, 10}
Using the occupation-rainfall variables as instruments for income raises the coefficient on income
changes significantly, to &IV = .21 (t = 5.4) without the inclusion of village-year dummy variables
(Table 2, column 4), and &IV = .17 (t = 3.9) when the village-year dummies are added. Once
measurement error in income is addressed, the evidence is even stronger that households bear a
substantial fraction of their idiosyncratic income risk, although village-level insurance does smooth
a significant portion of income risk, as discussed below.
Another telling feature of the data is a large amount of movement in the village per capita
expenditure (PCE) distribution: the correlations between household PCE rankings in adjacent
years range from .824 (1999-2000) to .539 (2000-2001). (See Table 3, Panel A.) Moreover, PCE
rank changes are not random, as they would be if driven by classical error in expenditure, but are
predicted by income changes, with a +10% change in income associated with an increase in the
18Townsend (1995) also finds imperfect insurance in northern Thai villages in the years 1989-1991.
19Households were asked in the initial wave of the survey about the primary occupation of each adult household
member. The response of the household head was used to classify the household, with responses grouped into 10
categories: farm rice, farm corn, farm orchard crops, farm other crops, raise livestock, raise fish/shrimp, agricultural
wage labor, non-agricultural wage labor, construction, and other.
PCE distribution of about one-half of a ranking. An ordered probit regression shows that, at the
mean income level, a +10% change in income is associated with a 5.9% increase in the probability
of moving up in the consumption distribution. (See Table 3, Panel B.)
Absent taste shocks and with no heterogeneity in risk aversion, churn in the consumption
distribution is incompatible with full insurance, as discussed above, as is a # 0 in (1.17). However,
insurance constrained by either limited commitment, hidden income, or moral hazard would predict
both a > 0 and corr(rankit,rankit,) < 1.
1.6.2 ... but villages do provide insurance
Finding a < 1 in equation (1.17) does not establish that villages provide insurance: households
could smooth consumption using borrowing and saving (Hall 1978), (Deaton 1991), or the relevant
risk-sharing network might be a different group, such as kinship groups. The presence of intravillage
insurance can be established by testing the hypothesis that the village-year effects in (1.17) are
jointly insignificant in explaining household consumption changes. If these village-year effects play
a significant role in explaining consumption changes, this implies that villagers' consumptions
move together, evidence of the spillover implied by inter-village insurance. The hypothesis of no
common component to within-village consumption changes is strongly rejected: F(111, 3210) =
5.256,p = 0.000 in the OLS regression (table 1, column 2) and F(63, 1814) = 3.471,p = 0.000 in
the IV regression (table 2, column 5), indicating that there is a highly significant tendency for the
consumption of households in the same village to move together.
To get a quantitative estimate of the extent of within-village insurance, Suri (2005) notes that
an additional implication of a set of households belonging to an insurance group is that household
consumption is less correlated with household income, conditional on total group consumption, than
group average consumption is correlated with group average income. If we estimate the village-fixed
effects specification
ln cpcvt = aW ln yivt + Oi + 6 vt + 6 ivt (1.19)
and the between-village (or village average) specification
In ct = In yvtaB + 6vt (1.20)
where ln civt and ln yivt are the log-per capita consumption and log-income of household i in village
v at time t, and In cvt and ln yvt, are the time t averages of log-consumption and log-income for
village v, insurance at the village level implies ; < 1. Suri (2005) shows that the "contrast
estimator"
aw
3=1Z- B
is a measure of the extent of insurance provided by village-level networks. (Under the null hypothesis
that villages do not provide insurance, household consumption would be no less correlated with
household income, conditional on total group consumption, than group average consumption is
correlated with group average income, implying aw = CB and 3 = 0.)
Estimating (1.20) by OLS yields aB,OLS = .172, while CWOLS = .0669. (See table 2, columns 2
SOLS
and 3.) This implies .61. Estimating (1.20) by IV, using quarterly rainfall deviations and
squared deviations as instruments for average village income yields aB,IV = .300, while awIV
.174 (see table 2, columns 5 and 6), implying IV .421.
Whether estimated by OLS or IV, # is well below one: belonging to a village network does not
remove all idiosyncratic risk, but village networks do manage to reduce dependence of household
consumption on household income by between 40 and 60 percent. Section 1.3 discussed three
models that attempt to rationalize this finding of partial insurance: limited commitment, hidden
income, and moral hazard.
1.6.3 Credit is available
The form of the contract that the hypothetical village social planner can offer to a household
depends on whether the village's budget must balance each period. If so, a constraint on the
planner's problem is that, at each date and state of the world, total consumption among the
villagers (i E V) cannot exceed their total income:
cat < yit, Vt. (1.21)
iGV iEV
Alternatively, if borrowing and savings are possible, subject only to a terminal condition,20 village
assets art evolve according to
av,t+= R avt + Z(Yit - c)1 (1.22)
"aT+1 = 0 if T is finite or, if T is infinite, R - c) <; avo.
where R is the gross interest rate and yit and c are the income and total (not per capita) con-
sumption of household i E V.
Dependence of village consumption at time t on village income at t can be tested with with
between-village estimator (1.20). As noted above, aB,OLS = .172 (table 1, col 3) and aB,IV = 300
(table 2, col 6). Therefore, even correcting for measurement error in income, villages are far from
living "hand to mouth," consuming total village income period-by-period. This suggests that village
institutions (banks, moneylenders, local government, etc.) have access to a national-level credit
market or a set of equivalent institutions.
1.6.4 Testing sufficiency of lagged inverse marginal utility
Under limited commitment, moral hazard, or autarky, current inverse marginal utility should only
depend on the past through , 1  . If households' consumptions are described by efficient insur-
ance constrained by limited commitment or moral hazard, we should find y , 0, ( = 0 in
In cit = y In ci,t_1 + ('Xi,t- 1 + 6 vt + Eit (1.23)
where Xi,t_, is any information dated t - 1 or before. Table 4 presents the results of this test.
While lagged inverse marginal utility is significantly predictive of current inverse marginal utility
(column 1), lagged log income is also a significant predictor of current inverse marginal utility
(p < .001) in the full sample (column 2). The result is unchanged when the top and bottom 5%
of per capita expenditure (by year) are dropped, to address the concern that very high or low
observed consumption may be due to measurement error. (See columns 3 and 4.) This suggests
that neither limited commitment or moral hazard alone can explain the failure of full insurance in
these villages.
1.6.5 Testing amnesia
Table 5 presents tests of the amnesia prediction of the limited commitment model. If there is
measurement error in expenditure, exactly following Kocherlakota's proposed procedure for imple-
menting this test-classifying as constrained every household in a village who had consumption
growth above the village minimum-would result in every household but one in each village ap-
pearing constrained. In fact, many of these households will be unconstrained, and including them
in the set of households for whom amnesia is predicted will introduce bias toward rejecting the
predictions of limited commitment. To address this, in columns 1 through 4, interaction terms be-
tween ln 1 and indicators for the quartile of the village distribution of consumption growthV'(Cit i)
between t - 1 and t into which the household fell (1q); and similar interaction terms with ln(yi,t)
are added to (1.6). That is, estimate
4 4
In cit = a + #1 In ci,t-1 + E #q In ci,t-1 X 1 q + 71 In yit + JYq ln yit x 1 q + 6 vt + sit
q=2 q=2
If past promises are forgotten, conditional on current income, for those who had highest consump-
tion growth due to binding participation constraints, the sum of the coefficients on the LIMU terms
#1 + #q should be low and insignificant for higher quartiles of consumption growth and, since the
main effect of In I is positive and significant, 04 should be negative. In fact, these predictions
are rejected. The pattern of coefficients #q is the opposite of that predicted by amnesia-LIMU is
more strongly (positively), predictive of current consumption, conditional on current income, for
households with higher consumption growth: #4 is larger than #3, which in turn is larger than #2
(#4 = .201 > 03 = .152 > #2 = .134). For those in the highest quartile of consumption growth,
the hypothesis that #1 + #4 equals zero is overwhelmingly rejected (point estimate .057, p < .001),
suggesting again that limited commitment is not the (entire) explanation for incomplete insurance
in these villages.
As a second test, columns 5 and 6 estimate (1.6) for households with above-median consumption
growth, separately for villages where the variability of rainfall from year to year is high and villages
where rainfall variability is low, based on monthly rainfall data from 1999-2003. Villages with high
rainfall variance also had higher average income variance in every year but 2004, when the opposite
is true-see Figure 1. If measurement error in expenditure is independent of the variance in incomes,
then when high consumption growth is observed in high-rainfall-variance (HRV) villages, it is more
likely to be due to a high income realization resulting in a binding participation constraint. In low-
rainfall-variance (LRV) villages, high consumption growth is more likely to be due to measurement
error. This suggests that, if limited commitment is the true model, the amnesia prediction should
do better in HRV villages, i.e. the coefficient on ln , in column 6 should be less than in
column 5. Indeed, the point estimate for HRV villages is lower than for LRV villages, but the
two estimates are not statistically different (p = .66). Therefore, both the sufficiency and amnesia
predictions of the limited commitment model are strongly rejected.
1.6.6 Testing hidden income: insufficiency of LIMU and predictive power of
lagged income
Table 6, Panel A presents the results of the tests that under hidden income LIMU will overpredict
consumption for those households whose promises decreased, i.e. who had low income in the
previous period, while under moral hazard or limited commitment, the prediction errors will be
uncorrelated with last-period income because LIMU is a sufficient statistic for history, hence no
additional lagged information will contain predictive power. Consistent with the hidden income
prediction, when the prediction errors (1.11) are regressed on lagged income (and lagged income
and lagged income squared interacted with the aggregate shock measure 77) the slope is positive and
significant while the intercept is significantly negative (column 1). Since the dependent variable
is a regression residual, which has mean zero by construction, the slope and intercept are not
independent. The joint hypothesis that a = 0, = 0 is rejected at the .0001 level. Column 2
repeats this test without the aggregate shock interaction terms, showing that the overprediction
result holds unconditionally; i.e., the potential countervailing effect of increased aggregate resources
does not undo the overprediction result. Again, the joint hypothesis that a = 0, = 0 is rejected
at the .0001 level.
Columns 3 and 4 of table 6 show that instrumenting In ci,,t_1 with ln cio,t-2 does not overturn
the finding that the prediction residuals are negative at low levels of lagged income: the null that
the slope and the intercept in (1.7) are both 0 is rejected at the 1% level. This suggests that the
rejection of sufficiency of LIMU is not driven by classical measurement error.
To check the robustness of the insufficiency of LIMU to non-classical measurement error, the
tests of overidentifying restrictions on the reduced forms for current consumption and lagged con-
sumptions are presented in Table 7. Columns 1 and 2 present the results of comparing the reduced
forms of ln cit and ln ci,t-1 using crop and livestock income as "instruments" for consumption. Time
t - 1 crop income is associated with higher consumption at time t than at t - 1, while the opposite
is true for time t - 1 livestock income, consistent with what would be expected if crop income were
easier to observe than livestock income. The hypothesis that = is rejected at the 5% level
(p=.0422). Columns 3 and 4 present the results of comparing the reduced forms of ln cit and ln ci,t_1
using crop and fish income as instruments, and the results are similar, again consistent with what
would be expected if crop income were easier to observe than income from aquaculture, although
in this case the hypothesis that '-" - F1 is rejected at the 10% level (p=.0535). This suggests
that the rejection of sufficiency of LIMU is not due to measurement error in lagged consumption,
but in fact arises because reporting low levels of difficult-to-observe income is associated with a
greater penalty in terms of future consumption than contemporaneous consumption.
Finally, to check the robustness of this finding to allowing for a utility function that is not CRRA,
table 8 shows that when is estimated nonparametrically, sufficiency of LIMU is still rejected.
Panel A shows that there is still a significant positive association between the prediction errors it
(formed using a nonparametric estimate of LIMU) and lagged income. When the forecast of inverse
marginal utility based on LIMU is estimated by OLS, sufficiency of LIMU is once again rejected,
at the 1% level (column 1). Because measurement error is still a concern, column 2 presents results
instrumenting nonparametrically estimated LIMU with the second lag of nonparametric inverse
marginal utility. Sufficiency of LIMU is still rejected, now at the 5% level. Table 8, Panel B
presents the results of an alternative specification of the test of sufficiency of LIMU. Analogously
to equation (1.23), results for which are shown in table 4, Panel B estimates
In cit = f (ci,t_1) + ( In yi,t_1 + Jvt + Eit
where f (ci,t_1) is the nonparametric estimate of LIMU. Sufficiency of LIMU implies ( 0-lagged
income should contain no additional information relevant to forecasting current inverse marginal
utility once f (ci,t_1) is controlled for. The hidden income model, in contrast, predicts ( > 0, since
higher lagged income implies a higher forecast of current inverse marginal utility. In fact, as in
the CRRA formulation in table 4, ( is significantly positive, significant at the 1% level in the OLS
specification and at the 5% level in the IV specification. Given that the nonparametric estimate of
f (t_1) is quite similar to the CRRA form, it is not surprising that the two methods yield similar
conclusions about the (in)sufficiency of LIMU.
To summarize, a wide variety of evidence suggests that hidden income constraints cause those
with low past income to receive less current consumption (i.e. lower current inverse marginal utility)
than predicted by LIMU, while those with high past income receive more consumption and higher
current inverse marginal utility. This suggests that insurance is constrained by the need to provide
incentives to high-income households to truthfully reveal that income. This finding does not appear
to be driven by measurement error or misspecification of the utility function. Next, I present two
tests of the prediction that households with easier-to-predict income processes should display less
departure from sufficiency of LIMU.
1.6.7 Testing hidden income: departure from sufficiency and predictive power
of rainfall
If the primary barrier to insurance is the inability of the community to directly observe households'
incomes, and this barrier is manifested through insufficiency of LIMU, households whose income
processes are less uncertain, because they are predicted by observed factors, or are unconditionally
less variable, should display less insufficiency of LIMU.
As a first test of this prediction, I regress income on the rainfall variables Rqvt - Rqp and
(Rqvt - qp) 2 separately for households in each of 10 occupational categories. The R 2 from this
regression was interacted with lagged income. (The R 2s are shown in Table 10.) Table 9a shows the
results of regressing the prediction errors (1.11) on lagged income, separately for the occupations
with above- and below-median R2 s of income on the rainfall variables:
6 it = a + /3yi,t-1 ± uit
If insufficiency of LIMU is reduced when a household's income is easier to forecast, we should
find ahighR2 > a&os2, 1 43hi 2 "", and X2highR2 < x2 X.o2.In fact, this is the case: there is less
insufficiency of LIMU (in the sense of a less significant correlation of the residuals with lagged
income), when rainfall R 2 is high than when it is low.
As a second test, for each household, I calculate variance of income, after removing the com-
ponent of income predicted by the rainfall variables and occupation-year dummies; i.e. that part
which should be difficult to forecast. I split the sample according to whether this variance is above
or below the median. The prediction of the hidden income model is that there should be less
insufficiency of LIMU for the low-variance sample. Table 9b shows the results. Both in terms of
the point estimates and the chi-squared test of joint significance, the high-variance sample displays
greater insufficiency of LIMU: ahigh < alow, ohigh < g3low, and X2igh > X2ow.
1.7 Conclusion
Knowing what barrier to full informal risk-sharing is most important in a given community is im-
portant for evaluation of policies that may affect the sustainability of informal insurance. One such
group of policies is those that aim to increase individuals' access to savings, such as rural bank
expansion, cell phone banking and microsavings accounts. Access to savings can crowd out limited
commitment-constrained insurance if savings can be used after individuals renege on their informal
insurance obligations (Ligon, Thomas, and Worrall 2000). On the other hand, savings access may
crowd out insurance subject to hidden income if individuals' savings are not observable by the
community, and the degree of crowdout will be complete if hidden savings offers the same rate
of return as community-controlled savings (Cole and Kocherlakota 2001), (Doepke and Townsend
2006). Technologies that make observing others' incomes easier (such as crop price information dis-
semination) or harder (such as taking individual deposits rather than collecting savings at a group
meeting; or access to larger, more anonymous markets) may affect informal insurance constrained
by hidden income, but not if the only barrier to insurance is limited commitment or moral hazard.21
Weather insurance which makes leaving community insurance more palatable will crowd out insur-
ance under limited commitment (Attanasio and Rios-Rull 2000), but not under hidden income or
moral hazard. Policies that expand communities' sanctioning ability (such as community-allocated
aid; see Olken (2005)), or restrict it (such as road access; see Townsend 1995) will also affect limited
commitment constraints, while community-allocated aid may reduce problems of hidden income,
since the community knows the amount of aid each household is getting. Conditional cash transfer
programs may also have differing effects on insurance constrained by limited commitment, moral
hazard or hidden income. 22
This paper suggested a set of tests that can be used to determine whether any of three models
of endogenously incomplete insurance-limited commitment, moral hazard or hidden income-is
consistent with the relationship between current consumption, lagged consumption and other lagged
information. If information from "the past" helps to forecast current consumption, conditional on
one lag of inverse marginal utility, neither limited commitment or moral hazard can fully explain
incomplete insurance. However, if a household's past income helps to forecast current consumption,
in the particular sense that prediction errors ignoring past income are positive when past income
was low, this is consistent with a model in which households cannot directly observe one another's
income and must be given incentives to truthfully report it.
Measurement error in right-hand side variables, which is commonly seen as a threat to power
(causing underrejection of the null), is a particular concern with tests of this type, because mis-
measurement of the proposed sufficient statistic (here, lagged inverse marginal utility) can distort
2Of course, a technology that made observing others' incomes harder could also create a hidden income problem
where none had existed previously.
2 2 Angelucci and De Giorgi (2009) discuss partial insurance of income transfers under Mexico's Progresa program.
the size of the test, causing overrejection of the null, if those variables which are excluded under
the null hypothesis are correlated with the true value of the proposed sufficient statistic. This
concern is addressed here with instrumental variables and by testing overidentifying restrictions on
the reduced forms for the left- and right-hand-side variables.
Results from an 84-month (7-year) panel of households in rural Thailand are inconsistent with
pure moral hazard or limited commitment, and suggest that hidden income plays a role in con-
straining households from achieving full risk sharing. This suggests that policies which make it
easier (harder) for villagers to infer one another's incomes may improve (worsen) risk sharing.
Changes that improve observability of income could include dissemination of crop or other price
information; changes that worsen observability could include access to larger, anonymous markets;
diversification of occupations within a village; electronic payments of remittances or for business
transactions; seasonal migration; and private rather than group banking. Since policies that have
the potential to worsen observability of income may also raise the average level of income, this is
not to suggest that such policies be avoided. However, when possible they should be designed with
consideration of the consequences for informal insurance.
L.A Appendix: Proofs
Define the N-dimensional vector of household incomes at t, ht {YtI} 1, and the history (hi, ... , ht)
ht.
1.A.1 Proof of Proposition 1: Full insurance rules out rank-reversals and de-
pendence of consumption on income
Let Ait be the multiplier on household i's time t promise-keeping constraint, and 7t be the multiplier
on the village's time t budget constraint. Solving (1.1) subject to the promise-keeping constraints
(1.2) and the village's budget constraint (1.3) yields the following first-order conditions for transfers,
promised utility, and assets:
Proof. The FOCs are m
rit(ht) :
77t(ht) = Ait Pr(ht)v'(yit + Tit(ht)) (1.24)
ui,t+1(ht) :
Pr(ht) UN (Ut+1 (h t ), at+1(ht), e) Pr (ht) Ait, Vht, i < N (1.25)0Bui,t+1I(ht)
at+1:
Prh)UN (ut+ I h) t+1 (t),e
oat+1 (ht)
and the envelope conditions:
9UN (ut (ht ), at (ht 1), e')
uit (ht-1) ' =-AiVi < N (1.27)
9UN (ut (ht-1), at (ht-), e/) -ti(ht-1 ) (1.28)
oat(ht-1)
The FOCs for transfers for households i and N imply
ANt v'(yit - Tit(ht))
Ait v'(yNt + T Nt(h t ))
So that
cit yit + Tit (ht) v'- ANv'(yNt + TNt(ht)) (1.29)
Substituting into the law of motion for assets,
N N
N~t~ at +Zy/1 (ANt VI(YNt + TNt(ht))) (1.30)R-1at+1 = at + yit - v(i -- Tt 
-0
which is a single equation in cNt, i.e. CNt depends only on the aggregate endowment, and not on ht
or {yit}. Then (1.29) implies that for all households, cit depends only on the aggregate endowment.
Using (1.25) and (1.27), Ait = Ait+ 1 = Ai, Vi, t.
Further, for all i, j in the network:
V(Y+TN 
=t) Ai, Vr, t, i < N
V'(Yr + Tirt)
V'(Yr + Tjrt) _ Aj
V'(Yr + Tirt) Ai
So if in the first period, household i consumes more than household j, this will be the case
in all subsequent periods, and vice versa. Therefore under full insurance the ordering of initial
multipliers Aio or equivalently initial promises uio will determine the ordering of household i in the
consumption distribution in all periods.E
1.A.2 Proof of Proposition 2: Under moral hazard, lagged inverse marginal
utility is a sufficient statistic for current consumption
The proof proceeds in two steps. First, to show that the difference between the multipliers on the
household's time t promise- and threat-keeping constraints equals expected time t inverse marginal
utility. Second, that the expected difference between the multipliers on the household's time t
promise- and threat-keeping constraints equals time t inverse marginal utility; the difference is a
random walk (conditional on the time t budget multiplier, qt).
Again let Ait be the multiplier on household i's promise-keeping constraint, and 77 be the
multiplier on the village's time t budget constraint. Let (it be the multiplier on household i's
incentive-compatibility constraint. (Since there are only two possible effort levels and utility is
separable in consumption and effort, the incentive-compatibilty constraint will be binding at the
optimum (Grossman and Hart 1983).)
The planner's problem is now
uN(Ut, Ot, at le) max
{rrt},{ur,t+1 },{r,t+1 }
S
I Pri1V(Yr + TNrt) - c(1) + #Ey{}uN (ut+1, Gi+1, at+1|e)
r=1
subject to the promise-keeping constraints:
S
Prii [V(Yr + Tirt) - c(1) + /Uir,t+1] Uit, i < N (Ait)
r=1
the law of motion for assets:
N
R-1 at+1 = at - T irt (Nm)
the incentive-compatibility constraints:
((it)Z Prii[v (Yr + Tirt) + #Uir,t+1] - c(1)
r=1
S
= ZPrO[V (Yr + Tirt) + #ntir,t+1] - c(O)
threat-keeping 1: if the household disobeyed yesterday but obeys today, they don't get more
than ntt :
S
Prio[V(Yr + rirt) - c(1) + /Uir,t+1] lit, i < N (@iit)
r=1
threat-keeping 2: if the household disobeyed yesterday and disobeys today, they don't get more
than uit :
SSPrOO[V(Yr + irt) - c(O) + #fIir,t+I] < flit, i < N (@2it)
r=1
The FOCs are:
'rirt -1
7tPr1
V'(Yr + Tirt)
Pril - Prol (it
Pri 1
Pr1O 
- PrOO 2it
Pril Prii
9UN (- , I e)
Y-ilyl al r,t+1
EUN (-, -, -le)
Giir,t+1
it + (it - Prlo I)lit
Prii
_ Prol Proo
Pr1l Pr i
OUN,, Ie)
Etyl Oat+1
and the envelope conditions:
OUNt (ut, fit, ate'
OUirt
_aOlNt (Ut, Ot, at
09UNt (Ut, ft, atel
Oat
= 'Mt
= 
4
'lit + ?)2it
= 
771t
Multiplying the FOC for each -rirt by prii and summing gives
7tE , |v' = Ait - ( 4 lit + b2it)
E(pyr + irt) e
Expected inverse marginal utility at t equals the difference Ait - (#1it + b2it) (Step 1)
Uir,t+1
Uir,t+1
Adding the FOCs for Uir,t+1 and fGir,t+1 gives:
(-&uN( ut+1, Ot+1, at+ile) _9UN (Ut+l, fit+1, at+1ie)
'~{ tI(} Uir,t±1 OfUir,t±1
Pr1 0 + Prol PrOO
Pr1l , Prll Prl 1
Uir,t+1 Uir,t+1
it rll (it Pr lit - Proo2it
Prll Pril Prl1
V'(Yr + Tirt)
Lagging this by one period,
77t-1 E1- alN (Ut, Oit, at Ie') alN (ut, fit, at e')
v'(yi,t-1 + Ti,t-1) =Bi Efti
So that, using the time t envelope conditions for uit and fit :
?7t- - Ai - (Oit ± 0k2i)
V'(Yi,t_1 + ri,t_1)
Using Step 1, this implies
1771
v'(yi,t-1 + ri,t-i) ?7t_ i v'(yit + Tit)
Inverse marginal utility times the budget multiplier is a random walk (given the time t budget
multiplier).
LIMU is a sufficient statistic for past information in forecasting consumption.E
1.A.3 Proof of Proposition 3: Lagged inverse marginal utility is a sufficient
statistic under limited commitment
Let Ait be the multiplier on household i's promise-keeping constraint, and It(h') be the multiplierPr(ht) Pr(ht)
on the village's time t budget constraint after history ht. Using the stationarity of the problem,
Pr(ht~u(ht-l), a(ht~~1), e) =_ Pr(h'lht-1) = Pr(ht)
so probabilities are written conditional only on the time t realization ht. Let #it(ht) be the multiplier
on household i's participation constraint after history ht.
Assume that there is at least one realization ht such that no household's participation constraint
is binding: this guarantees differentiability of the planner's value function (Koeppl 2006). Solving
(1.1) subject to the promise-keeping constraints (1.2), the participation constraints (1.5) and the
village's budget constraint (1.3) yields the following first-order conditions for transfers, promised
utility, and assets:
rit (ht) :
77t(ht) = (Ait + #it (ht)) v'(yit + rit (ht)) (1.31)
ui,t+1(ht) :
Pr(ht) OUN(Ut+1(h t ), at+1(ht), e) -Pr(ht t , i < N (1.32)
Oui,t+i(ht)
at+1(ht) :
Prl)8N (ut+1 (ht), at+1 (t),e
Bat+1 (ht)
and the envelope conditions for current promises (1.27) and assets (1.28):
YUN (ut ('1)at 
- Vi <) N/
Oui(ht-l)
auN(Ut (ht),at(ht),e) 
- (h'-)
aat(ht-1)
It will be helpful to use the following result:
Lemma 6 The double (yit, 77) is a sufficient statistic for the N-vector of income realizations ht in
determining household i's transfer: rit (ht) = rit (yit, 7t )
Proof. Note that, when #it(ht) > 0, i.e. household i's participation constraint is binding,
(1.31) and (1.27) imply that the household's transfer and future promise are set to make the
household exactly indifferent between staying in the network or defaulting, and to equate the cost
of providing the current transfer r and future promise u, irrespective of the income realizations of
other households in the network:
V(yr + rit (ht)) + #ui,t+1(ht) = uut (yr)
V'(Yr +T-t(ht)) -(uN (ut+1(ht), at+1(ht) e)>-
(9ui,t+1 (ht)
so rit(h'|44t(ht) > 0) = rit(yit,rqt). And, when Oit(ht) = 0, i.e. household i's participation con-
straint is not binding, (1.31) and (1.27) imply that v'(yit+Tit(ht )) = , so, again, Tit(ht|#it(ht)
0) = rit (yit, 7t). M
This lemma allows us to write rit(yit, ?t) for Tit(ht). Using the FOCs for Tit(yit, it) and
Ui,t+1(ht):
?t(ht) = Pr(ht) OuN(ut+1(h t ), at+i(ht), e) v,(yit + -rit (yit, t ))Oui,t+i(ht)
Tit(YitBuN (ut+1 (ht), at+1(ht), e)
= Pr(yit, rt)v'(yit+-rit(yt,r)) Pr(h lyt, qt) a u1 ,t+)(h t)
IB0ui,t+1(ht)
since Pr(yit, t) Pr(h lyt, i3) = Pr(ht n (yit, rn)) = Pr(ht n (r/t(ht))). This says that inverse marginal
utility, weighted by the shadow price of resources scaled by the probability of (yit, rt), is equal to
the gradient of the planner's value function with respect to household i's time t + 1 promised utility
weighted by the probability of the N-vector of income realizations ht, given (yit, r/t):
rt/(ht) B= Pr(htIyt,7) auN (ut+1(h ), at+1(h t),e) (134)
Pr(yit, Tt)v'(yit + Tit(yit, r/t)) Bui,t+i(ht)
Note that
ES , (ht) Pr(y+yit)-T 77t)(ht)Pr(yit, ?7t)v' (yit + -rit (yit, jat)) v' (yit + Tit (yit, nt) h|P hE s,,>
since the term (+(yitt))does not depend on ht: Pr(yit, it) is the unconditional probability
that (yit, 7t) occurs.
Summing (1.34) over all time t realizations ht such that Pr(htIyit, 7t) > 0 gives
Pr(yit, t)- 
_ E 7t (ht)
v'(yit + Tit(yit, t)) htl Pr(ht yit,7t)>0
PUN(ut+1(ht ), at+1(ht), e)
Pr(htlyat - t
ht I Pr(htlyt,ah)>0)
{09UN (Ut+1ht, at+(ht)e
= E us,t+1I(ht) Yit, f
So that
1 E 77t (ht) = Pr(yit, qt)E
v'(yit + Tit(Yit, 7t)) htl Pr(htlyt,7t)>0
Summing over all realizations of (yit, 77) gives
S v'(yit + it(yit, t)) ht Pr(htly ,47)>0
Et(ht)
S'(yit + Tit(yit, 7)))
OUN(Ut+1(ht ), at+1(ht), e)
aui,t+i (ht)
S(ht) = E (OUN(ut+ (ht), at+( )
(h au,t+1i(ht )
E9UNN(Ut+1 (ht), at+ I(t),e
09ui't+1 (ht)
So, using the time t + 1 envelope condition for us,t+1(ht), (1.27):
7t (ht) = P h uN(ut+1(ht), at+(ht),e) Eht1 (Ae)t+1|ht)
'v'(yit + rit (ht)) r(ht) - ui,t+i(ht)
lagging by one period and using the FOC for rat(ht) = rit(yit, t),
( Ai't 1
Starting from the multiplier on the initial promise-keeping constraint, A0 ,
Eh v'(cit(ht))|y~
Ai,t-1(ht-1)
at (ht)
Ao±
q=1
_P (g-q)
p( yq )'q
Yit, t
Pr(htlhtl) )*
-i,t+1 k )
E h7,ty (ht) = o'(ci,t_ i(ht-1)) qt (ht)
Lagged inverse marginal utility, conditional on the current shadow price of resources ?It(ht), captures
all past information relevant to forecasting current marginal utility of consumption.E
1.A.4 Proof of proposition 4: With hidden income, lagged inverse marginal
utility over-predicts consumption for low-lagged income households
Let Ait be the multiplier on household i's promise-keeping constraint, ?I the multiplier on the
budget constraint, and (;rt the multiplier on the truth-telling constraint when yt = yr. The FOCs
are:
Tirt
7t (Pree'At + (irt) V'(Yr + Trt) -- i,r+1,tV'(Yr+1 + Tirt)
Uir,t+1
-aUN (ut+1, at+1, e)Pree'E{y jlyi} =utt+ e Pree'At + (irt -i,r+1,t
Oair,t+1
at+1:
-E uN(ut+1, at+1,e) _
o{at+1
envelope conditions:
BuN(ut, at, e')
Ouit
OuN(ut, at,e)
Oat
The lagged promise-keeping multiplier, At-1, is a sufficient statistic for history, since the FOC
for Uir,t+1 and the envelope condition for uit imply
IE (Ai,t+1|qt+1) = Ait + irt -
p(yt)
lagging one period,
E (Aitir,t-1 -=i1r+1,t-1
P(Yt-1)
The FOC for transfers at t - 1 implies that
1
A(,t_1 = x (1.35)
irnt-iv'(yr + Tirt) - (i,r+I,t-1V'(Yr+i + Tirt)
(t-1P(Yt-I)
Since E(AitI7t) = Ai,t1,
IE(Aitlqt) 1x
V'(Yr + Tr,t-i)
irnt-iv'(yr + Trt) - i,r+1,t-1'(yr+1 + Trt)
( t-1P(yt-1)
Using the envelope condition for uit, the time t - 1 FOC for uit can be written
OUN (Ut, at, e) OUN(Ut-1, at-1, e) _ i,r,t-1 - i,r+1,t-1
Duit aui,t-1 Pree!
First, assume no aggregate uncertainty: at = at-i
Since UN(Ut, at, e) is concave in each uit, when a household's promise decreases (uit < ui,t_1),
then
uN (ut, at, e) > N (ut-1, at, e)
Duit aui,t-1
SO dir,t1 > i,r+1,t-1: truth-telling constraints bind more at lower than higher output levels.
Then, since V'(Yr + Trt) > V'(Yr+1 + Trt),
ir,t-lV'(Yir + Tir,t-i) > i,r+1,t-1V'(yir+1 + Tir,t-1)
so
V'(Yir + Tir,t-1)
LIMU over-predicts Ait when the household's promise decreased between t - 1 and t. Promises
are unobserved, but truth-telling implies that promises are an increasing function of income, so
low-yt-i households will get less consumption at t than predicted using lagged inverse marginal
utility.
However, if at > at-1, there is an offsetting effect:
g &UN(ut, at, e)Ouit aat
uN (ut, at, e) &uN (t, at-1, e)
9uit Oui,t-i
However, we can sign this effect: by the envelope condition for uit:
9uN (ut, at,e) Ait
So
g2 uN (ut , at, e) _ Ait
&uitaat Oat
/ Ait\ {At\
sgn =at sgn
Using the formula for Ait:
OAit 1
a'lt V'(Yr + Tirt) X
a -irtV'(yr + Tirt) - (i,r+1,tV'(yr+1 + Tirt)
at) ,±p( yr )
sgn =- sgn ( irtv'(yr + Tirt) -- i,r+1,to'(yr+1 + rirt))
That is, when uit < ui,t-i,
02 uN (ut, at,e) >0
Ouitiat
so the extent of "overprediction at the bottom" is reduced the greater is Aat at - at_1.M
1.A.5 Proof of proposition 5: Less variable income processes display a reduced
wedge between LIMU and current inverse marginal utility:
Using (1.35):
E(Atir la) = 1V'(yq + Tiq,t-1)
t- lv'(yq + Tiqt-1) - (iq+1t-1V'(yq+1 + Tiqt+1)(1 - ~qt~iv(Yq + ?1t iPqee'
Define
0iqIi-iv'(yq + Tiqt-1) - (iq+1t-1V'(yq+1 + Tiqt+1)(y) 1 -?7tPqee
O(Yq) measures the "wedge" between Ait and 1 . Take the expectation of O(Yq), given thatV'(Yq+Tiq,t-
yq was below the average level of income y:
E [O(Yq)|Yq <g] =
iqt-lyq + Tiqt-1) - iq+1t-1V yg+1 + Tigt+1)
q:Yq g [ j ( +t-P qee'
Fixing the probability of each income realization, Pqee', a SOSD reduction in variability will reduce
E [V'(yq + Tiq,t-1) - V'(Yq+1 + Tiq,t+1)j
since income levels are closer together (note these differences remain negative since Yq < Yq+1), and
will reduce
since
aUN (ut, at, e) _UN(Ut-1, at-1, e) _i,r,t-1 - i,r+1,t-1
0uit (9ui,t-1 Pree'
and a reduction in the amount of uncertainty about the household's income moves uit and ui,tIcloser
together, on average (insurance improves). By the concavity of the planner's value function, this
in turn reduces the gap auN (ut,at,e) _ ON(Ut,at-1,e) (which remains negative since the household's19 uit 4Oui~
promise is falling).
Therefore, E [(yq)Iyq <] -+ 1 as the variability of y decreases, so that the amount of additional
information contained in yt-1 falls.M
L.A Appendix: Tables
Table 1: Summary statistics
Panel A: Income, demographics and occupation
531-HH Non-continuously N
panel mean observed HH
difference
Income
Monthly income
Monthly expenditure
Monthly income, resids
Monthly expenditure, resids
Household composition
Household size
Adult equivalents
Adult men
Adult women
Occupation (household head, baseline)
8981.224
5213.472
32.443
67.416
4.525
3.786
1.382
1.552
-2624.627
-1108.721***
-163.756
-570.84
-0.663***
-0.638***
-0.324***
-0.247***
670
670
670
670
669
669
669
669
Rice farmer 0.355 0.116* 667
Non-ag labor 0.119 0.033 667
Corn farmer 0.098 -0.062* 667
Livestock farmer 0.089 -0.082*** 667
Ag wage labor 0.051 0.007 667
Other crop farmer 0.043 -0.036* 667
Shrimp/fish farmer 0.036 -0.021 667
Orchard farmer 0.017 0.005 667
Construction 0.015 0.036* 667
Other 0.074 0.013 667
Notes: All baht- denominated variables were converted to 2002 baht using the Thai Ministry of Trade's
Rural Consumer Price Index for Thailand. In 2002, approximately 42 Thai baht were equal to US$1.
Income and expenditure residuals are residuals from regression on village, year, occupation and
demographic variables.
Table 1: Summary statistics
Panel B: Gifts
531-HH
panel mean
Non-continuously N
observed HH
difference
Gifts to orgs in village
Gifts to orgs not in village
Gifts given for events in village
Gifts given for events not in village
Other gifts to HHs in village
Other gifts to HHs not in village
Gifts from orgs in village
Gifts from orgs not in village
Gifts rec'd for events in village
Gifts rec'd for events not in village
Other gifts from HHs in village
Other gifts from HHs not in village
33.714
53.749
103.219
220.117
147.317
637.198
36.105
38.963
316.862
80.068
118.129
1327.131
Notes: All baht-denominated variables were converted to 2002 baht
Rural Consumer Price Index for Thailand. In 2002, approximately
-9.813
-29.063**
-35.550***
-140.576***
-29.854
-96.868
670
670
670
670
670
670
-20.002** 670
10.82 670
-213.653*** 670
9.976 670
-20.575 670
-253.376 670
using the Thai Ministry of Trade's
42 Thai baht were equal to US$1.
Income and expenditure resids are residuals from regression on village, year, occupation and
demographic variables.
Gifts given
Gifts received
Table 2: Consumption smoothing at the individual and village level
log household income
avg log household income
Village-year fixed effect?
Village-year F statistic
P value
Observations
R-squared
log
household
PCE
(1)
.0778***
[.00741
log
household
PCE
OLS
(2)
.0669***
[.0073]
log avg
household
PCE
log
household
PCE
(4)
.2113***
[.0394]
log
household
PCE
IV
(5)
.1737***
[.0444]
.1722***
[.0499]
No Yes
5.256
- 0.0000
3323 3323
0.0318 0.1807
112
0.8763
1879
log avg
household
PCE
.3002***
[.1164]
Yes
3.471
0.0000
1879
Notes: Household-level variables in columns (1), (2), (4) and (5) are deviations from individual means.
Standard errors in brackets. All variables are in 2002 Thai baht. F-statistic tests the joint significance of the
village-year effects. In columns (4) and (5) income is instrumented with quarterly rainfall deviations from
average province-level quarterly rainfall, and deviations, and deviations and squared deviations interacted with
11 occupation dummies. In column (6) income is instrumented with quarterly rainfall deviations and squared
deviations. Rainfall data is available for 1999-2003. *p<.1, ** p<.05, *** p<.01
Table 3: Movement in the consumption distribution
Panel A: Correlations in per capita expenditure rank over time
Rank in village PCE distribution
2005 2004 2003 2002 2001 2000 1999
2005 1.000
2004 0.643 1.000
2003 0.645 0.658 1.000
2002 0.565 0.681 0.680 1.000
2001 0.453 0.549 0.591 0.589 1.000
2000 0.354 0.409 0.436 0.437 0.539 1.000
1999 0.375 0.442 0.466 0.459 0.525 0.824 1.000
Notes: PCE is household expenditure divided by adult
equivalents.
Table 3: Movement in the consumption distribution
Panel B: Changes in PCE rank vs. changes in income
OLS Ordered
probit*
(LHS var: (LHS var:
change in direction
PCE rank) of change)
Change in ln(income) .527 .0586
[.1414] [.0089]
3.73 6.56
R-squared 0.0052
N 2674 2674
Notes: Standard errors in brackets, t-statistics in italics.
*Marginal effect on probability of positive change in income rank,
evaluated at mean income.
Table 4: Testing sufficiency of lagged inverse marginal utility
Full sample
(1) (2)
ln(LIMU) .7386*** .7126***
[.0208] [.023]
Lagged log income .0424***
[.007]
Village-year fixed efftects?
R-squared
Observations
Yes
0.6645
3186
Yes
0.6687
2845
Drop top and bottom
5% of PCE
(3) (4)
.6215*** .5952***
[.0212] [.0233]
.0378***
[.0068]
Yes
0.6200
2874
Yes
0.6299
2573
Notes: Robust standard errors in brackets. Ln(LIMU) is
proportional to ln(ct,). LIMU is lagged inverse marginal utility.
Table 5: Testing Amnesia
ln(
In(
ln(
Full Sample
(1) (2)
ln(LIMU) 0.846*** 0.756***
[0.011] [0.019]
LIMU)X25 0.041*** 0.134***
[0.001] [0.015]
LMU)X50 0.059*** 0.152***
[0.001] [0.015]
JLMU)X75 0.099*** 0.201***
[0.002] [0.022]
ln(income)
ln(income)X25
ln(income)X50
ln(income)X75
ln(LIMU)+ln(LIMU)X75
F-statistic
p-value
Chi-squared (High=Low)
p-value
0.093***
[0.013]
-0.084***
[0.013]
-0.085***
[0.013]
-0.092***
[0.018]
0.957
3576.2
0.000
Fixed effects Village Village Village Village Village Village
Sample Full Full Middle 90% Middle 90% HHs w/ above HHs w/ above
by PCE by PCE median growth median growth
in PCE, low in PCE, high
var. villages var. villages
R-squared 0.85 0.86 0.82 0.83 0.70 0.74
N 3186 2860 2874 2589 665 811
Note: High-rainfall variance villages are those with above-median standard deviation of annual rainfall.
Robust standard errors in brackets (clustered at the household level). Ln(LIMU) is proportional to ln(c- 1).
LIMU is lagged inverse marginal utility. *p<.1, ** p<.05, *** p<.01
Low rainfall
variance
(5)
0.949***
[0.027]
Drop top and
bottom 5% of PCE
(3) (4)
0.790*** 0.714***
[0.014] [0.021]
0.038*** 0.120***
[0.001] [0.016]
0.054*** 0.139***
[0.001] [0.015]
0.088*** 0.166***
[0.002] [0.020]
0.083***
[0.013]
-0.074***
[0.013]
-0.076***
[0.013]
-0.071***
[0.017]
0.880
2807.3
0.000
High rainfall
variance
(6)
0.933***
[0.024]
-0.004
[0.012]
0.20
(0.658)
0.030*
[0.012]
Table 6: Testing the hidden income model (CRRA utility)
LHS=Prediction residuals from a regression of ln(ct) on ln(ct-1) and a village-year effect.
OLS IV
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Constant (ce)
Lagged log income (3)
Control for aggregate shock interactions?
Chi-square stat (a<0, 3>0)
p value
Observations
-.5406
[.0691]
.0509
[.0061]
Yes
81.47
(0.000)
2781
-.4839
[.0694]
.0453
[.0063]
No
54.84
(0.000)
2781
-.2301
[.0668]
.0224
[.0059]
-.2123
[.0576]
.0205
[.0052]
Yes No
19.11 19.40
(0.000) (0.000)
2322 2322
Notes: Bootstrapped standard errors in brackets. All regressions include a village-year
fixed effect. Chi-square stat is the statistic for the test that the slope>0, intercept<0.
P-value in parentheses.
Table 7: Test overidentifying restrictions on reduced form for consumption
Cultivationt_1
Cultivationt-2
Cultivationt-3
LivestocktI
Livestockt-2
Livestockt-3
Fishti
(1)
ln(c)
0.1033
[0.0235]
0.0112
[0.0207]
-0.0283
[0.0318]
0.0141
[0.0147]
0.0104
[0.0057]
0.0039
[0.0105]
Fisht-2
Fisht--3
Rank in 1999 0.027
[0.0027]
Constant 9.057
[0.0500]
N 2124
Chi-sqared statistic (p-value) on
ratios of t - 1 coefficients equal
4.1286 (0.0422) 3.7292 (0.0535)
Notes: Standard errors clustered at the household level in brackets. Coefficients and standard errors
on income variables (in levels) are multiplied by 100,000. "Cultivation" is income from growing crops
(rice, corn, orchard crops, etc.). "Livestock" is income from raising cows, pigs, ducks, etc.
"Fish" is income from raising fish and shrimp. "Rank in 1999" is the household's rank in the 1999
distribution of per capita consumption.
(1)/(2)
1.575
0.632
(2)
ln(ct_1 )
0.0656
[0.0203]
0.047
[0.0164]
-0.0295
[0.0326]
0.0223
[0.0120]
0.0085
[0.0073]
0.002
[0.0092]
(3)/(4)
1.578
0.767
(3)
ln(ct)
0.1029
[0.0236]
0.0135
[0.0204]
-0.0376
[0.0325]
0.0396
[0.0166]
0.0121
[0.0083]
0.012
[0.0094]
0.0274
[0.0027]
9.0472
[0.0496]
2124
(4)
ln(ct..)
0.0652
[0.0204]
0.0498
[0.0166]
-0.0396
[0.0334]
0.0516
[0.0142]
0.0077
[0.0091]
0.0129
[0.0092]
0.0278
[0.0026]
8.9854
[0.0483]
2124
0.0273
[0.0027]
8.9959
[0.0487]
2124
Table 8: Testing the hidden income model, nonparametric u()
Panel A: LHS=Prediction residuals from a regression of ln(ct) on f(ct_1 ) and a
village-year effect.
OLS IV
(1) (2)
Constant (a) -0.370 -0.141
[0.0643] [0.0668]
Lagged log income (3) 0.034 0.014
[0.0059] [0.0060]
Control for aggregate shock interactions? Yes Yes
Chi-square stat (a<0, #>0) 33.86 7.30
p value (0.000) (0.026)
Observations 2781 2322
Panel B: LHS=ln(ct)
OLS IV
LIMU (f (ct-i)) 0.906*** 1.140***
[0.0178] [0.0286]
Lagged log income 0.0446*** 0.0209**
[0.0066] [0.0079]
Village-year effect? Yes Yes
N 2781 2322
Notes: In Panel A, standard errors bootstrapped (50 replications) to account for the
generated regressor. LHS variable is prediction residuals from OLS or IV regression
of ln(ct) on f(ct-1 ) and a village-year effect. Column (1) uses the nonparametric
spline estimate of f(ct-i) as an explanatory variable to form the predicted value
of ln(ct); column (2) instruments this nonparametric estimate with its lag, f(ct- 2 )-
Chi-square stat is the statistic for the test that the slope>0, intercept<0. p-values in
parentheses.
Table 9a: Testing the hidden income model:
Split by predictive power of rainfall
LHS=Prediction
year effect.
residuals from a regression of ln(ct) on ln(ct_1 ) and a village-
High rainfall R 2
(1)
Low rainfall R 2
(2)
Constant (a)
Lagged log income (3)
Control for aggregate shock interactions?
Chi-square stat (a<0, 0>0)
p value
Observations
-0.421
[0.088]
0.047
[0.008]
Yes
28.581
(0.000)
1173
-0.621
[0.090]
0.056
[0.008]
Yes
54.156
(0.000)
1326
Notes: Bootstrapped standard errors in brackets. Chi-square stat is the statistic
for the test that the slope>0, intercept<0. p-value in parentheses.
Table 9b: Testing the hidden income model:
Split by variance of income
LHS=Prediction residuals from a regression of ln(ct) on ln(ct_1 ) and a village-
year effect.
High variance Low variance
(1) (2)
Constant (a) -0.49 -0.406
[0.087] [0.089]
Lagged log income (/) 0.047 0.037
[0.008] [0.008]
Control for aggregate shock interactions? Yes Yes
Chi-square stat (a<0, 0>0) 56.96 22.03
p value (0.000) (0.000)
Observations 1387 1394
Notes: Bootstrapped standard errors in brackets. Chi-square stat is the statistic
for the test that the slope>0, intercept<0. p-value in parentheses.
Table 10: Predicting income with rainfall
Occupation R 2  N
Rice farmer 0.386 752
Construction 0.292 32
Orchard farmer 0.222 36
Shrimp/fish farmer 0.195 76
Agricultural wage labor 0.143 108
Livestock 0.142 188
Other crop farmer 0.120 92
Non-agricultural wage labor 0.116 252
Other 0.100 156
Corn farmer 0.088 208
Notes: R 2 is the R-squared of annual income on quarterly
income deviations and squared deviations, plus province-
fixed effects. N is the number of household-year
observations.
Avg std deviation of village incomes by rainfall variance0
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High (low) variance villages are above (below) the median monthly rainfall variance over 1999-2005.
Figure 1: Standard deviation of incomes by rainfall variance
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Chapter 2
The miracle of microfinance?
Evidence from a randomized
evaluation1
2.1 Introduction
Microfinance institutions (MFIs) have expanded rapidly in recent years: According to the Micro-
credit Summit Campaign, microfinance institutions had 154,825,825 clients, more than 100 million
of them women, as of December 2007. In 2006, Mohammad Yunus and the Grameen Bank were
awarded the Nobel Prize for Peace, for their contribution to the reduction in World Poverty.
CGAP, a branch of the World Bank dedicated towards promoting micro-credit, reports in the
FAQ section of its web-site that "There is mounting evidence to show that the availability of financial
services for poor households - microfinance - can help achieve the MDGs." Specifically to answer the
question "What Do We Know about the Impact of Microfinance?" it lists eradication of poverty and
hunger, universal primary education, the promotion of gender equality and empowerment of women,
reduction in child mortality and improvement in maternal health as contributions of microfinance
for which there is already evidence.
However evidence such as presented by CGAP is unlikely to satisfy the critics of microfinance
who fear that it is displacing more effective anti-poverty measures or even contributing to over-
borrowing and therefore even greater long term poverty. For instance, an August 2009 article in
This chapter is coauthored with Abhijit Banerjee, Esther Duflo and Rachel Glennerster.
The Wall Street Journal states that Indian households are being "carpet bombed" by loans, and
quotes a woman who borrowed from multiple MFIs saying, "I took from one bank to pay the
previous one. And I did it again.... [Microfinance] increased our desires for things we didn't have."
Another overindebted borrower is quoted saying she would like to see microlenders kicked out of
her community "[n]ot just now, but forever" (Gokhale 2009).
The problem is with comparing microfinance clients to non-clients is that clients are self-selected
and therefore not comparable to non-clients. Microfinance organizations also purposively chose
some villages and not others. Difference in difference estimates can control for fixed differences
between clients and non-clients, but it is likely that those who choose join MFIs would be on
different trajectories even absent microfinance. This invalidates comparisons over time between
clients and non clients (see Alexander-Tedeschi and Karlan (2007)). Moreover, anecdotes about
highly successful entrepreneurs or deeply indebted borrowers tell us nothing about the effect of
microfinance for the average borrower, much less the average household.
These issues make the evaluation of the impact of microcredit a particularly difficult problem.
Thus, there is so far no consensus among academics on the impact of microcredit. For example,
Pitt and Khandker (1998) use the eligibility threshold for getting a loan from Grameen bank as a
source of identifying variation in a structural model of the impact of microcredit, and find large
positive effects, especially for women. However, Morduch (1998) criticizes the approach, pointing
out that there is in fact no discontinuity in the probability to borrow at that threshold. 2
In 1999, Jonathan Morduch wrote that "the 'win-win' rhetoric promising poverty alleviation
with profits has moved far ahead of the evidence, and even the most fundamental claims remain
unsubstantiated" . In 2005, Beatriz Armendariz and Morduch reiterated the same uncertainty
in their book The Economics of Microfinance, noting that the relatively few carefully conducted
longitudinal or cross-sectional impact studies yielded conclusions much more measured than MFIs'
anecdotes would suggest, reflecting the difficulty of distinguishing the causal effect of microcredit
from selection effects. They repeated these cautions in the book's second edition in 2010.
Given the complexity of this identification problem, the ideal experiment to estimate the effect
of microcredit appears to be to randomly assign microcredit to some areas, and not some others,
and compare outcomes in both sets of areas: randomization would ensure that the only difference
between residents of these areas is the greater ease of access to microcredit in the treatment area.
2Kaboski and Townsend (2005) use a natural experiment (the introduction of a village fund whose size is fixed by
village) to estimate the impact of the amount borrowed and find impacts on consumption, but not investment.
Another possibility would to randomly assign individuals to treatment and comparison groups, for
example by randomly selecting clients among eligible applicants: the difficulty may then be that in
the presence of spillovers, the comparison between treatment and comparison would be biased.
Randomized designs have been used to explore the impact of number of microfinance product
design such as group lending and repayment schedules (e.g. Gine and Karlan (2006, 2009), Field
and Pande (2008) and Fischer (2010)), while Kaboski and Townsend (2009a, 2009b) use a natural
experiment in Thailand to study the intensive-margin impact of a village credit program in Thai-
land. In work close in spirit to ours, Karlan and Zinman (2009) use individual randomization of the
''marginal" clients in a credit scoring model to evaluate the impact of consumer lending in South
Africa, and find that access to microcredit increases the probability of employment, and Karlan and
Zinman (2010) use a similar random assignment procedure in Manila to study the impacts of "sec-
ond generation" individual-liability microfinance on male and female borrowers. However, to date,
to the best of our knowledge, there have not been any large-scale randomized trials with the poten-
tial to examine what happens when "first generation" microcredit (i.e., very small, joint-liability,
female-directed loans) becomes available in a new market. 3
In this paper we report on the first randomized evaluation of the effect of the canonical group-
lending microcredit model. In 2005, 52 of 104 neighborhood in Hyderabad (the fifth largest city
in India, and the capital of Andhra Pradesh, the Indian state were microcredit has expended the
fastest) were randomly selected for opening of an MFI branch by one of the fastest growing MFIs
in the area, Spandana, while the remainder were not. Fifteen to 18 months after the introduction
of microfinance in each area, a comprehensive household survey was conducted in an average of
65 households in each slum, for a total of 6,850 households. In the mean time, other MFIs had
also started their operations in both treatment and comparison households, but the probability
to receive an MFI loans was still 8.3 percentage points (44%) higher in treatment areas than in
comparison areas (27% borrowers in treated areas vs. 18.7% borrowers in comparison areas).
Inspired by claims similar to those on the CGAP website and in the The Wall Street Journal, we
examine the effect on both outcomes that directly relate to poverty like consumption, new business
creation, business income, etc. as well as measures of other human development outcomes like
education, health and women's empowerment.
3 Karlan and Zinman (2009) use individual randomization of the "marginal" clients in a credit scoring model to
evaluate the impact of consumer lending in South Africa, and find that access to microcredit increases the probability
of employment down the road. Karlan and Zinman (2010) use a similar random assignment to study the impacts of
"second generation" individual-liability microfinance on male and female borrowers in Manila.
On balance our results show significant and not insubstantial impact on both how many new
businesses get started and the profitability of pre-existing businesses. We also do see significant
impacts on the purchase of durables, and especially business durables. However there is no impact
on average consumption, although the effects are heterogenous, and as we will argue later, there
may well be a delayed positive effect on consumption. Nor is there any discernible effect on any of
the human development outcomes, though, once again, it is possible that things will be different in
the long run.
2.2 Experimental Design and Background
2.2.1 The Product
Spandana is one of the largest and fastest growing microfinance organizations in India, with 1.2
million active borrowers in March 2008, up from 520 borrowers in 1998-9, its first year of operation
(MIX Market 2009). From its birth place in Guntur, a dynamic city in Andhra Pradesh, it has
expanded in the State of Andhra Pradesh, and several others.
The basic Spandana product is the canonical group loan product, first introduced by the
Grameen Bank. A group is comprised of six to 10 women, and 25-45 groups form a "center".
Women are jointly responsible for the loans of their group. The first loan is Rs. 10,000 (about
$200 at market exchange rates, or $1,000 at PPP-adjusted exchange rates). It takes 50 weeks to
reimburse principal and interest rate; the interest rate is 12% (non-declining balance; equivalent to
a 24% APR). If all members of a group repay their loans, they are eligible for second loans of Rs.
10,000-12,000; loan amounts increase up to Rs. 20,000.
Unlike other microfinance organizations, Spandana does not require its clients to borrow to
start a business: the organization recognizes that money is fungible, and clients are left entirely
free to chose the best use of the money, as long as they repay their loan.
Eligibility is determined using the following criteria: (a) female,4 (b) aged 18 to 59, (c) residence
in the same area for at least one year, (d) possesion of valid identification and residential proof
(ration card, voter card, or electricity bill), (e) at least 80% of women in a group must own their
home. Groups are formed by women themselves, not by Spandana. Spandana does not determine
4 Spandana also offers an individual-liability loan. Men are also eligible for individual-liability loans, and individual
borrowers must document a monthly source of income, but the other criteria are the same as for joint-liability loans.
96.5% of Spandana borrowers were female in 2008 (Mix Market 2009). Spandana introduced the individual-liability
loan in 2007; very few borrowers in our sample have individual-liability loans.
loan eligibility by the expected productivity of the investment (although selection into groups may
screen out women who cannot convince fellow group-members that they are likely to repay).
Also, Spandana does not insist on "transformation" in the household (unlike Grameen). Span-
dana is primarily a lending organization, not directly involved in business training, financial literacy
promotion, etc. (Though of course business and financial skills may increase as a result of getting
a loan.)
2.2.2 Experimental Design
Spandana selected 120 areas (identifiable neighborhoods, or bastis) in Hyderabad as places in which
they were interested in opening branches. These areas were selected based on having no pre-existing
microfinance presence, and having residents who were desirable potential borrowers: poor, but not
"the poorest of the poor." Areas with high concentrations of construction workers were avoided
because people who move frequently are not desirable microfinance clients. While those areas are
commonly referred to as "slums", these are permanent settlements, with concrete houses, and some
public amenities (electricity, water, etc.). Within eligible neighborhoods, the largest areas were
not selected for the study, since Spandana was keen to start operations in the largest areas. The
population in the neighborhoods selected for the study ranges from 46 to 555 households.
In each area, a baseline survey was conducted in 2005. Households were selected for the baseline
survey conditional on having a woman between the ages of 18-55 in the household. Information
was collected on household composition, education, employment, asset ownership, decision-making,
expenditure, borrowing, saving, and any businesses currently operated by the household or stopped
within the last year. A total of 2,800 households were surveyed in the baseline. 5
After the baseline survey, sixteen areas were dropped from the study prior to randomization.
These areas were dropped because they were found to contain large numbers of migrant-worker
households. Spandana (like other microfinance agencies) has a rule that loans should only be made
to households who have lived in the same community for at least three years because dynamic
incentives (the promise of more credit in the future) are more effective in motivating repayment
for these households. The remaining 104 areas were paired based on minimum distance according
to per capita consumption, fraction of households with debt, and fraction of households who had
5 Unfortunately, the baseline sample survey was not a random survey of the entire area. In the absence of a
census, the first step to draw the sample was to perform a census of the area. The survey company did not survey a
comprehensive sample, but a sample of the houses located fairly close to the area center. This was rectified before
the endline survey, by conducting a census in early 2007.
a business, and one of each pair was randomly assigned to the treatment group. Spandana then
progressively began operating in the 52 treatment areas, between 2006 and 2007. Note that in the
intervening periods, other MFIs also started their operations, both in treatment and comparison
areas. We will show below that there is still a significant difference between MFI borrowing in
treatment and comparison groups.
A comprehensive census of each area was undertaken in early 2007 to establish a sampling
frame for the followup study, and to determine MFI takeup (to estimate the required sample size at
endline). The endline survey began in August 2007 and ended in April 2008. The endline survey in
each area was conducted at least 12 months after Spandana began disbursing loans, and generally 15
to 18 months after. The census revealed low rates of MFI borrowing even in treatment areas, so the
endline sample consisted of households whose characteristics suggested high propensity to borrow:
households who had resided in the area for at least 3 years and contained at least one woman aged
18 to 55. Spandana borrowers identified in the census were oversampled, and the results presented
below correct for this oversampling so that the results are representative of the population as a
whole. In general, baseline households were not purposely resurveyed in the followup. 6
Table 1, Panel A shows that treatment and comparison areas did not differ in their baseline levels
of population, household indebtedness, businesses per capita, expenditure per capita, or literacy
levels. This is not surprising, since the sample was stratified according to per capita consumption,
fraction of households with debt, and fraction of households who had a business.
Table 1, Panel B shows that households in the followup survey do not systematically differ
between treatment and comparison in terms of literacy, the likelihood that the wife of the household
head works for a wage, the adult-equivalent size of the household, 7 the number of "prime-aged"
women (aged 18 - 45), in the presence of teenagers (aged 13-18) in the household, the percentage
who operate a business opened a year or more ago, or the likelihood of owning land, either in
Hyderabad or in the family's native village.
6Baseline households were not deliberately resurveyed, since they were not a random sample to start with. Fur-
thermore, the baseline sample was too small to detect plausible treatment effects, given the low takeup of MFI loans.
These problems were both corrected in the followup survey, at the cost of not having a panel. The exception to the
non-resurveying of baseline households is a small sample of households (about 500 households) who indicated they
had loans at the baseline, who were surveyed with the goal of understanding the impact of an increase in credit
availability for those households who were already borrowing (though not from MFIs). This analysis is ongoing.
7 Following the conversion to adult equivalents used by Townsend (1994) for rural Andhra Pradesh and Maharastra,
the weights are: for adult males, 1.0; for adult females, 0.9; for males and females aged 13-18, 0.94 and 0.83,
respectively; for children aged 7-12, 0.67 regardless of gender; for children 4-6, 0.52; for toddlers 1-3, 0.32; and for
infants, 0.05. Using a weighting that accounts for within-household economies of scale does not affect the results
(results available on request).
2.2.3 The context: Findings from the Baseline
The average baseline household is a family of 5, with monthly expenditure of Rs 5,000, $540 at
PPP-adjusted exchange rates (World Bank 2006).8 A majority of households (70%) lived in a house
they owned, and the remaining 30% in a house they rented. Almost all of the 7 to 11 year olds
(98%), and 84% of the 12 to 15 year olds, were in school.
There was almost no MFI borrowing in the sample areas at baseline. However, 69% of the
households had at least one outstanding loan. The average loan was Rs. 20,000 (median Rs
10,000), and the average interest rate was 3.85% per month. Loans were taken from moneylenders
(49%), family members (13%), friends or neighbors (28%). Commercial bank loans were very rare.
Although business investment was not commonly named as a motive for borrowing, 31% of
households ran at least one small business at the baseline, compared to an OECD-country average
of 12%. However, these businesses were very small: only 10% had any employees, and typical assets
employed were sewing machines, tables and chairs, balances and pushcarts; 20% of businesses had
no assets whatsoever. Average profits were Rs. 3,040 ($340) per month on average.
Baseline data revealed limited use of consumption smoothing strategies other than borrowing:
34% of the households had a savings account, and only 26% had a life insurance policy. Almost
none had any health insurance. Forty percent of households reported spending Rs. 500 ($54) or
more on a health shock in the last year; 60% of households who had. a sick member had to borrow.
2.2.4 Did the intervention increase MFI borrowing?
Treatment communities were randomly selected to receive Spandana branches, but other MFIs also
started operating both in treatment and comparison areas. We are interested in testing the impact
of microcredit, not just Spandana branches. In order to interpret differences between treatment
and comparison areas as due to microcredit, it must be the case that MFI borrowing is higher in
treatment than in comparison. Table 2 shows that this is the case. Households in treatment areas
are 13.3 percentage points more likely to report being Spandana borrowers-18.6% vs. 5.3% (table
2, column 1). The difference in the percentage of households saying that they borrow from any
MFI is 8.3 percentage points (table 2, column 2), so some households borrowing from Spandana in
treatment areas would have borrowed from another MFI in the absence of the intervention. While
the absolute level of total MFI borrowing is not very high, it is almost 50% higher in treatment than
8 PPP exchange rate: $1=Rs. 9.2. All following references to dollar amounts are in PPP terms unless noted
otherwise.
in comparison areas-27% vs. 18.7%. Columns 3 and 4 show that treatment households also report
significantly more borrowing from MFIs than comparison households. Averaged over borrowers
and non-borrowers, treatment households report Rs 1,408 more borrowing from Spandana, and Rs.
1,257 more from all MFIs.
2.3 The Impacts of Microfinance: Conceptual Framework
The purpose that the borrower reports for borrowing from Spandana is instructive about the kinds
of effects of microcredit access that we might expect. Recall that Spandana does not insist that the
loan be used for business purpose; nevertheless, these responses come from the survey, not what
was reported to Spandana. In the case of 30% of Spandana loans the reported purpose was starting
a new business; 22% were supposed to be used to buy stock for existing business, 30% to repay an
existing loan, 15% to buy a durable for household use, and 15% to smooth household consumption.
(Respondents could list more than one purpose, so purposes add up to more than 100%.) In other
words, while some households plan to use their loans to start a business and others use a loan to
expand a business they already have, many others use the loan for a non-business purpose, such as
repaying another loan, buying a television or meeting day-to-day household expenses.
A feature of starting a business is that there are some costs that must be paid before any revenue
is earned. While a small business like those operated by households in our sample may not have a
lot of durable assets (machinery, property, etc.), they typically need working capital, such as stock
for a store, fabric to make saris, etc. And since there is always a fixed minimum time commitment
in any of these businesses (someone has to sit in the shop, go out to hawk the saris, etc.), it makes
no sense to operate them below a certain scale and hence it is hard to imagine operating even these
businesses without a minimum commitment of working capital. Many businesses also have some
assets, such as a pushcart, dosa tawa, sewing machine, stove, etc. The need to purchase assets and
working capital constitutes a fixed cost of starting a business, and one impact of microfinance may
be that it enables households who would not or could not pay this fixed cost without borrowing,
to become entrepreneurs.
2.3.1 A simple model of occupational choice
No MFI
As a simple model of the decision to become an entrepreneur, consider households who live for two
periods (t = 1, 2) and have endowment income y', y'. Households maximize the utility function:
U(c') + 6iU(c,) (2.1)
They can simply consume their endowment in each period (ci = yi, c yi), or they can make
several intertemporal decisions. In the first period they can invest in a business with a constant-
returns production function that generates second period income:
y = Ai(K - K)
Households differ in their return to entrepreneurship: some households are high-return: Ai = AH.
Other households have a low return to entrepreneurship: Ai = AL < AH. Households also differ
in their patience (that is, in their relative preference for consumption in period 1 versus period 2).
Patient households have oi = 6 H, while impatient households have 6i = 5L < SH-
In addition to the option of starting a business, households can also borrow and save. Prior to the
entry of the MFI, they can borrow up to an amount M from a money-lender at interest rate R(m) >
AH. Alternatively, they can lend at net interest rate R(I) < AL < AH < R(m). (Therefore, in
the absence of the fixed cost, households with a sufficiently strong desire to shift consumption from
period 1 to period 2 would invest in a business, rather than lend, since entrepreneurship has a
higher rate of return. However, households who do not want to shift consumption from period 1 to
period 2 will not borrow to start a business since AH < R(m).)
Households make decisions regarding first-period saving/borrowing s, and whether to become
entrepreneurs, in the first period. Let 1E be an indicator for a household entering entrepreneurship;
1s be an indicator for being a period-1 saver (s, > 0), and 1B be an indicator for being a period-1
borrower (s, < 0). Households maximize utility (2.1) subject to the constraints that first-period
consumption plus any net savings or investment not exceed first-period endowment income, and
that second-period consumption not exceed second-period endowment income, plus the net return
from any borrowing/saving or investment
c + s' + Ki < y? (2.2)
C2 < y + 1EAi(K - K) + 1sR(I)s' - 1BR(m)s'
where si - - 1EK.
Figure la shows the intertemporal choice problem of a household with a relatively low discount
factor (6i = 6L) and/or low return to entrepreneurship (Ai = AL). The indifference curve (solid
curve) is the locus of points that give equal utility, and the budget line (dashed line) is the locus
of points satisfying (2.2). This household will not choose to start a business in the absence of
an MFI. To do so would require borrowing at rate R(m) and/or choosing very low first-period
consumption, which is too painful for an impatient household or a household that realizes that
its period 2 returns from entrepreneurship will be low. Due to the wedge between borrowing and
lending rates (R(I) < R(m)), the household optimally consumes its endowment (yi, Y2).
Figure lb shows a the indifference curve and budget line of a household with high discount
factor (oi = JH) and high return to entrepreneurship (Ai = AH), who will choose to start a
business, borrowing from the moneylender to do so, because for this household cutting first-period
consumption is not too painful relative to the second-period returns.
Therefore, even when borrowing is expensive, the households with the highest incentives to
move consumption into the future will choose to become entrepreneurs, by borrowing or cutting
consumption. Other households will not start businesses in the high-interest regime, although some
of these households may opt to do so when they get access to a cheaper source of credit.
MFI enters
Now, an MFI enters. Households can now borrow at rate R(I) < R(s) < R(m) up to an amount
L. We assume that AL < R(s) < AH; the MFI lends at rates that are lower than the high
return to entrepreneurship, but lower than the low return to entrepreneurship. For simplicity,
we assume L < K: the MFI will lend up to the amount needed to finance the fixed cost of
entrepreneurship. Now, for some households, it may pay to borrow to go into business. Figure 2
shows two households, both of whom are relatively impatient (6 i = 6 L). Because they are impatient,
neither household had started a business before the MFI entered. However, household 1 has high
return to entrepreneurship (Ai = AH), while household 2 has low return to entrepreneurship
(Ai = AL)-
The higher-return household, Household 1, now decides to start a business, borrowing from the
MFI at rate R(s) to finance the fixed cost. Due to the nonconvexity in the budget set, Household
l's current consumption may actually fall when they get access to microfinance, because they pay
for part of the fixed cost with borrowing, and part by cutting consumption, rather than borrowing
the full amount.9 Because of the fixed cost, households who did not have a business before they
gained access to microfinance, but are have a high return to starting a business, may see their
consumption decrease due to treatment.
The other indifference curve in Figure 2 shows the case of a household with low return to
entrepreneurship, Household 2. This household does not choose to start a business even when MFI
loans are available. However, because the household is impatient (6i = 6L), the household takes
advantage of less-expensive credit to borrow against future income, and sees an immediate increase
in consumption when MFI credit becomes available.
Note that it is not necessary that AL << AH in order to see households with high and low
returns behaving differently. Because of the nonconvexity due to the fixed cost of entrepreneurship,
even quite similar households may make very different decisions.
A third group of households is those that already had a business when they gained access to
microfinance. Unlike new entrepreneurs, these households have already paid the cost of starting a
business, before the MFI entered. For such households, microfinance can allow them to scale up
their business. Because they do not need to pay a fixed cost at the time they start to borrow from
the MFI, their consumption should not decrease. Figure 3 shows that for a household that expands
an existing business with an MFI loan, investment in the business increases when they get access
to microfinance since R(s) < AH; current consumption may or may not increase significantly, but
will not fall as it may for households who are starting new businesses.
The final group of households is those who have Ai = AL and 6i = 6H: they have low returns
to entrepreneurship, and they are patient. For these households, since AL < R(s), it does not
pay to borrow to become an entrepreneur, and since they are patient, they do not want to borrow
to increase their current consumption. These households do not borrow from the MFI and, since
R(I) < R(s), the may continue to consume their endowment. Figure 4 shows such a household.
9 Alternatively, the household may borrow the full amount, but use part of the loan principal to make the initial
repayments, since MFI loans typically require that the borrower begin to make repayments just 1 week after the loan
is disbursed.
2.3.2 Summary of predictions
The presence of a fixed cost that must be paid to start a business suggests that we should see the
following when credit access increases:
" Of those without an existing business:
- Households with high returns to becoming an entrepreneur will pay the fixed cost and
become entrepreneurs: investment will rise, and consumption may fall.
- Households with low returns to becoming an entrepreneur will borrow to increase con-
sumption.
" Existing business owners do not face a nonconvexity: they can borrow to increase investment
(and perhaps consumption).
Before testing these predictions, we will summarize the overall treatment-comparison differences
in business outcomes and in household spending, averaged over existing business owners, those
with low propensity to become business owners, and those with high propensity to become business
owners.
2.4 Results: Entire Sample
2.4.1 New businesses and business outcomes
To estimate the impact of microfinance becoming available in an area, we examine intent to treat
(ITT) estimates; that is, simple comparisons of averages in treatment and comparison areas, aver-
aged over borrowers and non-borrowers. Table 3 shows ITT estimates of the effect of microfinance
on businesses operated by the household, and, for those who own businesses, we examine business
profits, revenue, business inputs, and the number of workers employed by the business. (The con-
struction of these variables is described in the Data appendix.) Each column reports the results of
a regression of the form
yi = a +# x Treati + Ei
where Treati is an indicator for living in a treated area; # is the intent to treat effect. Stan-
dard errors are adjusted for clustering at the area level and all results are weighted to correct for
oversampling of Spandana borrowers.
Column 1 of table 3 indicates that households in treated areas are 1.7 percentage points more
likely to report operating a business opened in the past year. In comparison areas, 5.3% of house-
holds opened a business in the year prior to the survey, compared to 7% in treated areas, so this
represents 32% more new businesses in treatment than in comparison. Another way to think about
the economic significance of this figure is that approximately 1 in 5 of the additional MFI loans in
treatment areas is associated with the opening of a new business: 1.7pp more new businesses due
to 8.3pp more MFI loans. 10
We also examine the impact of microcredit access on business profits. While the point estimate
in column 2 indicates that average profits in treated areas are higher than in nontreated areas,
this effect is not significant. The difficulty in measuring business profits means that we cannot
rule out either a large positive or a negative treatment effect on business profits. The effects on
monthly business revenues and monthly spending on business inputs are both positive, but not
significant (Table 3, columns 3 and 4).11 Business owners in treatment areas do not report having
more employees (column 5).
2.4.2 Expenditure
Table 4 gives intent to treat estimates of the effect of microfinance on household spending. (The
construction of the expenditure variables is described in the Data appendix.) Column 1 shows
that, averaged over old business owners, new entrepreneurs, and non-entrepreneurs, there is no
significant difference in total household expenditure per adult equivalent between treatment and
comparison households. The average household in a comparison area has expenditure of Rs 1,420
per adult equivalent per month; in treatment areas the number is 1,453, not statistically different.
About Rs 1,300 of this is nondurable expenditure, in both treatment and comparison areas (column
2). However, there are shifts in the composition of expenditure: column 3 shows that households
in treatment areas spend a statistically significant Rs 22 more per capita per month on durables
than do households in comparison areas-Rs 138 vs. Rs 116. Further, when focusing on spending
on durable goods used in a household business (column 4), the difference is even more striking:
101f we were confident that there were no spillovers of microfinance that affected the outcomes of nonborrowers
in treated areas, this would be the local average treatment effect (LATE) of borrowing on those induced to borrow
because of treatment. Although we are unable to conclusively estimate the extent of spillovers, this is nevertheless
the per-loan impact of microcredit access.
1 A second survey of the households is planned for late 2009-early 2010; we hope that when panel data on households
with businesses is available, we may be able to estimate the effect of microcredit access on business outcomes with
more precision.
households in treatment areas on average spend more than twice as much on durables used in a
household business, Rs 12 per capita per month in treatment vs. Rs. 5 in comparison.
Column 5 shows that the increase in durables spending by treatment households was partially
offset by reduced spending on "temptation goods": alcohol, tobacco, betel leaves, gambling, and
food consumed outside the home. Spending on temptation goods is reduced by Rs 9 per capita per
month.
The absolute magnitude of these changes is relatively small: for instance, the Rs 22 of in-
creased durables spending is approximately $2.50 at PPP exchange rates. However, this represents
an increase of almost 20% relative to total spending on durable goods in comparison areas (Rs
116). Furthermore, this figure averages over nonborrowers and borrowers. If all of this additional
spending were coming from those who do borrow (that is, if there were no spillover effects to non-
borrowers), the implied increase per new borrower would be Rs 265, more than twice the level of
durable goods spending in comparison areas. However, since it is entirely possible that there are
spillover effects, we will focus here on reduced-form/intent to treat estimates.
2.4.3 Does microfinance affect education, health, or women's "empowerment"?
The evidence so far suggest that, on average, after 15 to 18 months, microcredit allowed some
households to start a new business. While we see no impact on overall expenditures, there is a
significant impact on durable expenditures, and a significant decrease in goods that individuals had
reported most frequently in the baseline as being "temptation goods".
The increase in durable expenditure, and the decrease with spending on temptation goods fits
with the claims often made regarding microcredit, that microcredit changes lives. According to
these claims, microcredit can also empower women or allow families to keep children in school (e.g.
CGAP 2009). To examine these questions, Table 8 examines ITT effects on measure of women's
decision-making, children's health, and education spending. Columns 1-3 show that women in
treatment areas were no more likely to be make decisions about household spending, investment,
savings, or education. Column 2 shows that even focusing on non-food decisions, which might be
more sensitive to changes in empowerment, does not change the finding.
A finding of many studies of women's vs. men's decisions is that women spend more on child
health and education (e.g. Lundberg et al. 1997). These are interesting outcomes in their own
right, and increased spending in these areas might also demonstrate greater decision-making or
bargaining power for women. However, there is no effect on health or education outcomes, either.
Column 3 shows that households in treatment areas spend no more on medical and sanitation (e.g.
soap) than do comparison households, and column 4 shows that, among households with children,
households in treatment areas were no less likely to report that a child had a major illness in
the past year. Columns 5-7 examine educational outcomes. Among households with school-aged
children, households in treatment areas are not more likely to have children in school. Looking just
at girls' school enrollment gives the same conclusion (column 6). While the enrollment results are
unsurprising since the majority of children are enrolled in school even in treatment areas, schooling
expenditures vary widely from household to households, and treatment households do not spend
more on schooling, either: spending on tuition, school fees and uniforms is the same in treatment
and comparison areas. For decision-making, health, and education, the standard errors of the
treatment effects are reasonably small: with 95% confidence we can rule out an effect on any of
these outcomes of more than about 10% of the standard deviation in comparison areas.
This suggest that, at least in the relatively short run, there is no prima facie evidence that
microcredit changes the way the household functions.
2.5 Testing the model: Impact Heterogeneity
As discussed above, the fact that starting a new business requires a fixed, up-front expenditure on
assets and working capital, while expanding an existing business does not require such a fixed cost,
means that we predict different impacts of MFI access for 3 groups of households:
1. those who had a business one year before the survey
2. among who did not have a business one year before the survey, those who are not likely to
become entrepreneurs
3. among who did not have a business one year before the survey, those who are likely to become
entrepreneurs.
This section investigates those predictions.
2.5.1 Predicting who is a likely entrepreneur
Because starting a new business is an outcome that is itself affected by the presence of microcredit
(as shown in Table 3, column 1) we cannot just compare those who become new entrepreneurs in
treatment areas to those who become in comparison areas. We need to identify characteristics that
are not themselves affected by treatment, and which make some households more likely to become
entrepreneurs, so that we can compare their outcomes with those in comparison areas who would
have stated businesses if they had gotten access to microcredit. It also allows us to compare the
impact of microcredit on those likely to use microcredit to become entrepreneurs, to those who are
unlikely to use microcredit for this purpose.
Among those who did not already own a business a year ago, the following characteristics predict
the decision to become an entrepreneur: whether the wife of the household head is literate, whether
the wife of the household head works for a wage, the number of prime-aged women in the household,
and whether the household owns land in Hyderabad or in their native village. In the context of the
model in Section 6, education and number of women may proxy for time preference, since Indian
women have been found to be more patient than Indian men, and more educated individuals have
been found to be more patient (Bauer and Chytilovi 2008). If the wife of the household head works
for a wage, this will reduce the return to opening a business; land ownership is a proxy for initial
wealth.
Data on treatment-area households who do not own an old business is used to identify the
relationship between these predictors and entrepreneurship: the "first stage" is shown in Table 9.
Fitted values, "Biz hat" are generated for all households, treatment and comparison, who do not
own an old business. 12 Literacy of the women in the family, the presence of women who do not work
for a wage in the family, and the number of prime-aged women and the presence of teenagers in the
household all positively predict the family starting a new business. This is as it should be: They
all predict mean that the family has a larger pool of labor who have the ability to run a business,
labor whose outside wage is likely quite low. These households correspond to "AH households" in
the model. Land ownership, a proxy for wealth that is unlikely to be affected by treatment (and
is balanced across treatment and control, as shown in Table 1B, columns 7 and 8). also positively
predicts starting a business.' 3
2 The number of observations in these regressions is lower because 10% of the sample is missing information for at
least one predictor. Adding dummies for missing values and including these households does not substantially change
the results (available on request).
1 3Results dropping land ownership as a predictor are very similar and are available on request.
2.5.2 Relative consumption of old vs. likely vs. unlikely entrepreneurs
To interpret the findings below, which demonstrate significantly different treatment effects on the
families of current business owners, compared to non-business owners who we predict to be likely
to start a business as well as non-business owners who we predict to be unlikely to start a business,
it may be helpful to have in mind what these groups look like in terms of average per capita
expenditure in the absence of treatment. Due to randomization, the comparison group constitutes
a reliable source of this information. Table 5 shows, for households in comparison areas only, the
total per capita monthly consumption of old entrepreneurs (group 1 above), and, among those
without a business 1 year prior to the survey, those with below-median predicted probability of
starting a business (group 2 above), and those with median or above predicted probability of
starting a business (group 3 above). Approximately one third, 31%, of comparison households are
old business owners (Table 1b, col 5). Because all of the predictors of business propensity are
binary, a significant number of households are exactly at the median level of business propensity,
so group 2 includes 1,525 households and group 3 includes 2,571 households. Both those who
own a business and those with median-or-above propensity of starting a business have nondurable
monthly per capita expenditure approximately Rs 100 greater than low-propensity household: Rs
1,336 for old owners, Rs 1,337 for high-propensity households, and Rs 1,237 for low-propensity
households. When durables purchases are included, the gap between old business owners and low-
propensity households widens to Rs. 132 (Rs 1,480 vs. Rs 1,348) and the gap between high-
and low-propensity households narrows slightly to Rs 82 (Rs 1,430 vs Rs 1,348). All 3 groups are
quite poor in absolute terms: average nondurable consumption of old business owners and high-
propensity households, the better-off groups, is less than $5 per person per day at PPP exchange
rates: hardly prosperous. So, the impacts of microfinance discussed below are impacts for poor
households, although old business owners and likely new entrepreneurs are slightly better off than
those unlikely to become new entrepreneurs.
2.5.3 Measuring impacts for different groups
Table 6 presents the results of ITT regressions of the following form:
yj = a0 + a1Oldbizi + a 2Bizhati +
f31Treati x Old bizi + 0 2Treati x No old bizi + 03Treati x Biz hati + Ei
The O's are the intent to treat effects for the different groups for whom we expect different effects.
#1 measures the treatment effect for households who have an old business, and therefore did not
have to pay a fixed cost, but could expand their business with an MFI loan. #2 measures the
treatment effect for households who do not own an old business, and have the lowest propensity to
become new entrepreneurs. #3 measures the additional treatment effect for households who do not
own an old business, and are at the 75th percentile of propensity to become new entrepreneurs. 14
Column 1, where the outcome variable is an indicator for being an MFI borrower, shows that
all 3 groups take out MFI loans at very similar rates: households who have an old business increase
their rate of MFI borrowing by 8.5 percentage points in treatment vs. comparison, and households
who do not have an old business increase their rate of MFI borrowing by 9.6 percentage points; a
higher propensity to become a new entrepreneur does not imply a higher chance of borrowing from
an MFI. Therefore the results in columns 2 - 5 in Table 6 reflect different uses of MFI credit among
these groups, not different rates of takeup.
Column 2 of Table 6 shows that, indeed, it is those with high business propensity who start
more businesses in treatment than in comparison. Households with an old business are neither
more nor less likely to start new businesses in treatment areas than comparison areas.
2.5.4 Differing patterns of changes in spending
In column 3 of Table 6, the outcome variable is monthly per capita spending on durable goods.
Households who have an old business significantly increase durables spending, by 55 Rs in treatment
vs. comparison areas, averaged over borrowers and nonborrowers. Households who do not have
an old business, and have the lowest propensity to start a business, do not increase durables
spending at all. However, moving from the lowest propensity to become a new entrepreneur to the
75th percentile of propensity is associated with an 54.9 Rs. per capita per month increase in the
effect on durables spending. Therefore, consistent with the predictions above, those households
who already own a business, or who are likely to start a new business, show a significant positive
treatment effect on durables spending, while those who are least likely to start a new business do
not use MFI credit for durable goods.
In column 4 of Table 6, the outcome variable is monthly per capita spending on nondurables
4 The business propensity variable is scaled to have a minimum of zero and to be equal to 1 at the 75th per-
centile. Because this is a generated regressor, all regressions with the business propensity variable are reported with
bootstrapped standard errors. The regressions are weighted to correct for oversampling of Spandana borrowers.
(food, entertainment, transportation, etc.). Households who have an old business show no signifi-
cant treatment effect on nondurable spending. Households who do not have an old business, and
have the lowest propensity to start a business, on the other hand, show a large and significant
increase in nondurable spending: 212 Rs per capita per month. Moving from the lowest propensity
to become a new entrepreneur, to the 75th percentile of propensity is associated with 258 Rs. per
capita per month decrease in the effect on nondurable spending so that, at the 75th percentile,
households are reducing spending by 46 Rs. per capita per month. So, again consistent with the
predictions above, those households who are least likely to start a new business show a significant
positive treatment effect on nondurable spending (they do not pay the fixed cost to start a business,
and instead use the loan to pay off more expensive debt or borrow against future income), while
those who are highly likely to start a new business decrease spending on nondurables, in order to
finance the fixed cost of becoming entrepreneurs.
In column 5 of Table 6, the outcome variable is monthly per capita spending on "temptation
goods" (alcohol, tobacco, betel leaves, gambling, and food and tea outside the home). Microfi-
nance clients sometimes report, and MFIs sometimes claim, that access to MFI credit can act as a
"disciplining device" to help households reduce spending that they would like to reduce, but find
difficult to reduce in practice. The pattern of effects for temptation goods is similar to the pattern
for overall nondurable spending, but the effect for those with a high propensity to become entre-
preneurs is much larger relative to spending on this category (temptation goods spending accounts
for 6.5% of nondurables spending by comparison households). Households who do not have an
old business, and have the lowest propensity to start a business, increase spending on temptation
goods, roughly proportionally with the increase in other nondurables spending. However, moving
from the lowest propensity to become a new entrepreneur, to the 75th percentile of propensity is
associated with Rs. 40 per capita per month decrease in the effect on temptation goods spending
so that, at the 75th percentile, households are reducing spending on temptation goods by Rs. 14
per capita per month. In other words, those with high entrepreneurship propensity households are
cutting back temptation goods by 17%. If all of this effect were concentrated on those who become
borrowers due to treatment, it would suggest a decrease of Rs. 168 per capita per month, for high
entrepreneurship propensity households who become MFI borrowers due to treatment.
2.5.5 Business outcomes for existing businesses
Because new entrepreneurs (those who open businesses as a result of treatment) are a selected
sample, we analyze business profits separately for businesses that existed before the start of the
program. Table 7 shows treatment effects on business profits for these existing entrepreneurs.
Because month-to-month profits for small businesses are extremely variable, and we are concerned
that profits results may be driven by businesses who accidentally report no inputs or no income,
we report results for all existing entrepreneurs and results dropping businesses reporting no inputs
or no income.
Using both measures, we find impacts on business profits that, while uniformly positive, are
not significant. Column 1 looks at business profits for all existing entrepreneurs. Existing business
owners see an insignificant increase in business profits of Rs. 785 per month. Dropping businesses
reporting no inputs or no income reduces this estimate to Rs. 143, also insignificant (column 2).
Column 3 shows that the estimated effect on the 95th percentile of business profits is large in
magnitude (Rs 2095), but insignificant, while column 4 shows that the estimated effect on median
(50th percentile) business profits is an insignificant Rs 80.
In short, profits data for small businesses are extremely noisy, due in part to some businesses
with very high or very low profits, and unfortunately we cannot rule out either a large positive or
negative average impact on business profits. However, for the median business, we can rule out a
positive impact of more than roughly Rs 500 per month (one third of median profits in the control
group), or a negative effect of more than roughly Rs 300 per month, one sixth of median profits in
the control group. A second survey of our sample is planned for late 2009-early 2010; we hope that
when panel data on households with businesses is available, we may be able to estimate the effect
of microcredit access on outcomes for existing businesses with more precision.
2.6 Conclusion
These findings suggest that microcredit does have important effects on business outcomes and the
composition of household expenditure. Moreover, these effects differ for different households, in a
way consistent with the fact that a household wishing to start a new business must pay a fixed cost
to do so. Existing business owners appear to use microcredit to expand their businesses: durables
spending (i.e. investment) increases. Among households who did not own a business when the
program began, those households with low predicted propensity to start a business do not increase
durables spending, but do increase nondurable (e.g. food) consumption, consistent with using
microcredit to pay down more expensive debt or borrow against future income. Those households
with high predicted propensity to start a business, on the other hand, reduce nondurable spending,
and in particular appear to cut back on "temptation goods," such as alcohol, tobacco, lottery
tickets and snacks eaten outside the home, presumably in order to finance an even bigger initial
investment than could be paid for with just the loan.
This makes it somewhat hard to assess the long run impact of the program. For example, it is
possible that in the longer run these people who are currently cutting back consumption to enable
greater investment will become significantly richer and increase their consumption. On the other
hand, the segment of the population that increased its consumption when it got the loan without
starting a business may eventually become poorer because it is borrowing against is future, though
it is also possible that they are just enjoying the "income effect" of having paid down their debt to
the money-lender (in which case they are richer now and perhaps will continue to be richer in the
future).
While microcredit "succeeds" in affecting household expenditure and creating and expanding
businesses, it appears to have no discernible effect on education, health, or womens' empowerment.
Of course, after a longer time, when the investment impacts (may) have translated into higher
total expenditure for more households, it is possible that impacts on education, health, or womens'
empowerment would emerge. However, at least in the short-term (within 15-18 months), micro-
credit does not appear to be a recipe for changing education, health, or womens' decision-making.
Microcredit therefore may not be the "miracle" that is sometimes claimed on its behalf, but it does
allow households to borrow, invest, and create and expand businesses.
2.A Appendix: Tables
Table 1: Treatment-Control balance
Panel A: Slum-level characteristics (baseline sample)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Population Avg debt Avg debt Businesses Per capita Literacy
(census) outstanding outstanding per capita expenditure
(Rs) (Rs), no (Rs/mo)
outliers
Treatment -16.258 -4815.276 -2109.195 -0.014 24.777 0.002
[31.091] [4812.666] [2551.356] [0.035] [35.694] [0.018]
Control Mean 316.564 36567.56 28820.718 0.299 981.315 0.68
Control Std Dev 162.89 35319.929 12639.611 0.152 163.19 0.094
N 104 104 104 104 104 104
Note: Cluster-robust standard errors in brackets. Results are weighted to account for oversampling of Spandana borrowers.
* means statistically significant at .1, ** means statistically significant at .05, *** means statistically significant
at .01.
Table 1: Treatment-Control balance
(1)
Spouse is
literate
Treatment
Control Mean
Control Std Dev
N
-0.001
[0.027]
0.544
0.498
6133
Panel B: Household-level characteristics (followup sample)
(2) (3) (4) (5)
Spouse works Adult Prime-aged Any teen (13-
for a wage equivalents women 18) in HH busin
(18-45) o
-0.013
[0.026]
0.226
0.418
6223
-0.01
[0.066]
4.686
1.781
6821
-0.021
[0.028]
1.456
0.82
6856
0.018
[0.016]
0.495
0.5
6856
Old
esses
wned
0.002
[0.022]
0.306
0.461
6733
Note: Cluster-robust standard errors in brackets. Results are weighted to account for oversampling of Spandana borrowers. Spouse
is the wife of the household head, if the head is male, or the household head if female. An old business is a business started at least 1
year before the survey. * means statistically significant at .1, ** means statistically significant at .05, *** means statistically significant
at .01.
Own land in
Hyderabad
Own land in
village
-0.002
[0.007]
0.061
0.239
6824
0.005
[0.028]
0.195
0.396
6813
Table 2: First stage
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Borrows from Spandana Borrows from any MFI Spandana borrowing (Rs.) MFI borrowing (Rs.)
Treatment 0.133*** 0.083*** 1406.814*** 1250.504**
[0.023] [0.030] [261.568] [477.956]
Control Mean 0.052 0.186 592.467 2404.742
Control Std Dev 0.222 0.389 2826.855 6698.216
N 6651 6651 6651 6651
Note: Cluster-robust standard errors in brackets. Results are weighted to account for oversampling of Spandana borrowers. * means
statistically significant at .1, ** means statistically significant at .05, *** means statistically significant at .01.
Table 3: Impacts on business creation and business outcomes
All households
(1) (2)
New Stopped a
business business
Treatment 0.016**
[0.008]
Control Mean
Control Std Dev
N
0.054
0.252
6735
-0.003
[0.004]
0.031
0.173
6650
(3)
Profit
(4)
Inputs
Business owners
(5) (6)
Revenues Employees
475.15 2391.534 2866.683
[2326.340] [4441.696] [3187.618]
550.494
46604.8
2362
13193.81
59769.3
2362
13744.304
47025.5
2362
-0.028
[0.084]
0.384
1.656
2365
(7)
Wages (Rs
per month)
-100.937
[136.518]
411.477
2977.457
2365
(8)
Value of
assets
used in
businesses
857.876
[979.533]
6675.911
16935.123
2360
Note: Cluster-robust standard errors in brackets. Profits, inputs and revenues are monthly, measured in Rs. Results are
weighted to account for oversampling of Spandana borrowers. * means statistically significant at .10, ** means statistically
significant at .05, *** means statistically significant at .01.
Table 4: Impacts on monthly household expenditure
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Rs per capita per month
Total PCE Nondurable Food Durable Durables used
PCE PCE PCE in a business
"Temptation
goods"
Festivals (not
weddings)
Any home
repair>Rs 500
last year
75th percentile
of home repair
value (Rs)
Treatment
Control Mean
Control Std Dev
N
9.863
[37.231]
6821
1419.229
978.299
-6.689 -12.674 19.575*
[31.857] [11.618] [11.308]
6775
1304.786
852.4
6821
520.51
263.099
6775
116.174
332.563
6.832*
[3.519]
6817
5.335
89.524
-8.859*
[4.885]
6857
83.88
130.213
-22.217**
[10.620]
0.03
[0.020]
0.495
0.501
2189
6857
119.489
161.522
-1000
[1320.07]
75th percentile
in control is
8000
2189
00 Note: Cluster-robust standard errors in brackets. "Temptation goods" include alcohol, tobacco, gambling, and food and tea outside the home.
Durables include assets for household or business use. Results are weighted to account for oversampling of Spandana borrowers. * means
statistically significant at .10, ** means statistically significant at .05, *** means statistically significant at .01.
Table 5: Expenditure for control households, by business status
Did not have a business 1 yr ago
Old business High-business Low-business P value: (1)=(3) P value: (2)=(3)
owners propensity propensity
(1) (2) (3)
Total PCE 1,479.56 1,430.31 1,347.56 0.014 0.011
(Rs/mo)
Nondurable PCE) 1,335.57 1,336.81 1,237.32 0.006 0.051
(Rs/mo)
Number of 979 2,571 1,525
control households
Note: P-values computed using cluster-robust standard errors. Old business owners are those who own a business
started at least 1 year before the survey. High-business propensity households are those (who did not have a business
1 year before the survey) with median or above predicted propensity to start a new business; low-business propensity
households are those with below-median propensity who did not have a business 1 year before the survey. New
business propensity estimated using spouse's literacy, spouse working for a wage, number of prime-aged women,
presence of any teens in household, and land ownership. PCE is per capital expenditure (Rs per month). Nondurable
PCE excludes purchases of home and business durable assets.
Table 6: Effects by business status: borrowing and expenditure
(1) (2)
Borrowing
Borrows Non-MFI
from any loan age
MFI (years)
Main effects
New biz propensity
(no old biz)
Any old biz
Interaction w treatment
No old biz
New bi
0.00
(0.03)
.125***
(0.03)
.095**
(0.05)
z propensity -0.02
(0.04)
Any old biz .085*
(0.05)
Control mean of LHS var
Control Std Dev
N
0.19
0.39
5996
-.281**
(0.13)
-.309**
(0.14)
-0.31
(0.20)
0.24
(0.20)
-0.09
(0.12)
0.85
1.41
6037
Note: New business propensity estimated in treatment
(3) (4)
Monthly PCE
Durable Business Nondurable
expenditure durables expenditure
4.49
(19.68)
50.13**
(22.08)
-46.72**
(23.10)
67.40**
(29.17)
55.42**
(24.53)
116.17
332.56
6141
using spouse's
-7.58
(7.62)
1.74
(9.20)
-5.10
(9.33)
7.45
(8.63)
18.90**
(8.86)
5.34
89.52
6179
literacy,
201.94***
(57.56)
202.42***
(51.13)
213.30**
(99.12)
-260.24**
(102.29)
65.12
(56.03)
1,304.79
852.40
6141
spouse working
"Temptation
goods"
-25.03***
(8.10)
-10.58
(7.97)
19.90*
(12.06)
-32.87***
(12.35)
-14.71*
(8.86)
(7) (8)
Business outcomes
Started new Stopped
business business
.046**
(0.02)
.0395**
(0.02)
-0.02
(0.02)
.0424*
(0.02)
0.01
(0.01)
83.88
130.21
6183
0.05
0.25
6183
-0.08
(0.11)
-0.15
(0.09)
0.02
(0.16)
0.04
(0.18)
0.00
(0.01)
0.04
0.19
2299
for a wage, number of prime-aged women, indicator for any
teens in household, and land ownership (HHs with missing predictors dropped). New business propensity scaled to equal one at 75th percentile. Loan
age in column 2 is the average age of a household's loans (i.e., the time since the loans were taken), weighted by the size of the loan principal. "Temp-
tation goods" include alcohol, tobacco, paan, gambling, and food and tea outside the home. Durables include assets for household or business use. Index
of social outcomes is an equally-weighted average of z-scores for outcomes including: indicators for women making decisions on food, clothing, health,
home purchase and repair, education, durable goods, gold and silver, investment; levels of spending on tuition, fees, and other education expenses; medical
expenditure; teenage girls' and teenage boys' school enrolment; and counts of female children under 1 and 1-2 years old. Cluster-robust standard errors
in parentheses bootstrapped (200 repetitions) to account for generated regressor; regressions are weighed to account for oversampling of Spandana
borrowers. * means statistically significant at .10, ** means statistically significant at .05, *** means statistically significant at .01.
(9)
Social
index
.127***
(0.039)
.158***
(0.038)
0.065
(0.057)
-0.064
(0.053)
0.001
(0.028)
-0.001
0.456
6183
Table 7: Business effects on existing business owners
Treatment effect
Control mean
for existing
businesses
Control Std Dev
N
OLS
(1) (2)
Profits Drop businesses
with zero inputs
or zero income
784.967 143.27
[2,561.379] [2,516.557]
35.829
47055.357
2084
95th quantile
regression
(3)
Drop businesses
with zero inputs
or zero income
2095
[2,120.626]
1,432.80 95th percentile in
treatment is
Rs. 14,473
27,446.82
1968
Median
regression
(4)
Drop businesses
with zero inputs
or zero income
80
[221.443]
Median in
treatment is
Rs. 1,768
19681968
Note: Existing businesses are those started at least 1 year prior to the survey. Cluster-robust standard
errors in brackets; regressions weighted to account for oversampling of Spandana borrowers. * means
statistically significant at .10, ** means statistically significant at .05, *** means statistically
significant at .01.
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Table 8: Treatment effects on empowerment, health, education
HHs with
Women's empowerment: All households loans
(1) (2)
Woman Woman
primary primary
decision- decision-
maker maker
(non-food
spending)
Treatment 0.014 0.024
[0.035] [0.032]
Control Mean
Control Std Dev
N
0.662
0.473
6849
0.516
0.500
6849
(3)
Health
expenditure
(Rs per
capita/mo)
-2.608
[12.431]
140.253
455.740
6821
(4)
Index of
social
outcomes
0.008
[0.023]
-0.002
0.457
6856
(5)
Woman
primary
decision-
maker on
loans
Health: HHs
w/ kids 0-18
(6)
Child's
major
illness
0.009
[0.017]
0.281
0.396
6028
0.017
[0.032]
0.420
0.659
5871
Note: Cluster-robust standard errors in brackets. Decisions in columns 1 and 2 include household
spending, investment, savings, and education. Health expenditure (col 3) includes medical and cleaning
products spending. Index of social outcomes (col 4) is an equally-weighted average of z-scores for
outcomes including: indicators for women making decisions on food, clothing, health, home purchase
and repair, education, durable goods, gold and silver, investment; levels of spending on tuition, fees,
and other education expenses; medical expenditure; teenage girls' and teenage boys' school enrolment;
and counts of female children under 1 and 1-2 years old. Decisions in cols 5 and 6 indicate women
being the primary decision-maker in taking out household loans. Child's major illness in col 7 is a
child's lillness in the past year on which the household spent more than Rs. 500. Results are weighted
to account for oversampling of Spandana borrowers. * means statistically significant at .10, ** means
statistically significant at .05, *** means statistically significant at .01.
102
Table 9: Predicting business propensity
RHS variable: Household opened new business
Spouse is literate 0.017
0.014
Spouse works for wage -0.048***
0.016
Number prime-aged women 0.009
0.009
Own land in Hyderabad 0.019
0.032
Own land in village -0.018
0.017
Any teenagers in household 0.025*
0.014
Constant 0.049***
0.018
N 2134
Note: Regression estimated using treatment-area
households who did not own a business one year prior to
the survey. "Spouse" is the wife of the household head, if
the head is male, or the household head if female. Teenagers
are household members aged 13-18. * means statistically
significant at .10, ** means statistically significant at .05,
*** means statistically significant at .01.
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2.A Appendix: Figures
Figure Ia: No MFI, non-entrepreneur
(A L or 1 L)
a5 LU! (ci )Iu (02)
(y 1 Y2)
K
\r R(m)
\ y1
Figure Ib: No MFI, entrepreneur
(AH and ( H)
a HU(c1)/u(C2)
(y1,Iy2)
K \
R(m)
y1
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Figure 2: MFI enters:
2 impatient households (no existing business)
(5 LU (c 1 )/u (c 2) [Household 1: AH, borrows to
I -start business]
6 Lu' (c21)/u'(C22) [Household 2: AL doesn't start
business, borrows to consume]
Figure 3: MFI enters:
household w/ existing business
patient, high business propensity (A H and a H)
& Hu(Cl)/u(C 2)
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Figure 4: MFI enters:
patient, low-business propensity
(A L and ( H)
L 5 LU/ (c1)/U (2) [AL household: doesn't start business,I / or borrow]
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Chapter 3
Does Savings Crowd Out Informal
Insurance? Evidence from a lab
experiment in the field1
3.1 Introduction
Village economies have been found to do a surprisingly good job of insuring idiosyncratic risk, as
documented by Rosenzweig (1988), Townsend (1994, 1995), Udry (1994), Morduch (1995), Suri
(2005) and others. However, households are not completely insured - income and consumption are
positively correlated, and serious income shocks like severe illness translate into sharply reduced
household consumption (Gertler and Gruber 2002). One proposed explanation for the failure of
village economies to achieve full consumption smoothing is the need for insurance relationships to
be self-sustaining because households cannot bind themselves to participate in the future ("limited
commitment"). The predictions of limited commitment have been found to fit consumption and
income data from village economies by Ligon et al. (2002), Dubois et al. (2008), Ligon and Schecter
(2009) and others.
Moreover, access to formal savings is low, but growing, in poor countries (Banerjee and Du-
flo 2007). Therefore, we are interested in analyzing the welfare effect of financial development
in poor countries in settings where individuals cannot commit to remain in insurance networks.
Furthermore, social networks play an important role in consumption smoothing, as documented by
This chapter is coauthored with Arun Chandrasekhar and Horacio Larreguy.
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Fafchamps and Lund (2003), Bloch et al. (2008), Karlan et al. (2008) and Angelucci et. al (2009),
among others, so when analyzing the impact of financial development in a limited commitment
framework, it is crucial to consider the role of social networks.
Access to savings affects the welfare attained in a limited commitment relationship in two
countervailing ways. First, savings provides a technology by which individuals can smooth out risk
that is not insured interpersonally. This effect suggests that welfare may increase when savings
becomes available. However, since access to savings increases the value of an individual's autarky
option, sustaining the insurance relationship becomes more difficult. In turn, informal transfers
may be crowded out, thereby reducing the welfare benefit of savings. The interaction of savings
and informal insurance suggests a possible negative ramification of financial development: increased
access to savings technologies may undermine traditional mutual-insurance arrangements.
Moreover, there are distributional consequences within a village. When inter-household risk
sharing is augmented by the ability to smooth risk across time, the average household may be
better off, but households that suffer large setbacks may suffer much more than they would under
a mutual-insurance-only system (Platteau 2000). It is also theoretically possible that, on average,
individuals will be worse off with savings access (Ligon, Thomas, and Worrall 2000). On the other
hand, savings access can increase welfare if mutual-insurance arrangements are not undermined by
savings, or if informal insurance leaves significant amounts of idiosyncratic risk uninsured, and this
risk can be smoothed over time with savings.2 Given the spread of cellphone banking, microsavings
accounts, and other initiatives to increase access to savings in developing countries, understanding
how savings interacts with informal insurance is particularly important.
However, there is little empirical evidence addressing the interaction of risk-sharing and savings
because this question is difficult, if not impossible, to answer with non-experimental data. Access to
savings is likely to be correlated with many other factors which affect the sustainability of informal
insurance: communities with banking access may differ from those without in ways that directly
affect the sustainability of informal insurance, such as migration opportunities, wealth, or the nature
of the income process. Further, even exogenous variation in availability of banks (such as that used
by Burgess and Pande 2005) would not be sufficient to answer our question: banks do more than
offer household savings (credit, business finance, information, etc.), and savings/credit access allows
investment, changing the income process (Gin6 and Townsend 2004, Dupas and Robinson 2009).
2Savings access can also be welfare-enhancing when aggregate risk is important. However we do not consider
aggregate risk here, to focus on the interaction of savings and (in)ability to commit to stay in the insurance network.
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Therefore, even a field experiment such as Dupas and Robinson (2009) will not isolate the direct
effect of savings access on informal insurance from the effect of changing the income process.
We study the interaction of informal insurance with access to savings using a unique field lab
experiment in Karnataka, India. In particular, we set out to investigate the effect of savings access
(as opposed to an environment where interpersonal transfers are possible but intertemporal storage
is not) on welfare, both for the average individual in our experiment and at different quantiles of
the experimental income distribution. We are also able to use detailed data on the social linkages
between the households in the villages where we conducted our experiment to show how our results
interact with the effect of individuals' social ties.
A drawback of analyzing field data on exogenously-formed risk sharing groups, which our ap-
proach avoids, is that individuals within a village may have numerous "games" that they are playing
outside the game that we are attempting to study, and access to punishment mechanisms other
than exclusion from future mutual insurance. Therefore, ideally we would control for the surplus
that paired individuals derive from their relationship outside the game we conduct. Our design
addresses this in two ways. First, we have information on a wide variety of interactions between
individuals (discussed below), which allows us to construct a measure of the social distance between
paired individuals; and second, we randomly assign pairings, oversampling the right tail of the so-
cial distance distribution. Therefore, pairs' social distance is uncorrelated with other, unobserved
characteristics of their relationship.
Finally, we conducted two versions of our experiment in each village to examine whether the
post-defection strategy assumed in most theoretical treatments of informal risk sharing, reversion
to permanent autarky if promised transfers are not made, is a realistic approximation of the post-
defection strategy employed by the individuals in our experiment when this strategy (which we refer
to as grim trigger) is not imposed. While some players were randomly assigned to play risk-sharing
games in which the grim trigger (GT) post-defection strategy was imposed, others played the same
risk-sharing games, but were not constrained to use any particular post-defection strategy. (We will
refer to this as the "sequential dictator game" or SDG treatment.) Comparing the experimental
outcomes under SDG and GT allows us to examine whether individuals indeed play GT and the
interaction of individuals' strategies with the risk-sharing. On a methodological level, it allows us
to investigate whether comparative statics and other predictions derived from a model imposing the
GT post-defection strategy hold when individuals may choose a different post-defection strategy
(both in terms of magnitudes and signs).
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We must note that answering this question is not our goal in this paper. We address this
methodological point more deeply in the sequel, Chandrasekhar, Kinnan, and Larreguy (2009b).
This paper will focus on the questions of whether limited commitment constrains informal insurance,
whether savings access crowds out such insurance, and how the interaction of limited commitment
and savings access is affected by social ties between risk-sharing partners.
To briefly preview the results presented in this paper, when players are free to choose their own
response to defection by their partner, limited commitment binds significantly, and savings does not
crowd out informal insurance. Instead, savings access allows individuals to smooth intertemporally
some of the income risk that is not insured interpersonally. Limited commitment binds most when
players assigned to risk-sharing groups are socially distant, and when one member of the pair gets
high income most of the time, while the other gets low income most of the time. Savings access
is most beneficial when partners are socially distant. Even for unlucky individuals, savings access
is beneficial relative to the limited commitment no savings case-transfers are not increased, but
consumption variability is reduced.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 briefly reviews the theory of informal
insurance with and without access to an intertemporal technology. Section 3 describes our experi-
mental protocol and data. Section 4 presents the results of our experiment and discusses internal
and external validity. Section 5 concludes.
3.2 Insurance without commitment: Theory
The theory of interpersonal consumption insurance without commitment (and without a savings
technology) was developed by Kimball (1988), Coate and Ravallion (1993) and Kocherlakota (1996),
among others. Ligon et al. (2000) show that access to savings may possibly make the village as
a whole better off, by allowing better smoothing of originally uninsured individual and aggregate
risk; or worse off, by increasing the temptation of lucky households to walk away. Here we revisit
three models-limited commitment without savings, limited commitment with savings which are
retained after defection, and limited commitment with savings that are forfeited after defection-to
highlight the comparative statics that are predicted by each model of informal insurance, and the
comparisons that will allow us to study the interaction of insurance and savings access. We solve
these insurance problems from a planning perspective since this allows us to characterize the set of
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Pareto optima.3 This subsection concludes by discussing the effect of imposing an equilibrium on
the model characterization.
3.2.1 Setup
Suppose that there are two individuals i = 1, 2. Each period t = 1, 2, ... an individual i receives an
income y' (s) > 0 of a single good, where s is an i.i.d. state of nature drawn from the set S = {1, 2}.
y' (s) is assumed to follow the process:
0 otherwise
The income process is i.i.d. across time, and perfectly negatively correlated (p -1) across
individuals. This results in an average per period income of y/2. In other words, in each period,
one individual will earn positive income y while the other individual will earn no income, with each
player equally likely to be lucky.
Individuals have a per-period von Neumann-Morgenstern utility of consumption functions u (ci)
where c' is the consumption of household i. It is assumed that c2 > 0. Individuals are assumed to
be risk averse, with u' (ci), and u" (ci) for all c' > 0. Individuals are infinitely lived and discount
the future with a common discount factor 0.4
Individuals may enter into risk sharing agreements. A contract r (.) will specify for every date
t and for each history of states, ht = (si, S2, ---, St), a transfer 7- (ht) to be made from individual 1
to individual 2, and correspondingly a transfer r2 (ht) to be made from individual 2 to individual
1. For simplicity we then denote r (ht) = r (ht), that is, the (positive or negative) transfer that
individual 1 makes to individual 2 after history ht.
Denote V' (ht) to be the continuation value of remaining in the insurance agreement, that is,
the expected utility of an individual i from a contract from period t onwards, discounted to period
t, if history ht = (ht_1, st) occurs up to period t and st is already known:
0
VZ (ht) =_ U (yi (st) -'r' (ht)) +#OE 1: U (yi (sj) - ri (hj)) (3.1)
j=t+1
3 This will also be the set of decentralizable equilibrium allocations since the conditions of the 2nd welfare theorem
are satisfied.
41n our experiment the # =, the chance the game will continue after each period, as explained in Section 3.
In some of the cases we consider below, individuals have access to a savings technology. The
gross return on savings is assume to be
R f 1 when saving is available
0 otherwise
That is, when saving is available, one unit of the consumption good saved today delivers one unit
in the next period. Note that the feasible set is given by R+.
In the case that individuals have access to a savings technology, a risk-sharing contract will not
only determine transfers T (ht) to be made from individual 1 to individual 2 but also an amount
z' (ht) that an individual i, for i = 1, 2, saves from period t to period t + 1. For simplicity we then
denote as a sharing agreement (T (ht) , z (ht)) = (ri (ht) , z' (ht)) for i = 1, 2.
For the case that individuals have access to a savings technology V' (ht) is denoted as
0o
V' (ht) = u (zi (ht_1) + y' (st) - Ti (ht) - z (ht))+3E E u (z' (hj1) + y' (sj) - Ti (hj) - z (hj))
j=t+1
(3.2)
3.2.2 No commitment, no savings
We will now characterize the set of constrained efficient risk-sharing contracts for the case where
there is no access to savings. For this characterization we assume that, if either party reneges
upon the contract, both individuals consume autarky levels thereafter. 5 In other words, after the
violation of a contract, both individuals consume their income in every period.
Denote Vi (st) to be the expected utility of autarky for an individual i in period t once st is
already known:
o
Vi (SO) = U (yi (SO)) + OE E U (yi (sg))
j=t+1
As a risk-sharing contract can be seen as non-cooperative equilibrium of a repeated game, since
reversion to autarky is the most severe sub-perfect punishment, this assumption allows us to char-
acterize the most efficient set of non-cooperative sub-perfect equilibria (Abreu (1988)).
The set of efficient risk-sharing contracts for the considered case solves the following dynamic
5 The "autarky forever after defection" case is used for expositional clarity and because it supports the most on-
equilibrium risk-sharing. In our experimental setup, some pairs are constrained to play this strategy, while other
pairs are free to choose any post-defection strategy.
programming problem:
Vl (Vt2 (st)) = max j(y' (st) - i (sj)) + #E V1 (V/ (sg) (3.3)
rl(st),{ V2(s)} -t i
s.t.
A: u(y2 (st)+r(t))) + E Y V2 (s) 2 V2 (st), V st S (3.4)
j=t+1
0j V2 (s) 2 V(sj), V j 2 t + 1, V sj ES (3.5)
#> : j(V >(s))2V(s),V2 t + I1, V sj S (3.6)
$1 y 1 (st) - rt (st) 20, V st E S (3.7)
y 2 (st) + T(st) 0, V st E S (3.8)
where we have written Tr (st) and V (sj) instead of rl (ht) and V (hj) because, due to the re-
cursiveness of the problem, all previous history of the efficient risk-sharing contract, is respectively
encoded in V 2 (st) and V 2 (sj_1) (Ligon, Thomas, and Worrall 2002).
Due to the strict concavity of u (ci) for c' > 0, it follows that V' (.) is also strictly concave for
i = 1, 2. What is more the set of constraints is convex (this follows from the the concavity of u (.)
and the linearity in V' (.)). Consequently, the problem is concave, and the first-order conditions
are both necessary and sufficient.
The first-order conditions for this problem are the following:
' (y 2 (st) - ri (st)) es-)$2
T1 (St) :.(O = A - V1 02 V St E S, (3.9)
n'U (y2 (St) +rF (St)) U,'(y2 (St) - T (St))'
V :-" (V- (s)) = A± V j > t + 1, V sj E S. (3.10)
Further, the envelope condition is given by
V' (V2 (st)) = -A, V st E S. (3.11)
Ligon et al. (2002) note that a constrained efficient risk-sharing contract can be characterized in
terms of the evolution of A, the multiplier on individual 2's promise-keeping constraint, which from
(3.11) measures the rate at which individual l's expected utility can be traded off once the current
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state is known against that of individual 2. Once the state of nature for the following period sj is
known, the new value for A is determined by equation (3.10). Furthermore, A completely determines
the current transfers (3.9) once the state of nature st has been realized.
The intuition for this result is the following. For the sake of simplicity assume that the non-
negativity constraints never bind, and hence that V1 = 02 = 0. Then, we can rewrite (3.9) as
A u' (y, (st) - r (st))
u' (y 2 (st) - 7 (St))
The first-best risk sharing contract keeps the ratio of individuals' marginal utilities constant
across states and over time. Then, if (3.5) and (3.6) never bind, A never updates, and hence full
insurance can be achieved. Then individuals each consume a constant share of the endowment y
where the share is given by the initial value of A, A0 . However, if either (3.5) or (3.6) ever bind, A
is no longer constant and hence full insurance is no longer achievable. Because the only player who
may be constrained is the player with the high income realization, who would be required to make a
transfer to the other under full insurance, binding continuation constraints will cause consumption
to be positively correlated with income.
3.2.3 No commitment, private savings
We will now characterize the set of constrained efficient risk-sharing contracts for the case where
there savings are available. Again, for the sake of simplicity, we assume that, if either party reneges
upon the contract, both individuals consume autarky levels thereafter. An important change with
respect to the above case is that, after the violation of a contract, individuals are not constrained
to consume their income as now they can make use of the storage technology. What is more for the
case analyzed in this section, after the violation of a contract, both individuals keep their previous
period savings. This is what we will denote as "private savings."
Then, we denote Vj (st, zt_4) to be the expected utility of autarky for an individual i in period
t with savings zt_ 1 once that st is already known:
00
Vj (St, z 1 ) =u I + y (st) - z4 (St)) + E u (z + yi (sj) - zj (sj))
j=t+1
The set of efficient risk-sharing contracts for the considered case solves the following dynamic
programming problem:
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(3.12)
u (zL_1 + y1 (st) - -4r (st) -z (St)) +
max
r (st),zU(st)R, E ti u z_1+y' (sj) -r (hj) -zj (sj))
{j,z)} E GR+
s.t.
-\ : u (zf_1 +y 2 (st) + 1 (st) -z2 (st)) +#1E E V? (sj, z?) > V2 (St, z_ 1 ) , V st E S(3.13)
j=t+1
##j : Vf (s,z_1 ) V2 (sj,z_ 1) , V j t + 1, V sj E S (3.14)
Spj V"l (V? (Si, Z? 1)) j(y VAj2 +I1, V sj E S (3.15)
iP : zt_1 + y1 (st) - -r (st) - z' (st) 2-: 0, V st E S (3.16)
2 :z_+y2 (St) + _rl (St) - Z2 (St) > 0, V St E S (.7
where as before the problem has been characterized recursively. Note that now the constraint set
is not convex and consequently the problem might not be concave. To avoid such issues, lotteries
can be used to convexify the problem, as in Ligon et al. (2000).
The qualitative predictions of informal insurance with private savings are similar to those with-
out savings that we characterized above. Therefore, we omit the characterization of (3.12). Our
main interest is analyzing the welfare impact of the access to a savings technology. Ligon et al.
(2000) note that access to a savings technology has a twofold impact on the optimal constrained
efficient risk-sharing contract. On the one hand, access to a savings technology increases the au-
tarky value that individuals enjoy after the violation of a contract. Intuitively, this reduces the
amount of interpersonal insurance which can be achieved. On the other hand, if full insurance is
not feasible without access to a savings technology, savings can help to smooth over time the risk
that cannot be spread interpersonally. Overall, the effect on individuals' risk-sharing and welfare is
then ambiguous and depends on the initial level of risk-sharing. In order to see this let us consider
two extreme examples. First, let us assume that without savings full risk-sharing is possible. Then,
it could be the case that when the possibility of savings is introduced full risk-sharing is no longer
possible, and savings access would reduce welfare. Second, let us consider the opposite case where
without savings little risk-sharing is achieved. Then, clearly, access to savings allows individuals to
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V1 (V2 2tSt, Zt-1) 7 4-1)
smooth intertemporally some amount of risk that they initially could not insure interpersonally.
Therefore, individuals may be better or worse off on average, or equivalently, from an ex ante
perspective, before income uncertainty is realized. However, we could also expect distributional
effects, i.e. ex post unlucky (lucky) individuals might be better or worse off. Distributional effects
might be relevant in terms of policy recommendations.
Additionally, with no aggregate risk and if savings generate no net return (so that #R < 1),
we have the further prediction that if participation constraints do not bind, savings should not be
used. Then, the first best involves consuming the entire endowment in each period. Therefore, since
our experiment replicates such conditions, any use of savings is direct evidence that participation
constraints bind.
3.2.4 No commitment, joint savings
We will now characterize the set of constrained efficient risk-sharing contracts for the case where
only joint savings are available. Again, for the sake of simplicity, we assume that, if either party
reneges upon the contract, both individuals obtain their autarky utility levels thereafter. An
important change with respect to the above case of "private savings" is that, after the violation of
a contract, the individual that reneges upon the contract loses her access to savings. This is what
we will denote as "joint savings" because it replicates the payoffs of a joint savings account.
Then, as before, denote Vi (st) to be the expected utility of autarky for an individual i in period
t once that st is already known:
00
j=t+1
The set of efficient risk-sharing contracts for the considered case solves the following dynamic
programming problem:
V (V2 (St, z 1 ) , z1 1 ) = (3.18)
u (zh_1 + y 1 (st) - Tr (st) - z' (st)) +
max
(st,z 1(s)ER+, OE E (ztu j+yl (sj) -r (hj) -z (s))
s.t.
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A u (zei1y 2 (St) +r 1 (St) -Z2 (St)) +#E [: V 2 (sj, z9) > j V2 (St, z_ 1) , v st E S(3.19)
j=t+1
##j V2 (sj, z_1) V2 (sj) , V j 2 t + 1, V sj E S (3.20)
#p : V1 (V2 (sj, z _1)) > VA (s),Vjt + 1, V sj E S (3.21)
1 t:_1 + y' (St) - rF' (St) - z1 (St) 20, V St E S (3.22)
2 :z_+y2 (St) + _r (st) - Z2 (St) 20, V st E S (.34'2 Zt1+ .23)
where as before the problem has been characterized recursively. The only difference between (3.18)
and (3.12) is that we have replaced Vj (St, z_ 1 ) by V1 (st).
All above mentioned problems and their solutions for the characterization of (3.12) also apply
to (3.18). Further, the qualitative predictions of informal insurance with joint savings are similar
to those with private savings that we characterized above. Therefore, we omit the characterization
of (3.18).
Our main interest of this section is analyzing the differential welfare impact of access to a joint
savings technology versus access to a private savings technology. Ligon et al. (2000) note that there
is an important difference between the two. In contrast to private savings, where individuals retain
access to savings in the event that they default on their insurance obligations, joint savings, which
are forfeited in the event of default, should unambiguously increase welfare. The reason is that
joint savings, like private savings, allow intertemporal smoothing of risk that cannot be insured
interpersonally, but, unlike private savings, do not tighten participation constraints.
3.3 Tests
The theoretical results for the three models presented above, together with the result that in a risk-
sharing model with full commitment and no savings, individuals achieve full risk-sharing, allow us
to test whether these models predict players' behavior in our experimental setting. Furthermore,
our experimental setting will allow us to analyze the theoretically ambiguous welfare implications of
introducing private savings when insurance in constrained by limited commitment. For this analysis
we can compare the use of transfers and savings, and the degree of consumption smoothing, across
the experimental settings which replicate, respectively, full commitment, limited commitment with-
out savings, limited commitment with private savings, and limited commitment with joint savings.
The comparison of the use of transfers and savings across different treatments is motivated directly
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by the predictions of the different models. On the other hand, the models are silent on the degree
of consumption smoothing per se but have predictions in terms of individual welfare. However,
due to the fact that our experimental setup keeps expected individual consumption constant across
models, consumption smoothing can be used as a measure of individual welfare, a point we discuss
further below.
Hence, to test the validity of the models as a description of experimental subjects' behavior, we
can check whether the following comparative statics hold: When comparing the Full Commitment
No Savings (FCNS) treatment to the vs. Limited Commitment No Savings (LCNS) treatment, we
should see lower transfers and less consumption smoothing if participation constraints bind.
When comparing LCNS and Limited Commitment with Private Savings (LCPS), the compari-
son is theoretically ambiguous. If limited commitment (participation) constraints were binding in
the LCNS treatment, when savings were not available, then access to savings will tighten partici-
pation constraints, since the defection continuation value in (3.6) and (3.5) is higher than that in
(3.15) and (3.14) but, due to the absence of aggregate risk, access to savings does not increase the
total amount of possible consumption smoothing, and hence the cooperation continuation value is
no higher. In this case, interpersonal transfers will be reduced ("crowded out"). However, the im-
pact on aggregate consumption smoothing is ambiguous. If tightening of participation constraints
reduces interpersonal insurance by more than savings access increases intertemporal smoothing, ag-
gregate consumption smoothing will worsen and the variance of consumption will increase. On the
other hand, if interpersonal insurance is reduced by less than intertemporal smoothing is increased,
the variance of consumption will decrease, reflecting improved aggregate consumption smoothing.
If participation constraints were non-binding when savings were not available, and continue not to
bind when savings is available, the savings technology should not be used (since there is no aggre-
gate risk and #R < 1), and the variance of consumption would remain unchanged. Empirically
estimating which of these effects dominates, tightening of participation constraints or smoothing
of uninsured risk, is one of the key questions of this paper.
When comparing LCPS versus Limited Commitment with Joint Savings (LCJS), the predictions
are more clear-cut. If pairs were fully insuring each other under private savings (LCPS), because
participation constraints were not binding, then we would expect to see no change in the variance
of consumption under LCJS, because the move from private savings to joint savings further relaxes
the (already non-binding) participation constraints. It could be that in this case, the variance of
consumption would be zero-because pairs achieve full, first-best insurance. However, if there is a
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psychic cost to making interpersonal transfers (owing to the contemplation cost of calculating the
appropriate transfer, an endowment effect which makes it unpleasant to surrender money one has
won, etc.), then there may be less-than-full insurance even when participation constraints per se do
not bind. We are able to estimate the extent of such psychic costs of engaging in full risk sharing
using the Full Commitment, No Savings (FCNS) case. In the case that we see positive variance of
consumption under FCNS, if we see no change in the variance of consumption when moving from
LCPS to LCJS, it suggests that participation constraints per se were not binding under LCPS.
In the case that participation constraints were binding under private savings, then the move to
joint savings should relax participation constraints. In this case, we would see increased consump-
tion smoothing and increased transfers. We would expect weakly decreasing use of savings, unless
the players use savings as a form of "bond-posting," wherein they put money in savings as a way
to commit not to defect, since the more money they have in savings, the higher the penalty for
defection.
An important point is that these comparisons were derived assuming that individuals are on the
Pareto frontier (albeit possibly a frontier that reflects costs to risk-sharing other than participation
constraints). However, we consider these comparisons to be a natural starting point for our analysis
even if individuals are not on the Pareto frontier. What is more, even if individuals are not on
the Pareto frontier, while we would then not be able to neatly map our empirical findings into
statements about quantities in a limited commitment problem such as the magnitudes of Lagrange
multipliers on particular constraints, the comparison of the LCNS treatment versus the LCPS
treatment will still help us to address the empirical question that this paper proposes: namely,
do individuals achieve better overall consumption smoothing with or without access to savings?
However, we will argue that the comparative statics we observe are surprisingly consistent with the
hypothesis that individuals are on the Pareto frontier, subject to a psychic cost of engaging in full
risk sharing (i.e., a cost not derived from the participation constraints of the limited commitment
model) .
3.3.1 Equilibrium selection
Models of limited commitment-constrained insurance typically assume that individuals play an
equilibrium where they use grim trigger (GT) strategies of "autarky forever after defection". As
shown by Abreu (1988), in the absence of direct punishments for defection, shutting down interper-
sonal trade permanently is the worst possible subgame-perfect punishment, and as such, its use as
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an off-equilibrium punishment sustains the maximum degree of on-equilibrium-path cooperation.
However, individuals may not actually use grim trigger strategies. One reason why they might not
use them is the fact that grim trigger strategies are not renegotiation proof. That is, once someone
has defected from a risk-sharing contract, his or her partner has incentives not to implement the
grim trigger strategy but to renegotiate their risk-sharing contract. The reason is that the use of
a grim trigger strategy does not only punish the partner but also the individual who is punishing.
Farrel and Maskin (1989) propose a weakly renegotiation proof equilibrium concept. In such an
equilibrium, the only feasible punishments are those located on the Pareto frontier. They essen-
tially show that renegotiation proofness limits the scope of the payoffs that can be sustained. Ligon
et al. (2000) show that allowing for less-extreme responses to defection does not fundamentally
change the shape of the frontier of efficient allocations, although it must weakly reduce the scope
for risk-sharing by Abreu's argument.
Moreover, this leaves open the empirical question of what type of post-defection strategies in-
dividuals actually use, and what consequences they have for consumption smoothing. To examine
what post-defection strategies arise naturally and how consumption smoothing is affected in conse-
quence, some individuals playing our risk-sharing games are not restricted in the way they respond
to defection. We call this the sequential dictator game (SDG) treatment, because in each round
the lucky individual is essentially playing a dictator game-deciding how much to offer the other
player.
To examine the effect of imposing a grim trigger post-defection strategy, we compare the degree
of consumption smoothing achieved when we impose this strategy to the degree of consumption
smoothing achieved when we do not impose a particular post-defection strategy. If consumption
smoothing is worse when we do not impose a particular strategy, this suggests that empirical risk
sharing is limited by elements that are not captured in models that impose an equilibrium where
individuals use grim trigger strategies after defection.
3.4 Experimental Setup
3.4.1 Setting
To understand how savings access interacts with interpersonal risk sharing ("crowdout"), how
punishment strategies affect the nature of risk sharing, and how crowdout and the choice of response
to defection are affected by individuals' social ties, we conducted a field lab experiment designed
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to mimic as closely as possible the risk-sharing opportunities and constraints individuals face in
their lives. However, we deliberately shut down certain barriers to trade, such as moral hazard,
asymmetric information, and endogenous group formation, in order to understand how participation
constraints are affected by savings access and by imposing particular post-defection strategies.
Our experiment was conducted in a total of 34 villages in Karnataka, India. The villages
range from 1.5 to 3 hours' drive from Bangalore. South India was chosen as the setting for our
experiment because rural, periurban villages in South India have historically been characterized
by a high degree of interpersonal risk-sharing, as demonstrated by Townsend (1994) and others
for the ICRISAT villages, and because rural South India is currently experiencing rapid growth
in the availability of savings, but from a low base (Banerjee and Duflo 2007). These particular
villages were chosen because village censuses and social network data were previously collected in
these villages, giving us uniquely detailed data, not just on our experimental participants and their
direct connections to their partners, but also on indirect linkages between partners, e.g. through
mutual friends.
In each village, 40 individuals, aged 18 to 50, were recruited to take part in the experiment. In
total, 1,358 individuals and 4,251 pairs participated in the experiment. (Each individual assigned
to SDG played 3 games, each with a different partner, and each individual assigned to GT played 4
games, as we explain below.) The average age was 30, 56% of players were female, and the average
education was 7th standard. Over 97% of pairs in our sample could reach each other through
the social network and the average social distance was 3.5; the median was 4, meaning that the
members of a median pair were "friends of a friend of a friend of a friend."
We randomly assigned 20 of the individuals to GT and 20 to SDG. Table 0, Panels a to c, show
summary statistics for the 1,358 individuals and 4,251 pairs that participated in the experiment.
Groups are well-balanced in terms of demographic and network characteristics. Pairs in the GT
group had slightly lower social distance on average because these individuals are paired 4 times
while SDG individuals are paired 3 times, so some less-distant pairs are used. We control for
network covariates in what follows.
Based on the village census and network data, individuals were assigned a partner. Our
randomization was unique in that it stratified against the social network. We computed the social
distance between each pair of individuals and then plotted the distance distribution. Since most
social networks exhibit small-world phenomena, even if a random subset of villagers took part in our
experiments, randomly chosen pairs would tend to be fairly close in social distance. This tendency
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would be exaggerated if people tend to come to the experiment with their friends or relatives,
which was the case for many people who took part in our experiment. Therefore, the distribution
of social distances will be right-skewed, and simply randomly assigning partners would mean that
more often than not, people would be paired with near-kin. To make the distribution of social
distances between our pairs more uniform in our sample, we used the network data by oversampling
the right tail of the distance distribution. Figure 1 shows the distribution of social distances for 3
villages; both the actual distribution and the distribution of assigning pairings in the experiment.
The pairings used in the experiment have more mass at greater distances, particularly distances of
5 and 6.
3.4.2 Overall game structure
The purpose of our games is to replicate the incentives to share income risk that exist in real life,
but to do so in a way that can be implemented in an experimental session lasting a few hours. For
external validity, individuals should have strong incentives to smooth risk (we explain what that
risk is below) and to think carefully about their choices.
Empirical consumption-smoothing has both intertemporal and interpersonal components. We
create an interpersonal component by pairing individuals into groups of two. In all games, the
members of a pair can make transfers between them. To simulate the intertemporal smoothing
motive, individuals play many rounds during the experiment (18 rounds on average for SDG and 24
for GT, as explained below), but are paid their "consumption" for one randomly-selected round. To
make this salient, income is represented by tokens that represent Rs 106 each, and each consumption
realization is written on a chip and placed in a bag that the player keeps with him or her during
the entire experiment. At the end of the experiment, a field staff member draws one chip from the
bag, and the individual is paid that amount.
Incomes are risky: as in our theoretical setup, there is a high income level (Rs 250), and a low
income level (Rs 0). Moreover, to simulate past wealth, which is not equal across individuals, in
round 1 of each game, one partner is randomly given an endowment of Rs 60 and the other is given
randomly Rs 30. The games are described in the context of a farmer who may receive high income
in a round because of good rains this season or low income in a round because of drought. (An
excerpt of the experimental protocol, translated into English, appears in Appendix D.) Discussions
6 Rs 10 is approximately $0.20 at market exchange rates, or $1 at PPP-adjusted exchange rates.
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with participants indicate that they understand the risk they face and the data show that both
transfers and savings are used to smooth this risk.
To replicate an interaction that may extend indefinitely into the future, induce discounting
and avoid a known terminal round, the game ends with - probability at the end of each period.
Therefore at any point when they game has not ended, it is expected to continue for 6 more rounds.
Once a game ends, individuals are repaired. The order of the games is randomized, and we control
for game order in our regressions.
The options players have to decouple consumption from income vary by game, and also by
treatment (SDG vs. GT). However, in all treatments, at the beginning of each round before
incomes are realized (but after the endowment is realized in round 1), partners may decide on an
income sharing agreement. That is, partner 1 chooses how much 1 will give 2, if 1 gets Rs 250
and 2 gets 0 (-r), and 1 chooses how much 2 will give 1, if 2 gets Rs 250 and 1 gets 0 ( 2). This
agreement may be asymmetric (rF f r2) and time-varying (-r' # r,).
The details of each treatment are as follows:
1. Full commitment, no savings: each player tells the experimenter their choice of transfer
they will make if they get high income, rF. Once incomes are realized, the experimenter
implements the transfer that the lucky player agreed to ex ante. (There is no opportunity
for the lucky player to change her mind.) Each individual then "consumes" by placing all
of their tokens, net of any transfers, into a consumption cup. The experimenter removes the
tokens, writes the amount on a chip, and the chip is placed in the consumption bag. The
game is the same in the GT and SDG treatments.
2. Limited commitment, no savings: Partners may agree on an income sharing rule as
before. However, after seeing their income, the lucky individual may change her mind and
transfer a different amount (including transferring nothing). Each individual then consumes
by placing all of their tokens, net of any transfers, into the consumption cup. The experimenter
takes the tokens, writes the amount on a chip, and the chip is placed in the consumption bag.
In the GT treatment, if either opts out of the transfer agreement, each partner consumes her
income in that period and in all remaining periods. In the SDG treatment, players are free
to continue making transfers after defection, or not.
3. Limited commitment, private savings: as in (2), each individual may renege on their
promised transfer after seeing their income. Further, each has access to a "savings cup." Once
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transfers are made, players can consume tokens by placing them in the consumption cup, or
save them by placing them in the savings cup. Saved tokens are available to consume in later
rounds, but are lost when the game ends. If an individual reneges on transfers she promised
to make, she keeps her savings. In the GT treatment, if either opts out, each can use savings
in that period and in all remaining periods, but no further transfers are allowed. In the SDG
treatment, players are free to continue making transfers after a defection, or not.
4. Limited commitment, joint savings: this game is similar to (3), except that if an indi-
vidual reneges on transfers she promised to make, her savings will go to the other partner.
Thereafter, the defecting partner may not save, but the other partner may continue to use
savings. This game is only played in the GT treatment group. Ideally, in the SDG group,
players would have been able to choose whether, as a pair, they wanted to commit to forfeit
their savings in the event of not making their agreed transfers, as they could choose how to
punish one another after defection. However, this proved difficult to implement and so the
LCJS treatment was only administered in the GT group.
In thinking about the external validity of the findings of this experiment, two points are worth
noting. First, the amounts of money involved are substantial. Average expected earnings in the
experiment are Rs 130. To put this into perspective, the NREGA (National Rural Employment
Guarantee Act) has a wage rate of about Rs 60 for a day's work and the prevailing wage rate in
southern Karnataka is about Rs 80 for a day's work.
Second, great care was taken in designing the physicality of the games (consumption bags,
income tokens, consumption and savings cups, etc.) and the framing with which we presented
them, in order to make them both easy to understand and similar to real life. In explaining the
games to the participants, it was explained that the games that they play are much like the decisions
they take in every day life. In each round they receive some income and (depending on the game)
they are able to make decisions to consume, save for the future, or transfer money to their partner.
Many players spontaneously noted the parallels between the games and real-life decisions. 7
While individuals were registered for the experiment and matched to the social networks data
(explained below), we administered a short questionnaire to measure risk aversion, time preference,
7 One player told us "The games were not boring... They were very interesting, especially for those who have some
education... They help us think about how much we really should save and give to our friends in times of hardship."
Furthermore, in two villages, after the experiment village leaders inquired about the possibility of having an MFI
come to their village, because they saw links between the games and the possibility to have actual savings.
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and hyperbolic discounting. We also collected information on education and financial decision-
making in the household. 8
3.4.3 Network data
We make use of a unique dataset containing information on all 34 villages in which our experiment
was conducted. We have complete censuses of each of the villages as well as detailed social network
data. With the network data, we are able to examine two conceptually distinct concerns with two
different types of network statistics. First, we can use vertex level measures of popularity and
importance as coarse controls for the relative bargaining power between partners. So long as we
can think of bargaining power as, in part, being a function of an individual's prominence in a village,
we are able to partial the effect out with such controls. Second, we can use the geodesic distance
(shortest path length) between partners to make a methodological point. In lab experiments in
the field, one runs the risk of having partners whose relationship extends beyond the game at hand,
thereby threatening internal and external validity. We can use the geodesic distance in order to
measure such effects and control for them. Moreover, because we created our sample by stratifying
against the geodesic distance distribution by over-sampling the right tail, we can use the subset of
the data which pairs virtual strangers to see whether our findings are robust. In this manner, we
are able to bolster both our internal and external validity.
The network data was collected for Banerjee et al. (2009) in which they conducted a survey
about social linkages for a random subset of the population. For a village, the network graph (or
multi-graph), represents individuals as nodes with thirteen dimensions of possible links between
pairs of vertices. These dimensions include relatives, friends, creditors, debtors, advisors, and co-
workers. For our purposes, we work with an undirected, unweighted graph which takes the union
of these dimensions. As explained in Banerjee et al. (2009), for these villages, the union graph
is the right object of study. For these villages, the multiple dimensions are highly correlated so
the union network allows the researchers to capture latent information. Moreover, any weighting
method would be rather ad hoc in nature. Henceforth, we will simply refer to this object as the
social network of the village.
We include degree, betweenness centrality, eigenvector centrality, and path length in our regres-
sion analyses. We provide a more technical description in Appendix C. Degree, the number of
8 The risk aversion, time preference and financial decision-making data will be incorporated into our analysis once
data entry is complete.
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edges that a vertex has, is a measure of popularity. Betweenness centrality is a measure of how
crucial an individual is in terms of conveying information. To compute the betweenness centrality
of individual i, we first find all the geodesics (shortest paths) between all other individuals in the
network and then count how many of those pass through vertex i. Eigenvector centrality allows
us to rate the importance of a vertex as a function of the importance of a vertex's neighbors.
The eigenvector centrality assigns to vertex i the ith entry of the eigenvector corresponding to the
maximal eigenvalue of the adjacency matrix. The centrality measure is recursive in the sense that
a vertex's eigenvector centrality is higher if it is connected to higher eigenvector centrality nodes.
Solving this recursive system produces a measure that corresponds to the eigenvector associated
with the maximal eigenvalue. This also has a natural interpretation from an operator perspective
which is one way to understand the adjacency matrix.
This data allows us to address two issues. First, by controlling for degree, betweenness centrality,
and eigenvector centrality, we are able to partial out whatever effect that network importance may
have in the experiment. We interpret these as coarse controls for the relative Pareto weights
between partners. That is, insofar as Pareto weights may be a function of an individual's popularity
in a village, we can control for it through node-level importance metrics.
Second, we can address a problem that would be faced by similar experiments if the researchers
lacked the social network data. One might imagine that lab experiments in the field face severe
internal validity problems if the games spillover into real life. That is, if two individuals treat
the game as a subgame of their real life interactions, then decisions taken within the game may
be polluted by their real world relationships. To address such a concern, ideally one would pair
individuals with no prior nor future contact. Of course, this is impossible to do in a village. Our
network data enables us to measure precisely such an effect. The distance between a pair is given
by the geodesic or the length of the shortest path between the two vertices. We use this to measure
the potential out-of-game spillover effect that may occur due to closely connected people playing
together in the experiment. By creating a near uniform distribution of the path length between
pairs, we are able to actually compute and partial out the effect due to distance. We can interpret
this as a measure of internal invalidity due to out-of-game spillovers. We are also able to study
our results on a support of pairs with infinite or near-infinite social distance (i.e. no path or very
long geodesics from i to j). Because our findings are robust to such perturbations, it is safe to say
that we do not have problems of internal validity.
In controlling for network effects, we use degree, betweenness centrality, eigenvector centrality,
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and path length as well as their interaction with whether or not an individual was administered the
follow-up network survey module. The interaction of these factors with whether or not the indi-
vidual was surveyed is an essential term in our analysis because individuals who were not randomly
surveyed mechanically are assigned different degree, betweenness centrality, eigenvector centrality,
and geodesic distance. Because of the random sampling of networks induce non-classical measure-
ment error (see Chandrasekhar and Lewis (2009)), we control for whether or not an individual was
surveyed.
3.4.4 Methodology and Network Effects
Distance between partners enters significantly in most regressions that we have presented, even
though we have taken care to oversample the right-tail of the path length distribution. The
regularities that emerge are that individuals transfer more on average to partners whom they can
reach through the network, and that conditional on being able to reach their partner through the
network, the amount that they transfer to their partner is decreasing in social distance, as discussed
below. Moreover, an individual's consumption is more variable if her partner is not reachable and
the variability of consumption is increasing in social distance.
This is unsurprising since individuals who are socially close may have numerous "games" that
they are playing outside the game that we are attempting to study. Therefore, the gold standard
for analysis of risk-sharing games in a village would be to perfectly control for the surplus that
paired individuals derive from their relationship outside the game we conduct. We feel that our
design approaches this ideal in two ways. First, we have information on a wide variety of inter-
actions between individuals (discussed above), which allows us to construct a measure of distance,
and second we have randomly assigned pairings, oversampling the right tail of the social distance
distribution. To that end, a natural question to ask is whether our conclusions would have changed
had we not used such procedures. That is, we want to see if researchers repeat our experiment
in villages without having access to network data and simply use 40 randomly chosen individuals,
how would their conclusions change?
Though one natural approach would be to undo our oversampling of the tail and reweight
observations, we refrain from this because even the oversampling was not sufficient to get a large
enough distributional shift to make this approach meaningful. However, the oversampling enabled
us to efficiently estimate a subset of the data in which we restrict ourselves to looking at partners
who were far from each other (y ;> 4, where 4 is the median distance in our sample). Though
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reweighting requires a sufficiently significant change in the path length distribution for power, the
power in a split-sample regression depends on the number of high distance pairs, and not the share.
Therefore, by simply sampling V) more high distance pairs, we can converge at a /(1 '+@)T rate
instead of a V'T rate, where T is the number of observations in the tail (individual-game-round or
pair-game-round).
Motivated by this argument, we split the sample and study our results for the cases of high
distance pairings, -ygj > 4, and low distance pairings, yij < 4; we discuss the results below.
It is worth emphasizing that, because we have exogenous variation in social distance, our results
are informative for studying how limited commitment relationships and the insurance that they can
support are affected by social distance. This would not be possible with data on endogenously-
formed risk-sharing groups, where social distance will be an omitted variable. With our data,
because we construct and randomly assign a measure of social distance, which will therefore be
uncorrelated with other, omitted components of the true value of a pair's relationship outside
the game, we obtain consistent estimates of the effect of social distance in changing how limited
commitment binds.
Now, we turn to the results of the experiment.
3.5 Results
Our experiment was designed so that many of our hypotheses of interest can be answered by simple
comparisons of the mean of a particular outcome across games. We want to measure the effect of
different treatments on the magnitude of interpersonal insurance, and on welfare. Before presenting
our results, we discuss how we measure these quantities.
3.5.1 Measuring the degree of insurance
To examine the magnitude of interpersonal insurance, we examine average transfers made by in-
dividuals with high income realizations to those with low income realizations. This gives us a
measure of the amount of interpersonal risk-sharing which does not rely on knowing the relative
bargaining power or Pareto weights.
To see this, note that if players 1 and 2 fully insure their idiosyncratic risk, and 1 has a Pareto
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weight/bargaining power factor of A, 1 transfers an amount
FI = (1-A) 250
to 2 when 1 is lucky, and 2 transfers an amount
TFI = A250
to 1 when 2 is lucky. Since each player is lucky 50% of the time on average, average transfers
will be
.5 AI + .5-r2I =.5 (A + 1 - A) 250 = 125
regardless of A.
Similarly, if players 1 and 2 insure fraction a of their idiosyncratic risk, ri = a (1 - A) 250 and
ra= aA250, and average transfers will be
.571 + .5w = a125
Even if transfers change over the course of the game in response to binding participation constraints,
as we expect to happen in a limited commitment setting, average transfers will be a125, where
a is the fraction of risk that is insured, averaging across rounds. Note that the independence of
average transfers and bargaining weights relies on the fact that the income process is independent of
bargaining weights. This holds in our setting because each player has a 50% chance of being lucky
or unlucky in each round. However, in non-experimental data, bargaining weights would typically
be correlated with the individuals' income processes, and it would not be possible to map average
transfers into the degree of insurance without knowledge of bargaining weights. Therefore, we can
interpret changes in transfers when moving from full commitment (the LCNS game) to limited
commitment without savings (LCNS) as the change in interpersonal insurance due to binding
participation constraints; and we can interpret changes in transfers when moving from limited
commitment without savings (LCNS) to limited commitment with private savings (LCPS) as the
change in interpersonal insurance due to savings access affecting participation constraints.
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3.5.2 Measuring welfare
Examining transfers as an outcome tells us about the degree of interpersonal insurance. However,
we are also interested in the questions: Is welfare higher (or lower) with savings access than without
(and by how much)? How much do binding participation constraints reduce welfare, relative to the
full commitment case?
In general, the effect of different treatments on welfare would be comprised of an effect of the
level of consumption, and an effect on the variability of consumption. However, because the income
process was fixed across treatments, there will mechanically be no difference in average consumption
between the full commitment (FCNS) and limited commitment (LCNS) games. Table Od shows
that this is indeed the case-average consumption is Rs.132 in both games. 9 Because savings are lost
when the savings games end, consumption is slightly lower in the games with savings: between Rs 2
and Rs 3 lower, depending on the game and treatment. With the caveat that average consumption
is slightly lower in the savings games, we will think of the variability of consumption as a measure
of relative welfare. While making cardinal comparisons (e.g., utility under full commitment is x%
higher than under limited commitment) would require assumptions about the form of players' utility
functions, as long as players are risk averse-and their use of smoothing mechanisms shows that
they are-more variable consumption implies lower expected utility, holding expected consumption
constant.
3.5.3 Regression specifications
Our main estimation specification take the following form for outcomes defined at the individual-
by-game-by-round level:
Wig= a+ B3 + X + 6 j+ Zp p+Eigr
where Wigr is the outcome for i in game g, round r; #g is a game indicator (commitment, no
commitment without savings, etc.); Xg includes characteristics of the game (order-of-play and
surveyor effects). 6i is an individual-fixed effect," and Zig includes an indicator for whether i and
9Consumption is higher in round 1 of each game, where players receive Rs 30 or Rs 60 as an initial endowment.
Because there were random variations in how long each game lasted, consumption is an insignificant Rs .31 higher in
the LCNS game than in FCNS in the SDG treatment, and an insignificant Rs .11 higher in the LCNS game in the
grim trigger treatment.
"
0We have also omitted individual-fixed effects and controlled for characteristics of the individual (degree, between-
ness, eigenvector centrality, wealth, etc.) Individual characteristics enter with the expected signs and do not change
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i's partner in game g are connected in the village social network, and, if connected, the distance
between i and i's partner. Outcomes defined at the individual-by-game-by-round level are absolute
deviations of consumption from the overall average for that game, Icig, - Cg|, consumption squared
deviations I cig, - g 12, and savings Sigr.
We also examine consumption variances var(cig) -- y; , (cigr - cig)2 and standard devi-
ations var(cig).5 , which are defined at the individual-by-game level. The specification takes the
following form:
var(cig) = a +3g + X' +6i+ Zig# +Eig
Some outcomes, namely defection (that is, the individual with the high income realization
transferring a different amount than stated, including zero)11 and the magnitude of realized transfers
Tpgr, are defined at the pair-by-game-by-round level, since there is only one transfer and one
defection decision per pair per round, namely the decision made by the lucky individual. Then we
run specifications of the following form:
Wpgr = + g + XY + W'g( + 6 pgr
where wpgr is the outcome for pair p in game g, round r; #g is a game indicator; Xp includes
characteristics of the game (order-of-play and village effects). W'g includes characteristics of the
individuals in the pair (reachability and distance).
The estimation errors (the e) in our regressions may be correlated across individuals or pairs
within a given game in a particular village, due, for instance, to slight idiosyncrasies of game
explanation, disruptions in the experiment venue, etc. Therefore all regression standard errors are
clustered at the game-times-village level.
3.5.4 Use of smoothing mechanisms
Because we want to use the results of our experiment to study how interpersonal and intertemporal
consumption smoothing interact, we need to show that the players understand and are willing
to use interpersonal transfers, and, when available, savings. Table Od shows average transfers and
savings by game. Overall transfers are approximately Rs 93 in the full-commitment treatment, 70%
the between-game comparisons we find in the individual-fixed effect regressions. (Results available on request.)
"'Below we distinguish between "downward defection," i.e. transferring less than promised and "upward defection,"
i.e. transferring more than promised, although both constitute defection in the GT treatment.
of the Rs 131 that would be associated with full insurance. (As noted above, even if one individual
always consumed more than the other due to a higher bargaining weight, average transfers would
still equal half of aggregate income, or Rs 170 in the first round and Rs 125 in all other rounds.
Our games have 7 rounds on average.)
Table 1 shows that average savings levels in the private savings game are Rs 22.6 in the SDG
treatment, and Rs 20.1 in the GT treatment. In the joint savings game (GT treatment), average
savings are Rs 23.8.
Significant levels of transfers in savings and non-savings treatments, and use of savings when
savings are available, suggest that meaningful consumption smoothing is occurring. Figure 2 shows
consumption, income and transfers for a typical individual in the "no commitment without savings"
game (SDG treatment). Consumption is noticeably smoother than income, due to the use of
transfers (defined as positive when she has high income, and negative when she has low income).
Figure 3 shows consumption, income and savings for a typical individual in the "no commitment
with private savings" game (SDG treatment). Again, consumption is noticeably smoother than
income, now due to the use of savings as well as transfers.
Recall, too, that use of savings in our experiment (with 3R < 1 and no aggregate risk) is direct
evidence that participation constraints are limiting interpersonal risk-sharing.
3.5.5 Does limited commitment bind?
An implication of binding participation constraints is that transfers are reduced when individuals
cannot commit, relative to when they can. Table 1, presents the results of regression-adjusted com-
parisons of levels of transfers, by game. The first two columns show results for the SDG treatment.
The first column shows results for all rounds in SDG games. Transfers are significantly lower in
the two no-commitment treatments. Relative to the full commitment treatment, transfers are Rs
9 (10%) lower with limited commitment-no savings, and Rs 11 (12%) lower with no commitment
and private savings, indicating reduced interpersonal consumption smoothing when players are not
required to use the GT punishment strategy. The reduction in transfers under LCNS is not signifi-
cantly different than under LCPS, suggesting that savings access does not crowd out interpersonal
insurance. The second column shows results for rounds in SDG games where a defection has not
previously occurred. (Defection occurs in roughly one-third of SDG game, as we discuss below.)
In this sample, transfers are not significantly reduced in the limited commitment-no savings game,
indicating that the reduction in transfers in this case is due to players reneging on their promises,
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rather than promising less in anticipation of binding constraints.
The coefficient on the measure of reachability shows that players at distance zero (a pairing
which is never observed in our data) would transfer Rs 15 more than a pairing not connected through
the social network in the full sample; Rs 23 more in the no-defection sample. The coefficient on
distance shows that a one-unit increase in the path length between the pair reduces transfers by Rs
3, in the full sample or the no-defection sample. These figures tell us, that socially close individuals
share more with each other than distant individuals. Below we examine whether the degree of
crowdout moving from commitment to no commitment, and no savings to savings, is different
when pairs are close versus when they are distant.
The third through sixth columns show limited commitment does not appear to bind when the
GT strategy is imposed. Levels of transfers are not significantly lower when individuals cannot
commit to transfers than when they are able to do so, suggesting that participation constraints do
not bind when the punishment for defection is autarky for the rest of the game. In what follows, we
focus on the SDG results, since the SDG results reflect endogenously-chosen punishment behavior
and are more likely to reflect the real-world impact of limited commitment and savings access.
3.5.6 Does limited commitment affect consumption smoothing?
Consumption smoothing for the average player
Table 2 shows results for consumption smoothing. Again, the omitted category is FCNS, so coeffi-
cients on the indicators for other games give the regression-adjusted difference between that game
and the full commitment benchmark. We present results for consumption absolute deviations,
squared deviations, variances and standard deviations; all yield similar results. We focus on the
regressions with the absolute deviation of consumption and the standard deviation of consumption
since these are in units of rupees.
We find that going from FCNS to LCNS leads to a Rs 9 increase in the absolute deviation of
consumption (or a Rs 9 increase in standard deviation), significant at the .01 level. This effect is
equal to almost 20% of the average absolute deviation in the FCNS game, an economically as well
as statistically significant increase.
However, the coefficient on LCPS is only Rs 5. While this is significantly different from zero,
indicating that FCNS induces significantly more smooth consumption patterns than LCPS, a simple
F-test also demonstrates that LCPS results in significantly more smooth consumption relative to
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LCNS (p < .01). That is, individuals use savings to smooth some risk intertemporally that they
cannot smooth using interpersonal transfers.
In order to make a statement about welfare, we must first look at the levels of consumption.
Table Od shows that the level of consumption is not significantly different between LCNS and
LCPS. Conditional on sustaining the same level of consumption, variability is a sufficient statistic
for welfare implications.
Therefore, we can interpret our results as saying that limited commitment with no savings
induces a welfare loss relative to the full commitment no savings case. However, the introduc-
tion of savings to the limited commitment game improves the situation by significantly reducing
consumption variability.
Consumption smoothing at different levels of income
As noted above, it is theoretically possible for savings access to reduce the welfare of the average
member of a risk-sharing group (Ligon, Thomas, and Worrall 2000). However, our results show
that, on average, savings access is beneficial because it allows individuals to smooth some risk
intertemporally that they cannot smooth using interpersonal transfers. The limited commitment
model also predicts that participation constraints will bind more when the members of a pair have
very unequal luck-one is lucky most of the time, so the other is unlucky most of the time. Table
3a shows that this prediction is borne out in our data. In games where one player has a realized
income in the lowest tercile of the income distribution, that player's consumption smoothing is
much worse in LCNS relative to FCNS-the absolute deviation of consumption increases by Rs. 16.
When both players' income realizations are in the middle tercile, the increase in absolute deviation
of consumption is only Rs 5.
Comparing the coefficients on LCNS and LCPS shows that the benefit of savings (in terms of
consumption smoothing) is greatest in games where one player has a realized income in the lowest
tercile of the income distribution: the unlucky individual's consumption is smoother in LCPS than
LCNS (p=.07), as is the lucky individual (p<.01).
Moreover, table 3b shows that, while transfers fall by approximately Rs 20 when moving from
FCNS to LCNS and LCPS, the LCNS-vs-LCPS difference in transfers is not significant at the
extreme terciles of the income distribution, while it is significant when luck is distributed relatively
evenly. That is, savings crowds out transfers most when luck is distributed evenly.
These results seem counter to the hypothesis that those individuals with the worst series of
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income realizations (i.e., "bad luck") would do worse when their partners have access to savings,
because their more fortunate partners would prefer to save their income than repeatedly make
transfers to the unlucky partner. Transfers from the lucky to the unlucky member of the pair are
not reduced by savings access when luck is uneven (so that average consumption for the unlucky
partner is unchanged), and consumption variability falls because the unlucky (and lucky) partners
use savings to smooth risk over time. Of course, in a setting where individuals have heterogeneous
income process which are initially private information, so that individuals are learning about their
partners' income process, it is possible that individuals with a series of low income realizations
would see a larger drop in insurance going from the no savings to savings treatments than in the
full information, i.i.d. income setting we consider.
Consumption smoothing for close vs. distant pairs
Given our data, a natural question to ask is how informal insurance relationships between pairs
who are socially close and pairs who are socially far differ. To that end, we split the sample by high
and low social distance: pairs with a social distance of at least the median value of 4 (including
unconnected/unreachable pairs), vs. pairs with a social distance of 3 or fewer. The results are
presented in Table 7.
The results for the Low Distance sample indicate that limited commitment appears not to bind
significantly for low distance pairs, in the sense that consumption variation under LCNS and LSPS
is not significantly different from FCNS. On the other hand, limited commitment binds greatly for
high distance pairs in the sense that consumption variation under LCNS is significantly different
from FCNS.
For Low distance pairs, moving from LCNS to LCPS does not lead to a significant change in
consumption smoothing; that is, there is no evidence that access to savings affects welfare. On the
other hand, for High distance pairs, moving from LCNS to LCPS leads to significant decrease in
the variability of consumption, that is, an increase in consumption smoothing (the LCNS to LCPS
effects are significantly different at p<.01). Savings allows high distance pairs to smooth some of
the risk that they do not insure through transfers.
3.5.7 Crime (defection)...
The results on consumption smoothing and transfers show that participation constraints signifi-
cantly bind in the SDG treatment, and that socially distant pairs are more affected by participation
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constraints than socially close pairs. While models of limited commitment feature no defection in
equilibrium, because every subgame has an efficient continuation path (Ligon, Thomas, and Wor-
rall 2002), the experimental participants in our games, particularly in the SDG treatment, mention
changing their minds (i.e., defecting) in response to binding participation constraints. Table 4,
which presents results on defection probabilities, shows that binding participation constraints man-
ifest themselves through defection, i.e. players transferring a different (usually lower) amount than
they promised. Defection occurs in 30% of rounds under the SDG treatment. The significant
negative coefficient on the reachable indicator shows that individuals defect less often when they
can reach their partner through the network. Conditional on being reachable, a greater distance is
associated with more defection.
3.6 ... and punishment
If the data featured no actual defection, we would be unable to learn directly what post-defection
strategies players used when the experiment did not impose the GT strategy, because defection
would never actually occur. However, our data do allow us to study what happens after defection
in the SDG treatment. Figures 4 and 5 show how transfers are affected in the rounds following a
defection. Transfers are significantly reduced by about Rs. 12, though after 4 rounds they return
to the level that prevailed before defection occurred. Figure 4 emphasizes the transiency of the
punishment phase.
Moreover, during the punishment phase, transfers are not completely ceased, but only reduced.
Even during the maximal punishment phase, transfers fall by about Rs. 12, or roughly 15%, a
far cry from permanent reversion to autarky. If the players were endogenously imposing severe
punishments post-defection, something in the flavor of a grim trigger, one would see a drop on the
order of Rs. 80. Therefore, when not required to follow a GT strategy, players appear to inflict
moderate punishments for about 2-3 rounds, or a third to a half of the expected duration of the
game at the time the defection occurred (since the game can always be expected to last 6 rounds,
conditional on not having ended yet.)
Perhaps surprisingly, Table 5 also shows that individuals do not punish those that are socially
close to them any less (or more) than those who are far from them. This is in contrast to Table 4
which shows that distance is proportional to defection rates. That is, while individuals defect less
the closer they are to their partner, conditional on defection they do not punish closer partners any
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less.
3.7 Conclusion and future directions
The results of a unique lab experiment, conducted in the field, show that under SDG (that is, when
players are free to choose their own response to defection by their partner), limited commitment
binds, and savings does not crowd out informal insurance. Private savings access does not appear
to reduce welfare relative to limited commitment without savings, even at low quantiles of the
income distribution. Instead, private savings access allows individuals to smooth intertemporally
some of the income risk that is not insured interpersonally.
Consistent with the predictions of the limited commitment model, participation constraints are
most binding when one member of the pair is very fortunate (gets high income most of the time),
while the other in unfortunate and gets low income most of the time. But, even in such cases,
savings access does not crowd out interpersonal transfers. Thus, we do not find evidence that
savings access has negative distributional consequences, such as benefitting the most fortunate but
harming the least fortunate.
When players are free to choose their own response to defection, defection is common (occurring
in 30% of rounds), and the punishments are small in magnitude (a roughly 15% reduction in trans-
fers the following period), and short in duration, with the response decaying to zero in 4 periods.
The fact that in this case, consumption smoothing is worse than when a "grim trigger" (permanent
reversion to autarky) punishment is imposed, suggests that some friction is preventing households
from adopting the GT strategy-GT may be socially unacceptable, susceptible to renegotiation, too
fragile to accidental lapses in risk-sharing, etc. Modelling these frictions is an interesting avenue
for future work, and one we hope to pursue.
Using detailed data on how individuals within a village are connected socially, we find that
limited commitment binds significantly when individuals are socially distant, and does not appear
to bind when they are socially close. Players are less likely to renege on the transfers they promised
their partner when they and their partner are close. However, if defection does occur, players
do not punish (i.e., reduce transfers) differently when their partner is socially distant or socially
close. While it is perhaps not surprising that limited commitment binds less when those engaged
in risk sharing know each other, it illustrates the advantage of using a lab experiment, where we
are able to randomly assign pairs. Using endogenously-formed, socially close pairs might result
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in concluding that limited commitment does not bind and that savings access does not improve
consumption smoothing. If economic development weakens social ties between individuals, our
results for socially distant pairs may be relevant in forecasting how well income risk can be insured
and what role financial access might play in improving consumption smoothing.
Finally, we hope that our experimental strategy-a lab experiment, conducted in field settings
in a developing country, carefully designed to test theoretical predictions-is of interest as a way
to test other theoretical predictions which are difficult to test with non-experimental data. We
feel this method can achieve high external validity by closely mimicking real-life decisions while
controlling possibly confounding influences (endogenous network formation, etc.).
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Assets (savings) and net transfers
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Figure 3b: Savings and Transfers
Figure 3 shows that consumption is smoother than income, net transfers to an individual's part-
ner covaries positively with income, savings covaries with income, and that savings is considerably
smoother than transfers.
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Figure 4a: Response to defection, SDG
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Figure 4b Response to defection, scaled relative to FCNS transfers
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3.A Appendix: Tables
Table Oa: Comparison of Caste Variables from Individual Survey
Surveyed SC ST OBC General
SDG 0.0185 -0.0117 0.0269 -0.0362 0.0124
[0.0265] [0.0345] [0.0172] [0.0388] [0.0264]
Constant 0.3431*** 0.2727*** 0.0376** 0.5611*** 0.1254***
[0.0187] [0.0248] [0.0124] [0.0279] [0.0190]
N 1300 660 660 660 660
Table Ob: Comparison of Wealth Variables from Individual Survey
Surveyed Roof Number Number Electricity Latrine Owner
Thatch Title Stone Sheet RCC Other of Rooms of Beds of house
SDG 0.0185 -0.0015 -0.0102 0.0203 -0.0058 -0.0013 -0.0095 -0.0304 0.0237 -0.0178 -0.0222 -0.0005
[0.0265] [0.0059] [0.0263] [0.0271] [0.0218] [0.0171] [0.0117] [0.0709] [0.0722] [0.0337] [0.0469] [0.0174]
C 0.3431*** 0.0122** 0.3190*** 0.3445*** 0.1834*** 0.1021*** 0.0494*** 2.5040*** 0.9155*** 1.4361*** 2.5678*** 0.8982***
[0.0187] [0.0042] [0.0185] [0.0191] [0.0154] [0.0121] [0.0083] [0.0501] [0.0510] [0.0238] [0.0331] [0.0123]
N 1300 1310 1252 1252 1252 1252 1253 1252 1252 1250 1252 1215
Table Oc: Comparison of Variables from Collected During the Experiment
Male Married Age Education Not found Betweenness Degree Eigenvector Distance Reachable
in Census Centrality if Reachable
SDG 0.0296 -0.0036 -0.2992 0.0162 0.0015 -5.7124 0.2708 0.0025 0.0883* 0.0097
[0.0270] [0.0240] [0.4672] [0.2464] [0.0104] [287.2915] [0.3571] [0.0018] [0.0365] [0.0071]
C 0.4410*** 0.7360*** 30.2419*** 7.4786*** 0.0354*** 3285.7023*** 9.8400*** 0.0198*** 3.5454*** 0.9792***
[0.0191] [0.0170] [0.3306] [0.1742] [0.0073] [203.1458] [0.2525] [0.0013] [0.0240] [0.0050]
N 1358 1358 1358 1354 1300 1300 1300 1300 4251 1253
Table Od: Average transfers and consumption, by game and treatment
Transfers Consumption
G SDG G SDG
No Savings (LC) -0.2097 -9.621*** 0.1063 0.3142
[3.546] [3.551] [.4407] [.516]
Private Savings (LC) 2.238 -10.11*** -3.223*** -2.079***
[3.551] [3.544] [.5521] [.5861]
Joint Savings 1.269 -2.453***
[3.575] [.4346]
Full commitment Mean 93.18 92.35 132.25 131.04
Standard deviation 33.47 36.31 49.26 51.97
N 8406 7025 16822 14070
Robust standard errors, clustered at the village by game level, in brackets.
Transfer is the actual amount given to the unlucky individual (who earned Rs 0)
by the lucky individual (who earned Rs 250). Consumption is the amount the
individual chose to place in their consumption cup. Individuals were paid one
randomly chosen consumption value at the end of the game.
* p<.1, ** p<.05, *** p<.01
Table Oe: Average consumption, by game and in-game income
Transfers
G SDG
Middle tercile 10.99*** 11.6***
[.832] [.9694]
Top tercile 20.09*** 23.77***
[1.345] [1.549]
Lowest tercile mean 119.18 117.12
Standard deviation 44.77 55.89
N 16800 14048
Robust standard errors, clustered at the village by game
level, in brackets. Consumption is the amount the individual
chose to place in their consumption cup. Individuals were
paid one randomly chosen consumption value at the end
of the game. * p<.1, ** p<.05, *** p<.01
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Table 1: Use of smoothing mechanisms
SDG Grim
Transfers Savings Transfers Savings
Unconditional Conditional Unconditional Conditional
No S (LC) -8.899*** -3.61 1.423 2.424
[1.937] [2.545] [1.698] [1.816]
Private S (LC) -11.02*** -6.988** 0.5778 2.894 0.84
[2.23] [2.669] [2.025] [1.977] [.8733]
Joint S (LC) 0.9233 1.434 0
[1.825] [1.897] [.]
Reachable 15.37** 23.06** -4.032 -3.104 -4.159
[7.598] [10.58] [4.727] [4.552] [3.693]
Reach -2.751*** -2.697** 1.363* 1.162 0.039
x Distance [.8611] [1.153] [.7124] [.733] [.6022]
Constant 86.32*** 66.9*** 40.42*** 83.46*** 83.39*** 37.31***
[8.117] [11.01] [2.443] [6.263] [6.369] [4.734]
LCNS=LCPS
F-stat 1.111 1.325 0.18 0.0502
p-value 0.2945 0.2523 0.6721 0.8231
LCNS=LCJS
F-stat 0.0899 0.2863
p-value 0.7648 0.5935
Full Com. Mean 92.3512 93.0808 22.6453 93.1755 92.8645 20.0956
St. Dev. 36.3129 36.6006 28.6262 33.4701 34.2887 26.9258
N 3180 1938 4267 3899 3208 7848
R2 0.4613 0.5168 0.6296 0.4117 0.4284 0.5387
Adjusted R 2  0.3617 0.3705 0.5662 0.3197 0.3166 0.4962
Regressions at the pair-game-round level. Regressions include individual and village-fixed effects,
indicator for whether individuals were directly surveyed about social relationships, network
betweenness, degree and eigenvector centrality for both pair members, reachability and distance
between partners, village order, surveyor and team effects, and controls for order and round of
play. Robust standard errors, clustered at the village by game level, in brackets.
* p<.1, ** p<.05, *** p<.01
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Table 2: Consumption smoothing
SDG - Consumption
Abs. Dev.
8.865***
[1.348]
4.903***
[1.368]
-6.249
[4.951]
.8942*
[.4666]
52.24***
[5.539]
Variance
1141***
[231.5]
453*
[234.9]
-951.3
[649.9]
168**
[78.06]
3735***
[876.4]
Grim - Consumption
St. Dev.
9.249***
[1.801]
4**
[1.851]
-6.921
[6.333]
1.17*
[.6585]
57.5***
[7.6]
Sq. Dev.
1.093
[1.546]
-3.755**
[1.594]
-2.792*
[1.482]
-1.488
[3.834]
0.0814
[.5405]
26.76***
[.]
Abs. Dev.
-0.1299
[1.274]
-3.887***
[1.274]
-3.221***
[1.22]
-1.979
[3.429]
0.0847
[.4614]
43.07***
[3.253]
Variance
150.7
[196.9]
-489.4**
[202.8]
-237.8
[192.1]
-403
[513.3]
2.389
[68.05]
3211***
[500]
LCNS=LCPS
F-stat 16.26 10.17 9.765 10.33 8.572 7.944 8.843 13.45
p-value 0.00011 0.0019 0.0023 0.0018 0.004 0.0056 0.0035 0.00035
LCNS=LCJS
F-stat 5.717 5.404 3.461 6.845
p-value 0.0182 0.0216 0.065 0.0099
FC Mean 27.0085 40.912 2898.8811 48.5979 24.2837 38.7713 2568.1424 45.4687
St. Dev. 37.3173 32.0513 2641.2137 23.1931 33.7581 30.42 2521.5301 22.3938
N 12752 12752 1848 1848 15371 15371 2465 2465
R2 0.2657 0.2923 0.5612 0.5818 0.28 0.2965 0.5113 0.5539
Adj. R 2  0.2253 0.2533 0.3144 0.3465 0.2473 0.2645 0.3296 0.3879
Notes as in previous table.
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No Savings
(LC)
Private S
(LC)
Joint S.
(LC)
Reachable
Reach
Distance
Constant
Sq. Dev.
10.79***
[1.656]
4.427***
[1.622]
-8.205
[5.203]
1.122**
[.5374]
39.31***
[6.007]
St. Dev.
0.2553
[1.465]
-5.631***
[1.582]
-3.892**
[1.558]
-5.033
[4.755]
0.2441
[.5693]
53.21***
[4.252]
Table 3a: Consumption smoothing (Absolute Deviation of Consumption) at income percentiles
SDG -Percentile Grim - Percentile
No Savings (LC)
Private Savings (LC)
Joint Savings (LC)
Reachable
Reach * Distance
Constant
33rd
15.53***
[3.163]
9.968***
[3.744]
-45.48***
[13.34]
0.9573
[2.126]
81.87***
[14.28]
66th
4.004**
[1.907]
4.129**
[1.77]
-6.033
[10]
-0.3695
[.7243]
56.41***
[10.92]
100th
14.5***
[2.439]
5.564**
[2.522]
16.38*
[8.812]
1.818
[1.316]
27.94***
[8.873]
33rd
-1.193
[2.713]
-4.004*
[2.411]
-2.429,
[3.177]
-33.94***
[10.03]
1.553
[1.456]
69.06***
[7.658]
66th
-0.6693
[1.516]
-2.842*
[1.501]
-3.966***
[1.426]
1.971
[6.013]
-1.065
[.6952]
45.79***
[5.204]
100th
0.2994
[1.948]
-3.414
[2.096]
-0.2936
[1.743]
-6.882
[4.656]
1.243
[.8257]
48.09***
[6.786]
LCNS=LCPS
F-stat 3.255 0.0052 14.3 1.5 1.878 3.543
p-value 0.0743 0.9428 0.00026 0.2228 0.173 0.062
LCNS=LCJS
F-stat 0.1851 4.144 0.1408
p-value 0.6677 0.0438 0.708
Full. Com. Mean 39.7506 40.8573 40.7789 39.6518 36.3 41.903
Standard Deviation 31.2281 31.8222 31.7478 31.1378 28.3459 32.5682
N 2562 5646 4522 3296 6935 5130
R 2  0.4687 0.35 0.3732 0.4398 0.3691 0.4076
Adjusted R 2  0.3912 0.2842 0.2993 0.3599 0.3093 0.3406
Notes as in previous table.
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Table 3b: Transfers at income percentiles
SDG - Percentile Grim -Percentile
No Savings (LC)
Private Savings (LC)
Joint Savings (LC)
Reachable
Reach * Distance
Constant
33rd
-20.14***
[5.562]
-19.05***
[4.921]
33.56**
[14.93]
0.2191
[2.277]
68.43***
[16.44]
66th
-2.395
[1.977]
-8.352***
[1.825]
3.76
[12.73]
-0.8215
[.9068]
83.43***
[13.97]
100th
-13.25***
[2.685]
-12.62***
[3.139]
-19.65*
[10.72]
-3.543**
[1.44]
116.1***
[11.13]
33rd
-0.2475
[3.058]
0.1657
[2.883]
1.285
[3.672]
32.98***
[8.378]
-1.732
[1.614]
54.77***
[8.347]
66th
2.146
[1.456]
0.005
[1.969]
1.462
[1.717]
-0.9795
[6.851]
0.7763
[.9499]
88.76***
[5.299]
100th
-2.725
[2.126]
-2.079
[2.668]
-3.925*
[2.358]
10.46*
[6.265]
-1.794*
[1.035]
94.85***
[7.985]
LCNS=LCPS
F-stat 0.0693 11.09 0.0567 0.018 1.321 0.0733
p-value 0.793 0.0012 0.8122 0.8936 0.2524 0.787
LCNS=LCJS
F-stat 0.2095 0.1431 0.348
p-value 0.648 0.7059 0.5563
Full Com. Mean 93.8895 91.3642 92.8067 91.8027 95.8978 90.0227
Standard Deviation 36.7522 36.0272 36.4272 34.0633 31.4111 35.6621
N 2562 5646 4522 3296 6935 5136
R2 0.5139 0.4317 0.4407 0.476 0.3858 0.4362
Adjusted R 2  0.443 0.3742 0.3747 0.4014 0.3275 0.3726
Notes as in previous table.
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Table 3c: Savings income percentiles
SDG Grim
33rd Percentile 66th Percentile 100th Percentile 33rd Percentile 66th Percentile 100th Percentile
Joint Savings (LC) 3.162** 1.419 -0.3136
[1.327] [1.676] [1.181]
Reachable 11.32 -13.64
[12.49] [9.518]
Reach * Distance 7.412*** 0.5883 4.605**
[2.32] [1.455] [1.739]
Constant 37.36*** 41.78*** 40.1*** -9.342 31.76*** 41.39***
[6.352] [3.868] [2.997] [8.466] [9.418] [5.547]
Full Com. Mean 25.698 19.6684 24.6324 19.5562 18.0719 22.6544
St. Dev. 35.1322 22.8611 30.5376 27.5537 21.9806 31.161
N 875 1868 1524 1720 3397 2721
R2 0.6586 0.597 0.6239 0.6503 0.5207 0.6841
Adjusted R 2  0.5968 0.5312 0.5581 0.5888 0.4509 0.6349
Notes as in previous table.
Table 4: Defection and defection rates of Grim vs SDG, by game
Total Defection Total Defection
SDG
No Savings (LC) -0.0031
[.0061]
Private Savings (LC)
Joint Savings (LC)
SDG * No Savings (LC)
SDG * Private Savings (LC) -0.0061
[.0173]
SDG * Joint Savings (LC)
Reachable -.3104*** -.3105***
[.0764] [.077]
Reach * Distance .0255*** .0254***
[.0066] [.0067]
Constant .2936*** .2971***
[.0802] [.0821]
Full Commitment Mean 0.0095 0.0098
N 8059 8059
R2 0.4166 0.4166
Adjusted R 2  0.3477 0.3475
Notes as in previous table.
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Table 5: Response to Defection for SDG
Defection
1 Period Ago
Defection
2 Periods Ago
Defection
3 Periods Ago
Defection
4 Periods Ago
Reachable
Reach * Distance
Constant
Transfers
-6.999**
[2.805]
11.61
[8.858]
-1.707
[1.42]
74.87***
[9.607]
Transfers
-5.39*
[2.869]
14.94
[15.27]
-1.887
[1.838]
69.94***
[13.63]
Transfers
-6.579*
[3.773]
20.7,
[17.33]
-1.719
[1.918]
63.76***
[15.01]
Transfers Transfers
-10.73**
[5.075]
-8.315**
[3.727]
-6.714
[4.778]
-0.6261 0.0999
[3.355] [3.34]
17.7 -0.0368
[20.04] [18]
-0.3321 0.1502
[2.006] [2.052]
62.39*** 72.08***
[21.87] [17.7]
884 884
0.7035 0.714
0.4476 0.4638
N 1795 1500 1192
R2 0.5716 0.6113 0.6729
Adjusted R 2  0.4344 0.4529 0.4873
Notes as in previous table.
0.4476 0.4638
Table 6: Use of smoothing mechanisms for SDG
All Low Distance High Distance
Transfers Savings Transfers Savings Transfers Savings
Unconditional Conditional Unconditional Conditional Unconditional Conditional
No Savings (LC) -8.899*** -3.61 -6.603* 1.982 -11.1*** -9.512***
[1.937] [2.545] [3.796] [5.325] [2.981] [3.581]
Private Savings (LC) -11.02*** -6.988** -11.76*** -4.17 -13.53*** -12.72***
[2.23] [2.669] [3.962] [4.721] [2.984] [3.625]
Reachable 15.37** 23.06** -7.544 5.018
[7.598] [10.58] [16.03] [18.51]
Reach * Distance -2.751*** -2.697** -4.362* -0.3183 -0.1733 -1.672
[.8611] [1.153] [2.479] [3.552] [2.586] [3.878]
Constant 86.32*** 66.9*** 40.42*** 104.5*** 83.97*** 39.11*** 95.07*** 95.07*** 41.05***
[8.117] [11.01] [2.443] [8.924] [12.26] [3.814] [12.21] [13.71] [2.979]
LCNS=LCPS
F-stat 1.111 1.325 0 2.069 1.106 0 0.6468 0.6435 0
p-value 0.2945 0.2523 0 0.1534 0.2956 0 0.4229 0.4241 0
Full Commitment Mean 92.35 93.08 22.65 92.35 95.24 22.65 92.35 90.96 22.65
St. Dev. 36.31 36.6 28.63 36.31 37.94 28.63 36.31 35.19 28.63
N 3180 1938 4267 1459 936 2033 1925 1221 2354
R2 0.46 0.52 0.63 0.52 0.59 0.52 0.49 0.54 0.67
Adjusted R 2  0.36 0.37 0.57 0.39 0.42 0.44 0.37 0.36 0.62
Notes as in previous table.
Table 7: Consumption smoothing for SDG
All Low Distance High Distance
Squared Absolute Variance Standard Squared Absolute Variance Standard Squared Absolute Variance Standard
Deviation Deviation Deviation Deviation Deviation Deviation Deviation Deviation Deviation
b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se
No S 10.79*** 8.865*** 1141*** 9.249*** 4.14* 3.02 541.4 4.099 14.58*** 11.9*** 1447*** 11.41***
(LC) [1.656] [1.348] [231.5] [1.801] [2.338] [2.065] [383.5] [3.309] [2.058] [1.635] [341.6] [2.518]
Private 4.427*** 4.903*** 453* 4** 0.3669 1.385 223.6 2.344 6.717*** 6.946*** 589.9* 4.659*
S (LC) [1.622] [1.368] [234.9] [1.851] [2.606] [2.275] [393.4] [3.338] [1.895] [1.527] [330.5] [2.493]
Reach. -8.205 -6.249 -951.3 -6.921 -9.086 -8.568 -1379 -12.7
[5.203] [4.951] [649.9] [6.333] [8.529] [7.845] [1265] [11.27]
Reach. 1.122** .8942* 168** 1.17* -0.4166 -0.2858 133.2 0.6725 1.706 1.563* 320.1* 2.591*
x Dist. [.5374] [.4666] [78.06] [.6585] [1.577] [1.366] [268.5] [2.316] [1.042] [.9219] [180.6] [1.492]
Const. 39.31*** 52.24*** 3286*** 52.89*** 38.19*** 51.17*** 3383*** 55.06*** 32.86*** 46.94*** 2885** 52.82***
[6.007] [5.539] [839.8] [7.358] [5.218] [4.376] [1239] [8.987] [9.124] [8.091] [1379] [11.97]
LCNS=LCPS
F-stat 16.26 10.17 9.77 10.33 2.31 0.61 0.87 0.38 15.04 10.11 6.27 7.48
p-value 0.0001 0.0019 0.0023 0.0018 0.1321 0.4355 0.3526 0.538 0.0002 0.0019 0.0136 0.0072
FC Mean 27.01 40.91 2898 48.6 27.01 40.91 2898 48.6 27.01 40.91 2898 48.6
St. Dev. 37.32 32.05 2641 23.19 37.32 32.05 2641 23.19 37.32 32.05 2641 23.19
N 12752 12752 1848 1848 5939 5939 860 860 7137 7137 1040 1040
R2 0.27 0.29 0.56 0.58 0.32 0.34 0.66 0.68 0.39 0.33 0.66 0.69
Adj. R 2  0.23 0.25 0.31 0.35 0.26 0.29 0.24 0.28 0.24 0.28 0.28 0.33
Notes as in previous table.
Table 8a: Consumption Absolute Deviation by income percentiles
All - Percentile Low Distance- Percentile High Distance - Percentile
33rd 66th 100th 33rd 66th 100th 33rd 66th 100th
No Savings (LC) 15.53*** 4.004** 14.5*** 17.43*** -7.587** 15.96*** 18.05*** 11.2*** 15.51***
[3.163] [1.907] [2.439] [5.996] [3.128] [4.663] [4.898] [3.188] [3.18]
Private Savings (LC) 9.968*** 4.129** 5.564** 7.607 -1.864 7.051 5.954 5.302** 10.87***
[3.744] [1.77] [2.522] [7.131] [2.875] [5.058] [4.16] [2.386] [3.165]
Reachable -45.48*** -6.033 16.38* -42.07** 10.78 20.55
[13.34] [10] [8.812] [16.87] [8.754] [18.38]
Reach * Distance 0.9573 -0.3695 1.818 -11.77 1.628 -0.4731 6.083* -2.24 2.158
[2.126] [.7243] [1.316] [8.698] [2.316] [3.824] [3.62] [1.65] [2.505]
Constant 76.75*** 53.67*** 21.75** 92.03*** 53.64*** 39.52*** 41.48*** 54.79*** 27.69**
[14.84] [10.95] [8.823] [32.92] [7.951] [12.2] [8.711] [6.74] [12.48]
LCNS=LCPS
F-stat 3.26 0.01 14.3 3.92 3.54 4.86 5.36 5.68 3.19
p-value 0.0743 0.9428 0.0003 0.0511 0.0632 0.0298 0.0226 0.0188 0.077
Full Commitment Mean 39.75 40.86 40.78 39.44 39.16 41.92 39.29 40.82 39.48
St. Dev. 31.23 31.82 31.75 31.75 31.27 31.00 30.30 31.38 31.15
N 2562 5646 4522 1182 2582 2153 1835 3483 2803
R2 0.47 0.35 0.37 0.53 0.37 0.41 0.43 0.40 0.41
Adjusted R 2  0.39 0.28 0.30 0.45 0.29 0.32 0.35 0.32 0.33
Notes as in previous table.
Table 8b: Consumption Variance by income percentiles
All - Percentile Low Distance- Percentile High Distance - Percentile
33rd 66th 100th 33rd 66th 100th 33rd 66th 100th
No Savings (LC) 2024* 561.6 1920*** 2607** -878.1 2457* 1827 1331* 1859*
[1103] [405.2] [654.1] [1111] [803] [1401] [1544] [727.9] [995.8]
Private Savings (LC) 1127 359.2 802.4 1430 -464.4 1313 740.5 525.5 1293
[1269] [382.7] [677.8] [1486] [789.6] [1584] [1303] [558.9] [1197]
Reachable -5005 -582.3 1252 -4879 1332 1856
[4229] [1884] [1966] [5883] [2031] [4860]
Reach * Distance 203.4 -21.4 313 -253.2 316.8 30.51 624 -196 374.5
[757.3] [148.5] [313.5] [2323] [572.3] [1258] [1347] [408.4] [664.7]
Constant 5418 3660* 2.639 2120 3691 3838 3868 3516** -2376
[5227] [2141] [2341] [7337] [3418] [3729] [2987] [1625] [3292]
LCNS=LCPS
F-stat 0.44 0.27 2.86 1.25 0.22 0.85 0.41 1.78 0.47
p-value 0.507 0.604 0.0937 0.266 0.6428 0.3581 0.5253 0.1853 0.4936
Full Commitment Mean 2677.91 3052.37 2830.11 2566.81 2803.18 2847.8 2682.07 3018.85 2738.32
St. Dev. 2387.62 2941.5 2274.67 2320.85 2525.7 2275.41 2373 2961.24 2297.32
N 376 813 656 173 372 312 274 506 412
R2 0.90 0.77 0.77 0.85 0.85 0.87 0.89 0.84 0.86
Adjusted R2  0.21 0.36 0.15 0.28 0.28 0.12 0.22 0.36 0.21
Notes as in previous table.
Table 8c: Transfers, by income percentiles for SDG
All - Percentile Low Distance- Percentile High Distance - Percentile
33rd 66th 100th 33rd 66th 100th 33rd 66th 100th
No Savings (LC) -20.14*** -2.395 -13.25*** 8.281 9.969** -16.97*** -22.04*** -12.89*** -11.59***
[5.562] [1.977] [2.685] [10.92] [4.287] [5.629] [5.334] [3.282] [3.949]
Private Savings (LC) -19.05*** -8.352*** -12.62*** 17.45 -4.67 -16.38*** -12.75*** -11.56*** -16.43***
[4.921] [1.825] [3.139] [12.18] [3.643] [5.682] [4.713] [2.637] [3.902]
Reachable 33.56** 3.76 -19.65* 9.329 -30.97*** -19.41
[14.93] [12.73] [10.72] [17.14] [9.383] [19.29]
Reach * Distance 0.2191 -0.8215 -3.543** 18.01** -6.182** -2.335 0.287 4.463*** -2.208
[2.277] [.9068] [1.44] [8.227] [3.007] [4.772] [3.877] [1.646] [3.122]
Constant 68.43*** 88.31*** 128.4*** -29.46 89.95*** 83.15*** 96.04*** 82.74*** 99.69***
[16.44] [14.02] [10.84] [37.04] [9.36] [14.89] [9.094] [7.873] [12.65]
LCNS=LCPS
F-stat 0.07 11.09 0.06 1.53 17.64 0.02 3.6 0.26 1.95
p-value 0.793 0.0012 0.8122 0.2192 0.0001 0.8944 0.0607 0.6117 0.1658
Full Commitment Mean 93.89 91.36 92.81 95.27 94.51 93.63 91.13 89.34 90.92
St. Dev. 36.75 36.03 36.43 37.92 36.22 38.91 34.79 35.00 34.07
N 2562 5646 4522 1182 2582 2153 1835 3483 2803
R2 0.51 0.43 0.44 0.58 0.45 0.50 0.48 0.47 0.46
Adjusted R2  0.44 0.37 0.37 0.50 0.38 0.43 0.41 0.41 0.38
Notes as in previous table.
3.A Appendix: Networks
3.A.1 Introduction
Here we introduce basic social network terminology.1 2 A graph or network, F, is defined as a pair of
a set of vertices, V and edges E, F := (V, E). We represent F by its adjacency matrix A := A (F),
where Ai = 1 {ij E E}. However, as our data depicts connections on multiple levels (friendship,
family, coworkers, borrowing/lending relationships, etc.), we begin with {Fr}R,, where R is a set
of relationships.
Specifically, in our survey, we have the following connections between vertices: (1) Visitors
who come to the household, (2) Households that a person visits, (3) Relatives, (4) Non-relatives,
(5) Medical aid, (6) Temple company, (7) Borrows material goods, (8) Lends material goods, (9)
Borrows money, (10) Lends money, (11) Whom the person gives advice to, (12) Whom the person
asks for advice, and (13) Whom the person identifies as a local leader.
Taking this literally we have RI = 13 and therefore while A {0, 1}, Aij E {0, 1}13. In
order to deal with this excess of information, we can consider restricted graphs where we look at
networks built upon particular types of links. Alternatively, we can weight the edges via some
criterion function which we minimize to get "optimal weights" and get one relationship. 13
One simple way to collapse the information is to create the "all" network. Here we define
Iol := (V, Eall) where
Z3 fi A
r G {1,..12}
We omit AP, the entry for the local leader network, since this is not really a social network but
rather a network built upon people identifying their local leader. Henceforth, we drop the all
superscript and simply refer to A := A (rail) as the social network of the village.
3.A.2 Relevant Statistics
Recall that we want to include measures of an individual's prominence in a village as well as the
closeness between partners. Therefore we introduce degree, betweenness centrality, eigenvector
centrality, and geodesic distance.
The degree of a vertex is the number of edges emanating from that vertex
di (F) := # {j : Aij > 0} = 1NAei.
Associated with degree is the degree distribution. This is simply the empirical cumulative dis-
tribution function of the degree function. However, in an abuse of terminology, the distribution
typically refers to a density function denoted as f (d), which describes the fraction of nodes that
have degree d.
" The discussion follows Jackson (2008).
13This would involve generating an optimal weighting function
w (Reu) E (0, 1]
which would then give us the weighted, undirected graph
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The betweenness centrality of a node measures how well situated a node is in terms of the paths
that it lies on. We let gi (kj) denote the number of geodesics connecting k and j that go through
i. Then let g (kj) denote the total number of geodesics connecting k and j. The idea is to study
the ratio of these to get a sense of how critical i is to connecting k and j. To that end, we define
betweenness centrality as
B-- "kj) -2- gi (kj)
(n-1)(n-2) (n - 1) (n - 2) g (kj)~
kfj : if{k,j} 2 kfj : if{k,j}
Eigenvector centrality is a recursive measure which defines the importance of a node as a function
of the importance of its neighbors. S (F) denote the eigenvector centrality of the graph F. That
is, it is the vector of eigenvector centralities for each of the N nodes in the graph. We will define
eigenvector centrality as the eigenvector associated with the eigenvalue that is the spectral radius
of A:
AS = AA s.t. A = max o- (A).
This can easily be rationalized in the following setting. We can construct a recursive metric as
follows. Let us define the centrality of i to be a positive metric which is proportional to the sum
of the centrality of i's neighbors
j:1{ijEE}
Then we can write Vi C V
Ei c E = 1{ij EE} ESj= Ajj.
j:1{ijEE} jEV jEV
This completes the demonstration since E ocAS implying that S is an eigenvector. But for Si > 0
Vi E V, the eigenvector must be associated with the maximal eigenvalue.
Reachability and geodesic distance are self-explanatory. We define geodesic distance as
S(ij) = min IAk] > 0
kEN L J i3
and reachability as
R- = 1 {y (ij) < 0}.
Accordingly we can define the reachability matrix R = [Rij] and the distance matrix D = [y (ij)].
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